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Abstract 
This thesis investigates in depth the implementation of family planning regulations in 
China at the grassroots level with a focus on the period from the 1990s to the end of 
the 2000s, and the social environment in which such implementation takes place. The 
main evidence sources were collected during 5 months of fieldwork, and include 
close observation, in-depth interviews, questionnaires, archival records (secondary 
and official data), statistical data, and internal reports. Since the 1990s, China has 
experienced rapid economic development and has also introduced a new democratic 
system into the village: the village committee election. Thus in addition to the 
resistance caused by the traditional reproductive culture, these new factors also 
present themselves as obstacles to the smooth implementation of the family planning 
regulations. By adopting political science institutionalism theory and a socio-legal 
research method, this research aims to analyse the factors influencing the grassroots 
level officials’ implementation in a broad social environment. Following an 
explanation of the formal and informal organizational settings of the town family 
planning agency, this thesis also explores the town family planning officials’ degree 
of autonomy in implementation and the criteria they apply to their own decision-
making. This thesis argues that family planning implementation in the grassroots 
rural China has been influenced by the following factors: the formal and informal 
organizational structures, new democratic system influences, the economic 
development level, employment conditions, culture and convention, the relationships 
among various interest groups, and family planning officials’ understandings of their 
work, as well as the imperfect legal environment. All these factors interact with each 
other to bring about the complexities and discrepancies in implementation.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
In the last few centuries, there has been a growing preoccupation with human life. 
More and more aspects of human life became objectives of the modern state, such as 
health, welfare, environment and reproduction. In Western countries, with their 
developmental concerns shifting from family control to reproductive health, 
reproductive rights have been widely defined as an autonomous right.1 However, 
contrary opinions emerged from developing and undeveloped countries. In these 
countries, how to improve living conditions for their large sized populations was the 
first task of their states. Autonomous reproductive rights were thought to make no 
sense for those people who do not have enough food to feed themselves, nor 
appropriate living space, or any chance of education. 
In China, although famine had been largely averted since the liberalisation of the 
PRC in 1949 (despite notable exceptions2), the provision of textile and other light 
industries, and the nutritional needs of the populace were still barely met until the 
1980s. The phenomenon of three generations comprising 6-7 people (two 
grandparents, 1 or 2 young couples and their children) living in a 2-3 room flat was 
very common until the end of the 1990s. There were severe traffic problems also 
experienced throughout China, especially during public holidays. 
Thus, there has been a diverse range of attitudes to population policy in developed 
and undeveloped countries since the Second World War. The European countries 
worried about how replacement rates could be guaranteed; while the problem in Asia 
                                                
1 See Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy (Oxford: Hart, 2001). 
2 Except those catastrophic years of 1959, 1960, and 1961. 
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- China and India especially - was how geometrical growth could be reined back. 
Examples of these contrary stances are the promotion of reproduction in France and 
the limiting policy in China. 
In China, after the first census in 1953, the government realized that the rapid 
increase in population would cause a supply shortage in the long term, which would 
be a heavy burden to China.3  However, with the interruption of the Cultural 
Revolution, it wasn’t until the end of the 1970s that overpopulation was considered 
the biggest obstacle to economic development. It was believed that a lower 
population would bring in speedier economic development .4 As a result, a ‘one-
child’ population policy was launched in 1979. This policy was aimed as being part 
of an integrated policy for modernization.5  
In order to influence Chinese people’s reproductive behaviour in practice, three steps 
have been taken by the Chinese government. They are: the making and evolving of 
the PRC’s population regulations; the creation of a family planning administration 
system with its own rules; and enforcement of those rules on the persons or 
institutions they seek to influence or control.6 The last two stages are as vital as the 
                                                
3 Zhou Enlai, "The Principal Task of the First Five Years Constructive Plan （Diyige Wunian Jianshe 
Jihua De Jiben Renwu 第一个五年建设的基本任务）," in A Whole Series of China's Family 
Planning (Zhongguo Jihua Shengyu Quanshu 中国计划生育全书), ed. Peiyun Peng (Beijing: China 
Population Press (zhongguo renkou chubanshe 中国人口出版社), 1977). 
4 See, Thomas Robert. Malthus, An Essay on Population (1798 Version and 1803 Edited Version) 
(London: Routledge, 1996); Jian Song and Jing-Yuan Yu, Population System Control (New York: 
Springer-Verlag, 1988). 
5 China’s one-child policy has been criticized by many western scholars as violating human rights. 
However the morality or quality of China’s population policies is not the topic of this thesis. This 
thesis investigates only but how China’s population policies have been implemented, and how the real 
implementation compares with the aims set out by the policies, irrespective of whether those aims are 
good or bad. 
6  Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). p.96. 
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first one, and are the practical stages that exert their influence on reality. This thesis 
concerns primarily these two practical stages. 
Because of China’s traditional culture of pronatalism and son-preference, the 
implementation of this rule in practice highlights some of the fundamental and 
crucial issues in law implementation in general more than any other legislative 
initiative in China. This research is an attempt to provide an in-depth understanding 
of how and to what extent the population rules7 have been disseminated to society by 
these local agencies, with a particular focus on the 1990s and 2000s. 
In 2013, China’s one-child policy was relaxed: now all couples are allowed to have a 
second child if one parent is an only child. Following this central government 
guideline, most provinces revised their provincial regulations concerning the 
childbearing numbers in 2014. Meanwhile, following the reorganization of the 
family planning institutions at the state level in 2013, the provincial family planning 
organizations have merged with the health department in most provinces, while 
sublevel reorganizations have not yet started in many regions at the time of writing, 
the end of 2014. As this change occurred during the later stage of this research, the 
contents of this thesis focus mainly on the pre-2013 regulations. Although some of 
this research will soon cease to be up-to-date, particularly parts of chapter 3, which 
discusses the contents of the family planning regulations, and chapter 4, which 
examines the administrative structure of the family planning agencies, the other 
parts’ analysis could still reflect the current situation, because the practical work 
done by the grassroots level family planning officials still remains the same.  
                                                
7 In this thesis, the family planning regulations refer to all the family planning rules and legislation. 
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1.2 Research Method 
China’s population regulations are decentralized rules that differ from province to 
province, and also vary between urban and rural areas. It is impossible for any single 
project to provide a whole picture to cover all areas of China. Therefore, this study 
will only focus on the practical implementation of the PRC’s population rules and 
law in a selected rural area of China.  
In China, the population rules are decentralised. Because of China’s vast 
geographical space, unprecedented social change, uneven economic development, 
diverse cultural milieu, and unique ideological evolution, it is hard for the central 
government to formulate a concrete and centralised population regime, which is 
applicable to all local circumstances. Therefore, in order to increase flexibility but 
keep within the framework of central government’s general direction, the 
province/municipality level is authorised to make its own local population rules to 
match the local conditions. The rules are then delivered down to the prefectural level, 
then the county level, and then finally the town/township/district level.8  
In addition to the complexity of the decentralised rules, the PRC’s population 
regulations also vary between rural and urban areas. Generally speaking, there has 
been a one-child policy in urban areas and a one and a half-child policy in rural areas 
- rural families could have a second child if their first child was female.  
In urban areas, the communities are mainly organised by the people’s work unit 
system—danwei. During the 1980s and the 1990s---the formulation periods of the 
PRC’s main population law and rules---these danwei provided not only a secure job 
                                                
8 Village is not considered as a formal part of local government.  There is more discussion on this in 
later parts. 
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and pension, but also children’s education, housing benefit, etc. Therefore, 
implementation in the urban areas has been heavily reliant on the cooperation 
between the district and street level family planning officers and these danwei.9  In 
rural areas, the communities are organised into villages. The family planning 
regulations are mainly implemented by the town level family planning officers with 
the assistance of village cadres.  
However, since the 1990s, the decline of the danwei system has created new 
challenges for urban family planning regulations.  Thus, in addition to the resistance 
caused by the traditional Chinese reproductive culture: ‘The growth of the private 
sector, the slow revival of a labour market, increasing social mobility and new 
personal freedom,’10 which all caused further resistance to the implementation. 
1.3 Literature Review 
Although much attention has been focused on the PRC’s population regulations, 
most studies were carried out during the 1980s and the 1990s, and mainly focused on 
the first stage of law making and its initial evolution. Little is known about the 
current practical situation concerning the enforcement of the PRC’s population 
regulations at the grassroots level. This research is an effort to fill that void. 
                                                
9 Research on policy and implementation in China’s rural areas. See Ashwani Saith, "Economic 
Incentives for the One-Child Family in Rural China," The China Quarterly 87 (September) (1981); 
Mei Ling Hsu, "Growth and Control of Population in China: The Urban-Rural Contrast," Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers 75, no. 2 (1985); Elisabeth J. Croll, Delia Davin, and Penny 
Kane, China's One-Child Family Policy (London: Macmillan, 1985); Tyrene White, "Implementing 
the 'One-Child-Per-Couple' Population Program in Rural China: National Goals and Local Politics," in 
Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China, ed. David M Lampton (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1987); Susan Greenhalgh, "Controlling Births and Bodies in Village China," American 
Ethnologist 21, no. 1 (1994). 
Urban areas, See Hsu, "Growth and Control of Population in China: The Urban-Rural Contrast."; 
Cecilia Nathansen Milwertz, Accepting Population Control: Urban Chinese Women and the One-
Child Family Policy, vol. 74, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Monograph (Richmond: Curzon, 
1997). 
10 Thomas Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic 
Development (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003). p.331. 
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Since the end of the 1970s, extensive research has been carried out into the PRC’s 
Population and Family Planning Law and Policy. This research has provided 
valuable knowledge of the origins and development of the PRC’s Population and 
Family Planning regulations. Demographers contributed to the formulation and 
evolution of the PRC’s population rules.11 In addition, the social consequences of 
these rules have also been examined by anthropologists and feminists,12 such as the 
conflicts between the Production Responsibility System and the early stage birth 
                                                
11 See, Lynn C. Landman, "China's One-Child Drive: Another Long March," International Family 
Planning Perspectives 7, no. 3 (Sep.) (1981); Saith, "Economic Incentives for the One-Child Family 
in Rural China."; Croll, Davin, and Kane, China's One-Child Family Policy; Judith Banister, China's 
Changing Population (Stanford: Stanford University, 1987); H. Yuan Tien, China's Strategic 
Demographic Initiative (New York: Praeger, 1991); Gabe T. Wang, China's Population: Problems, 
Thoughts and Policies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Susan Greenhalgh and John Bongaarts, Fertility 
Policy in China: Future Options (New York: Population Council, Center for Policy Studies, 1986); 
Susan Greenhalgh, The Evolution of the One-Child Policy in Shaanxi Province,1979-88 (New York: 
Population Council, 1989a); Just One Child: Science and Policy in Deng's China (Berkeley, Calif: 
University of California Press, 2008); Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population 
Policy and Demographic Development; Susan Greenhalgh and Edwin A Winckler, Governing China's 
Population: From Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics (Stanford; Calif: Stanford University Press, 
2005); Tyrene White, China's Longest Campaign: Birth Planning in the People's Republic, 1949-2005 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
12 Some of the better research in this area includes. See Siu-Lun Wong, "Consequences of China's 
New Population Policy," The China Quarterly 98, no. June (1984); Erika Platte, "China's Fertility 
Transition: The One-Child Campaign," Pacific Affairs 57, no. 4 (Winter) (1984-1985); Croll, Davin, 
and Kane, China's One-Child Family Policy; Susan Greenhalgh and Jone Bongaarts, "An Alternative 
to the One-Child Policy in China," Population and Development Review 11, no. 4 (1985); Marlyn 
Dalsimer and Laurie Nisonoff, "The Implications of the New Agricultural and One-Child Family 
Policies for Rural Chinese Women," Feminist Studies 13, no. 3 (Fall) (1987); Penny Kane, The 
Second Billion: Population and Family Planning in China (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987); T Hull, 
"Recent Trends in Sex Ratios at Birth in China," Population and Development Review 16, no. 1 
(1990); Dudley L. Poston and David Yaukey, The Population of Modern China, The Plenum Series 
on Demographic Methods and Population Analysis (New York: Plenum Press, 1992); Yi Zeng et al., 
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control policy;13 and the population policy’s effects on Chinese women and girls 
because it embodies gender inequality and gender disparity, and puts women’s 
bodies and psychologicalsocial well-being at risk due to the mandatory 
implementation method, as well as leading to an unbalanced sex ratio and female 
infanticide, abandonment and discrimination.14 Other effects of the population policy 
have been labour shortages,15 a change in age distribution,16 a widening of the rural-
urban divide,17 unplanned birth,18 and changes to the personality of the single-child, 
the family structure and traditional Chinese culture. Furthermore, social scientists 
and political scientists have also discussed the political dynamics of the PRC’s 
population rules.19 
                                                
13 See Lee-Jay Cho, "Population Dynamics and Policy in the Peoples's Republic of China," Annals of 
the America Academy of Political and Social Science 476, China in Transition (Nov.) (1984); Judith 
Banister, "Population Policy and Trends in China, 1978-83," The China Quarterly, no. 100 (Dec) 
(1984); China's Changing Population. 
14 See Dalsimer and Nisonoff, "The Implications of the New Agricultural and One-Child Family 
Policies for Rural Chinese Women."; Greenhalgh and Winckler, Governing China's Population: From 
Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics. 
15 See Leo F. Goodstadt, "China's One-Child Family: Policy and Public Response," Population and 
Development Review 8, no. 1 (Mar.) (1982). 
16 Ibid. 
17  See Greenhalgh and Winckler, Governing China's Population: From Leninist to Neoliberal 
Biopolitics. 
18 See Greenhalgh, "Planned Births, Unplanned Persons: "Population" in the Making of Chinese 
Modernity. 
19  See Tyrene White, "Post-Revolutionary Mobilization in China: The One-Child Policy 
Reconsidered," World Politics 43, no. 1 (1990); "Birth Planning between Plan and Market: The 
Impact of Reform on China's One-Child Policy," in China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: the 
Problems of Reforms, Modernization, and Independence [Study Papers Submitted to the Joint 
Economic Committee, Congress of the United States] (Washing DC1991); "Two Kinds of Production: 
The Evolution of China's Family Planning Policy in the 1980s," Population and Development Review 
20, Supplement: The New Politics of Population: Conflict and Consensus in Family Planning (1994a); 
"The Origins of China's Birth Planning Policy," in Engendering China: Woman, Culture, and the 
State, ed. Christina K. Gilmartin, et al. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994b); Edwin A. 
Winckler, "Chinese Reproductive Policy at the Turn of the Millennium: Dynamic Stability," 
Population and Development Review 28, no. 3 (Sep.) (2002); Greenhalgh and Winckler, Governing 
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Political Dimensions of Population Policies and Programs, with Special Reference to China (New 
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Policy," Population and Development Review 29, no. 2 (June) (2003b); "Missile Science, Population 
Science: The Origins of China's One-Child Policy."; Just One Child: Science and Policy in Deng's 
China. 
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The vital part played by the implementation of the PRC’s population rules has also 
been widely studied. Using translated Chinese press and radio reports, interviews 
with Chinese officials or analysis of official Chinese reports on fertility, most 
research findings concentrate on the implementation methods at the macro state or 
provincial level rather than describe the actual process.20 These works have found 
that some factors are related to the implementation of China’s population rules: the 
influence of the political system; the coercive method of birth planning and 
economic incentives; the Household Registration system as a unique system of 
government control; improved health care; education; a “dual contract” system 
linking family planning with agricultural production; mobilization campaigns; and/or 
the family planning administrative systems. However, without empirical data, most 
of this research can only provide general pictures rather than precise accounts. 
A small amount of research carried out in-depth observation studies in isolated local 
areas at street level in urban areas and at village and county level in rural areas. 
Regarding the urban areas, Milwertz published Accepting Population Control in 
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"Planned Fertility of One-Child/One-Child Policy in the People's Republic of China," Journal of 
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199721 based on fieldwork undertaken during 1984-87 in Beijing and Shenyang. By 
using ‘everyday life theories’, Milwertz elaborated how urban city district one-child 
mothers experienced policy implementation, and how family planning workers 
interacted with these mothers, as well as the very meaning of ‘acceptance’. 
Regarding the rural areas, Kaufman et al. did their fieldwork in four rural counties of 
Fujian and Heilongjiang in 1987.22 They found out that the local officials (county 
level family planning officials) exercised certain degrees of discretion on policy 
interpretation depending on the local economic situation. They concluded that 
economic and political changes did influence (weaken) the capacity and desire of 
local officials to enforce the population policy.  
Susan Greenhalgh later published several papers based on her fieldwork in Shaanxi 
villages. In her 1993 work, 23 she noticed the discretion of the village cadres, when 
they were the enforcement agency, in the enforcement of population policy. She 
ascertained that economic reform has an influence on the village cadres’ behaviour 
and influences the implementation outcome. Finally, she concluded that the village 
cadres not only implemented the policy in an informal way but also influenced 
formal law making by communicating to the upper levels. In her 1994 work,24 co-
authored with Zhu and Li, based on the same fieldwork location of Shaanxi, she 
confirmed the Kaufman et al. finding that political pressure is the most important 
factor in successful population policy implementation in rural China. Later on, she 
                                                
21 Milwertz, Accepting Population Control: Urban Chinese Women and the One-Child Family Policy, 
74. 
22 See Joan Kaufman et al., "Family Planning Policy and Practice in China: A Study of Four Rural 
Counties," Population and Development Review 15, no. 4 (1989). 
23 See Susan Greenhalgh, "The Peasantization of Population Policy in Shaanxi: Cadre Mediation of 
the State-Society Conflict," in Chinese Families in the Post-Mao Era, ed. Deborah Davis and Stevan 
Harrell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
24 See Greenhalgh, Zhu, and Li, "Restraining Population Growth in Three Chinese Villages: 1988-93." 
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modified her opinion of who was the implementing agency. In her work “Controlling 
Births and Bodies in Village China”,25 she presented the rural village women not 
only as victims of the population policy but also as implementing agents in practice. 
Based on their fieldwork in Shaanxi and Guangdong respectively, Susan Greenhalgh 
(1993)26 and Tyrene White (1987, 2006) 27 both held the opinion that the village level 
officers were the grassroots level cadres who enforced the state policy among the 
rural populace.  
 ‘The village cadres are firmly rooted in local society; they live in the 
village, they are linked to villagers by kin and friendship ties, and their 
livelihood is drawn from village resources…. [Therefore,] [During the 
period from 1950s to 1980s] when state rules have challenged profoundly 
held local values or threatened peasant economic security, village cadres 
have often tried and sometimes succeeded in bending those rules to the 
advantage of their relatives and neighbours.’28 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the above review. First of all, this literature 
provided a detailed analysis of the implementation process at the local county and 
village levels, which is a valuable supplement to the general studies of population 
policy implementation. However, the literature also has some critical weaknesses. 
Principally, most of these works were carried out during the 1980s, more than 20 
years ago. Since China’s transformation from a Planned Economy to a Market 
Economy at the beginning of the 1990s and the introduction of more democracy in 
the political system, such as the village committee elections, the politics, culture and 
economics of China have changed greatly and widely compared to what Greenhalgh 
                                                
25 See Greenhalgh, "Controlling Births and Bodies in Village China." 
26 "The Peasantization of Population Policy in Shaanxi: Cadre Mediation of the State-Society 
Conflict." p.220. 
27 White, China's Longest Campaign: Birth Planning in the People's Republic, 1949-2005. 85. It was 
argued that the village level cadres played a crucial role on the success of the birth planning campaign 
by providing penetration and surveillance, and monitoring all village childbearing-age women. 
28 Greenhalgh, "The Peasantization of Population Policy in Shaanxi: Cadre Mediation of the State-
Society Conflict." p.220. 
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and Kaufman saw at that time. It is important to have an updated work to reflect the 
current situation.  
Secondly, both Susan Greenhalgh and Tyrene White were of the opinion that the 
village level cadres, the village women leaders and the village committee members 
were the actual enforcement officers in rural China. However, my argument is that 
the grassroots level is really the township/town level rather than the village level. 
Neither of these two studies provided a systematic investigation of China’s 
hierarchical government system and family planning administrative system. 
Therefore, it is difficult to understand why village level cadres might not be the 
grassroots level officials even though they were involved in most law and policy 
enforcement. At the village level, the family planning cadres (cun ji jihuashengyu 
zhuanguanyuan29 村级计划生育专管员) are directly administered by the Family 
Planning Office at the town level. Firstly, as Tyrene found, the main function of 
village cadres in terms of family planning enforcement is providing penetration and 
surveillance. These functions are vital to the successful enforcement of family 
planning but are only part of what caused compliance. The main work is carried by 
the township/town level family planning officers. Secondly, the village cadres do not 
have the authority to carry out enforcement without orders from the township/town 
level government or family planning office. Hence it is the township/town family 
planning office which is the agency authorized to ensure compliance with and 
enforcement of family planning. In conclusion, the village level family planning 
                                                
29 In this thesis, the Pinyin (拼音) Romanization system has been used in addition to Simplified 
Chinese characters. The Pinyin system is different from the Wade-Giles system (used in Taiwanese). 
Chinese names are cited in Pinyin but retain their Chinese order: the family name comes first, 
followed by the given name. 
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cadres are not the grassroots level agencies but rather are better described as 
assistants of the township/town level agencies. 
Thirdly, Kaufman’s and especially Greenhalgh’s work did point out that the local 
cadres’ discretion regarding enforcement was influenced by economic and political 
factors. Milwertz established the interrelationships between the local family planning 
worker and the local women. However, in addition to the local women, local 
families, and local family planning officers, some other actors have also been 
involved in the implementation, such as police registration officials, hospital staff, 
other professionals and the media. In addition, economics, politics and culture are 
only part of the factors which have influenced the decision making of the local 
cadres. More broad factors, such as social norms, values, relationships, power 
structures, and standard operating systems have all influenced the decision making of 
the local cadres and thus in turn the enforcement outcomes. Therefore, a systematic 
study is needed to understand the institutional environment in which the practical 
policy enforcing takes place. 
In conclusion, previous studies have mainly focused on policy implementation 
during the 1980s and the 1990s, and they have underestimated other institutional 
environments by overemphasizing the influence of economics and politics. Some 
important institutional factors were missing, namely the structure of the organisations 
and the other interest groups.30 The structure of the organisations, including the intra-
government and inter-government relationships of the family planning organisations, 
not only determines these enforcement agencies’ officials interests and pushes them 
                                                
30  Scharping provided a description of the organisations involved in the PRC’s population 
enforcement network, such as: CPC, family planning commissions, other government organs, medical 
network, academic bodies and mass organizations. However, his work did not elaborate on how these 
organisations interact with each other during the implementation process. See Scharping, Birth 
Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development. 
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in a certain direction, but also determines the fundamental decisions of the power 
structure in the decision making process. Without this structural analysis, it is hard to 
understand the officials’ behaviour during implementation and what influences their 
decision-making. It is also important to emphasise that the previous studies are over 
20 years old. During these 20 years, many things have changed, for example, 
professional opinion on population control, reproductive culture, as well as a newly 
developed economic and democratic environment. Therefore, this study of the 
population policy implementation environment at the grassroots level and the 
discretion of local cadres will contribute to a more systematic and updated 
understanding of China’s current state, society and family relationships. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
This study has a number of specific objectives. They are: 
(1) To identify and understand China’s family planning organizational structure and 
the grassroots level family planning officials work environment. 
(2) To identify and understand what are the institutional environment factors that 
have influenced the family planning implementation and how these factors interact 
and interplay with each other.  
(3) To identify and understand the level and nature of the grassroots officials’ 
discretion and autonomy over the family planning regulations implementation. 
1.5 Conceptual Framework 
This thesis will use institutional theory as the analytical framework to analyse the 
implementation environment of the PRC’s family planning regulations. Institutional 
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theory explains the impact of institutions upon the policy process, with an emphasis 
that implementation processes need to be placed in their constitutional and 
institutional contexts. However, as some scholars pointed out, institutional theory is 
an empirically based approach involving systematic analysis of the decision-making 
environment rather than a theory as such.31  
Various definitions of institutions have been given by sociological and organizational 
theorists. More recently, the ‘new’ institutionalism is in vogue in political science, 
sociology and economics. This study will mainly focus on the political science 
institutionalism approach. This method removes the focus from the formal 
institutions and puts it on to the individual actors within the political structure and 
their relationships with other interest groups.32 
The ‘old’ institutionalism was mainly concerned with studies of administrative, legal 
and political structures.33 In the 1950s and early 1960s, this approach was opposed 
by advocates of behaviouralism. They criticized the old institutionalism because by 
focusing just on the formal structures it did not explain what was really happening. 
They argued that informal distributions of power, attitudes and political behaviour 
had more influence and that they were more important for explaining and 
understanding the politics and the political outcomes. In conclusion, institutional 
theory can be defined as an examination of a policy process, which includes both the 
                                                
31 G.John Ikenberry, ed. Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic 
Policy, The State and American Foreign Economic Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1988). p.241. 
32  Julia Black, "New Institutionalism and Naturalism in Socio-Legal Analysis: Institutionalist 
Approaches to Regulatory Decision Making," Law & Policy 19, no. 1 (1997). p.58. 
33  Sven. Steinmo, Kathleen Ann. Thelen, and Frank Hoover Longstreth, Structuring Politics: 
Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
p.3. 
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process of the decision making and decision behaviour.34  These processes are 
influenced by an institutional environment where there are established formal 
organizations and sets of norms, values, relationships, power structures and ‘standard 
operating procedures’.35 In addition, the focus of this theory should not simply be 
upon the institutions of government, but also other interest groups.  
With regards to this research, the approach of political science institutionalism helps 
to build up a complete picture of the family planning regulations implementation 
process in a broader socio-legal environment at the grassroots level in rural China. In 
the legal environment, even for those rules that seem to be precise, the officials are 
still responsible for handling complex individual cases and for deciding what the law 
requires and how to achieve it. During this process, the officials make use of 
discretion for the enforcement of the rules. However, this legal regime and this 
process of implementation happen in a social context too; therefore the fuller social 
environment should also be considered. Thus, by adopting this theory, the present 
research will analyse how the socio-legal environment has influenced the 
implementation of the family planning policies in practice. Such influences on the 
family planning office include the culture, the economic development level, the 
organisational structure (not only the family planning agency but also the inter-
relationships and intra-relationships between the family planning agency and other 
                                                
34 See Keith Hawkins, ed. The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives from Law and Social Science, 
The Uses of Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); "On Legal Decision-Making," Washington 
and Lee Law Review 43, no. 1161-1242 (1986). D.J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study 
of Official Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
35  See Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Analysis. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. Dimaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in 
Organisational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Paul J. Dimaggio and W.W. 
Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in 
Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48, no. 1 (1983); John W. Meyer and Brian 
Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," American 
Journal of Sociology 83 (1977). W.R. Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests, 3rd 
ed. (London: Sage Publications, 2008). 
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government organisations), the organisational setting (for example, employment 
conditions), and politics (the ‘democratic’ election of village committees) and the 
relationships among the various interest groups (the policy makers of state and 
provincial/municipalities governments, the policy implementation agency of town 
level family planning offices and village cadres, and the policy objectives of 
families, local work units, hospital and police station). All these factors interact and 
interplay with each other and bring about the complexities and discrepancies in 
China’s regulations implementation. In addition, the author also attempts to argue 
that these institutions created by the PRC’s family planning policy during the past 30 
years may serve as a barrier to further policy changes and the development of the 
official family planning organisations at a later point.36 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis has 9 chapters in total, including the present one. 
Chapter 2 sets out the methodology and methods used in this study. Using socio-
legal research methods, an in-depth case study is carried out to unfold the process 
that shaped the grassroots level officials’ autonomy in family planning 
implementation. 
Chapter 3 serves as a background for the whole thesis. It traces the evolution of 
China’s family planning campaign from the 1950s and the origin of the one-child 
policy. In addition, this chapter also details the family planning regulations' allowed 
number of births for each province. This chapter gives an overall picture of China’s 
                                                
36 See T. Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States: Future Possibilites in Historical Perspective 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
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family planning regulations. The data in this chapter was updated in 2008, which is 
the last version for most provinces before 2013’s new revision.  
The main analysis develops through Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. These four chapters 
discuss the factors that have influenced the town family planning officials’ decision-
making, i.e. the organisational structure (not only the family planning agency but 
also the inter-relationships and intra-relationships between the family planning 
agency and other government organisations), the organisational setting (for example, 
employment conditions), the politics (the ‘democratic’ election of village 
committees), the economic development level, culture, and the relationships among 
the various interest groups (the policy makers of state and provincial/municipalities 
governments, the policy implementation agency comprising the town level family 
planning offices and village cadres, and the policy objectives of families). 
Chapters 4 and 5 explain the organizational structure of the family planning 
institutions and how it influences the interests of the political actors and, in turn, the 
implementation outcomes. The family planning organisational structure constitutes a 
vertical relationship between the grassroots level family planning offices (chapter 4) 
and the upper level family planning agencies, and a lateral relationship between the 
grassroots level family planning offices and their same level governments (chapter 
5).  
Chapter 4 explains the setting and evolution of the family planning administrative 
system, with particular focus on the county and town levels. Unlike previous 
research, which explains the organization setting based only on official reports or 
documents, this chapter investigates the family planning organization’s actual setting 
based on real-life observation. It argues that it is the formal and informal setting of 
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the family planning administrative system that influences the grassroots level 
agencies’ employment and financial environment, and in turn this environment 
influences the officials’ decision-making.  
Chapter 5 discusses the relationship between the family planning organizations and 
the local government at the town level. By explaining the assessment system, it 
argues that the town government gives different weight to each task depending on its 
assessment method. The town government’s own decisions on task priority well 
explained why family planning, an ‘unpopular’ policy, has been carried out well 
compared with many other ‘popular’ policies. Following on, this chapter also argues 
that the family planning tasks are also weighted by the family planning officials and 
local government based on the inspection system described in the Population and 
Family Planning Responsibility Commission (renkou he jihuashengyu mubiao zeren 
shu 人口和计划生育目标责任书) and  Leadership Responsibility System (yibashou 
fuze zhi 一把手负责制) and Single Veto System (yipiao foujue 一票否决). Finally, 
this chapter discusses the inability of the current supervision system to constrain 
town officials’ autonomy, and the resulting effects.  
Chapter 6 investigates the political influence on enforcement by analysing the 
obstacles caused by the new democratic system of the village committee election 
since the end of the 1990s. At the village level, after the democratization of village 
official elections, the family planning implementation has become more isolated in 
town level family planning offices. With the intention of gaining more votes in 
elections, most candidates for village committee members are more willing to take 
steps towards promoting villagers’ short-term economic interests than they are 
willing to take vigorous action on the family planning regulations implementation. 
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Village family planning cadres, traditionally the Women’s Chairman in most 
villages, are included as village committee members. They are normally appointed 
by the village heads. In this sense, the principle of ‘appointed by the town, used by 
the village, paid by the county’37 has been lost. The town family planning offices 
have lost their power of inspection over these village family planning cadres, to a 
certain extent, due to the village committee elections. This not only causes further 
difficulties in implementing the birth control regulations but also places a heavier 
burden on town family planning officers regarding job training and information 
collecting.  
Chapter 7 examines how the financial situation has influenced the grassroots 
officials’ decision-making. By exploring the source of China’s family planning 
funding, this chapter concludes that the grassroots level takes a heavier financial 
burden than its upper level agencies. At the town level, due to the massive load of 
family planning tasks, extra funding is required in practice to cover the officials’ 
salaries and running costs. Social maintenance fees collected from violators became 
the main source of these extra funding at the town level. Therefore, the successful 
collection of fines not only means the completion of the family planning tasks, but 
also relates directly to how much of the officials’ basic salary can be paid.  
Based on the analyses of previous chapters, Chapter 8 concludes by looking at the 
town family planning officials’ discretion in implementation. As a result of the 
family planning assessment system (chapter 5), the town family planning officials’ 
work is mainly focused on the birth-control operations and fee-collections. 
                                                
37 Xian guan, xiang pai, cun yong 县管, 乡派, 村用. This phrase means that these village family 
planning officials were appointed by the town, worked in the village and were paid by the county. 
However, the current practice is that these officials are paid by the county, and are appointed and 
work in the village. The town family planning office has lost control over these village level officers.  
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Influenced by the local economic conditions, government support, family planning 
funding, as well as the resistance from the local villagers, the town family planning 
officials often set up their own standards for the fines and birth-control operations. 
Chapter 9 offers a conclusion based on all the above findings. In addition, this part 
also discusses the effects of this one-child policy and the prospective development of 
this policy in the future. 
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Chapter 2 Research Methodologies 
This thesis adopted the socio-legal approach. Different from the traditional doctrinal 
studies of law, socio-legal research is done from a social scientific standpoint to 
‘understand the legal system in terms of the wider social structures’.1 The early 
socio-legal studies in Britain, represented by Wiles and Campbell, made a distinction 
between socio-legal studies and sociology of law.2 In their opinion, socio-legal 
studies were to be often employed not so much for substantive analysis, but as a tool 
for data collection.3 However, there has been a recent trend to view the separation of 
the sociology of law and socio-legal studies of law as having obstructed the 
development of the social scientific study of law.4 In order to better understand the 
content of law, contemporary socio-legal researchers have been aware of the 
necessity ‘to transcend beyond the boundaries of established disciplines such as law, 
sociology, political science or social anthropology’.5 Using this socio-legal method, 
the legal system can be considered along with the wider political, economic and 
social background within which it forms and operates. 
2.1 Introduction 
By using the socio-legal approach, this thesis attempts to examine how the 
enforcement of the PRC’s Family Planning regulations interrelate and interplay with 
governance at all levels and with socio-economic conditions. From a macro 
                                                
1 CM Campbell and P Wiles, "The Study of Law in Society in Britain," Law and Society Review 10 
(1976). p.553. 
2 Ibid. p.553. 
3 Ibid. p.553. 
4 Reza Banakar and Max Travers, eds., Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2005). p.vi. For a more detailed discussion, see R Banakar, Merging Law and Sociology 
(Berlin: Galda & Wilch, 2003). 
5 Banakar and Travers, Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research. p.vii. 
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perspective, it is already clear that different cultures, economics and politics can 
produce different enforcement styles and outcomes,6 for example, while China has 
generally been successful on population control, India has generally failed.78 
In the examination of the governance in China, this study focuses on the official 
family planning institutions at the bottom level of the PRC’s hierarchy system, called 
the township/town level family planning office. As defined by Jude Howell, 
governance refers to ‘the totality of processes and arrangements, both formal and 
informal, by which power and public authority are distributed and regulated.’ 9 This 
research analyses two types of bureaucratic system related to the town family 
planning office. One is the horizontal system between town level family planning 
office and the town government; the other is the vertical system between the town 
level family planning office and the upper level family planning institutions. 
Although villages are not a formal official level, the family planning cadres and 
village committees are considered to be vital assistants to the town level family 
planning office. This study illustrates how the family planning agencies’ behaviours 
and attitudes to enforcement have been shaped by this vertical and horizontal 
governance.  
                                                
6 From a micro perspective, differences can exist even in single agencies. See Robert Baldwin, Rules 
and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). P.143. Charles D. Drake and Frank B. Wright, Law 
of Health and Safety at Work : The New Approach (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983). P.24. These 
works discuss the variations within the Health and Safety Executive’s Inspectorates. 
7 “During 1975-1977, India tried a compulsory sterilization program that provoked popular outrage, 
helped topple India’s population growth. This traumatic experience prompted the generalization in the 
population field that compulsory family planning is more likely to bring down the government than 
the birth rate. But whereas India failed, China has succeeded so far in persuading some couples and 
forcing many others to use birth control techniques and drastically limit their fertility.” See Banister, 
China's Changing Population. p.1. 
8 Modern China still kept many characters of traditional administrative laws, such as ‘a clear principle 
that the function of the officials despatched from the center for the administration of provinces should 
be strictly limited’, and ‘a delegation and accountability system’. See, Geoffrey Macccormack, The 
Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1996). pp20-21.  
9 Jude Howell, "Governance Matters: Key Challenges and Emerging Tendencies," in Governance in 
China, ed. Jude Howell (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003). P.2. 
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In addition, governance and socio-economic conditions are interrelated and interact; 
both affect the enforcement agencies’ discretion on implementing the family 
planning laws. This study finds that the socio-economic conditions always generate a 
tension between the enforcement agencies and the local people. As a result, some 
informal institutions are generated due to this tension, and operate as an alternative 
resolution. For example, by using their personal networks, a family may obtain a 
quota from the local family planning office for a second child, which is not allowed 
under the formal procedure. Or a rich family might find a way to have their 
unpermitted child born in Hong Kong or overseas. These types of behaviour do not 
break the law, but break the spirit of the PRC’s Population and Family Planning 
Law. Even if they know all this local information, the local enforcement agencies 
very often take an informal interpretation of the enforcement of the Family Planning 
Law. This is normally agreed to by the local government under the table in order to 
sustain economic development and keep society stable. 
2.2 Empirical Data Collecting 
This research used mainly the Qualitative case study method. Documentation, 
archival records (secondary and official data), questionnaires, semi-structured 
interviews, and direct observations have been employed to collect empirical data for 
an in-depth analysis.10 A “grounded theory” approach will direct the data analysis.11 
A tentative theoretical framework will be developed on the ground of empirical data 
and data analysis (“grounded theory”) for exploring and explaining the implementing 
process of China’s Family Planning Law at the grassroots level. 
                                                
10 For a sufficient discussion of qualitative data collection in case study, see Robert Yin, Case Study 
Research: Design and Methods, 3rd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 2003). pp. 83-108. 
11 For a brief discussion of “grounded theory” approach, see Lesley Noaks and Emma Wincup, 
Criminological Research: Understanding Qualitative Methods (CA: Sage Publications, 2004). pp. 
122-127. 
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In studying China, one needs to be aware how large and complex China remains. Not 
only does the vast geographical space and widely settled multi-ethnic nationalities 
make it a country difficult to analyse, but also the unprecedented social changes, 
uneven economic developments, differing local politics, diverse cultures, and 
numerous regional dialects all give rise to complex variations at the local level. What 
is true in one (local) part of China may not be true in another. Therefore, the study of 
China is either a macro study of the system or the structure of the whole country, or a 
micro study of a locality, for example, a province, a city or a village, usually through 
a case study.  
The aim of this study is to investigate the implementation of the PRC’s family 
planning regulations, which does not happen at the state level, province or city level, 
but at the town level and the village level. Given the size and variety of China, such 
as its geography, dialects, ethnic differences, customs, cultures, and economy, it was 
decided that a micro study rather than a macro study would better realize this aim. 
Such an approach allows the investigator to examine how the policy would be 
perceived and carried out by local people and the first line of policy enforcement. 
The aim of a case study, focusing on a particular location, is ‘to illustrate the general 
by looking at the particular’.12 Therefore, though the case study approach is not 
intended to portray or represent Chinese society as whole, the insights from looking 
at individual cases can have wider implications. 
From August 2009 to Jan 2010, the author successfully undertook five months of 
fieldwork in a town of S province in China. Data were collected both from primary 
and secondary sources, drawing on both English and Chinese language materials. 
                                                
12 Martyn Denscombe, The Good Research Guide: For Small-Scale Social Research Projects, 2nd ed. 
(Buckingham [England]: Open University Press, 2003). P.30. 
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Documentation, archival records (secondary and official data), questionnaires, semi-
structured interviews, in-depth interviews, and participant observations have been 
employed to collect empirical data for an in-depth analysis. 72 persons were 
interviewed either as individuals or in groups. The interviewees were Chinese 
government officials, Family Planning officers, Family Planning Association 
Members, Family Planning Service Station staff, village committee members, retired 
cadres, local residents, farmers, journalists and scholars. There was also a 700 hours 
observation of a local township/town’s Family Planning Agencies’ daily work (more 
details will be discussed in the Fieldwork section).13 The primary information 
gathered was mainly concerned with particular day-to-day situations involving these 
agencies, whereas the secondary data was used to examine changes that have 
occurred over time, and help analyse the macro setting and its reflection at the micro 
level. 
2.2.1 Site Selection 
In China, on account of geographical circumstances, ethnic composition, and 
socioeconomic conditions, the territorial units at the provincial level (provinces, 
provincial-level municipalities, and provincial-level ethnic autonomous regions, 
excluding the SARs of Hong Kong and Macau) can be classified into three groups: 
(i) Developed coastal areas: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Liaoning, Hebei, 
Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong (the birth rate in these areas, 
compared with others areas in China, is relatively low but their high-level economic 
development and newly formed reproductive culture make these areas less 
representative of China as a whole). 
                                                
13 For a sufficient discussion of qualitative data collection in case study, see Yin, Case Study 
Research: Design and Methods. pp83-108. 
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(ii) Undeveloped border areas: Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, Yunnan, 
Guizhou and Guangxi (most residents in these areas are ethnic minorities who enjoy 
relatively loose family planning control by the state). 
(iii) Inland areas: Shanxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Sichuan, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, 
Anhui, Jiangxi, HeiLongjiang and Jilin. 
The inland area was chosen for the survey location not only because nearly 50% of 
the total Chinese population resides in this area and the ethic majority – the Han 
nationality, who are the main target of the population policy – is primarily settled 
there;14 but also because it is the most representative of the general circumstances of 
the Chinese countryside -- a less complex economy, no special standout cultural 
background (such as the strong son preference in the Chaoshan Area of Guangdong 
province, hence called Chaoshan culture (潮讪文化),) a less complicated ethnic 
cultural background, and fewer migration factors. In addition to the above factors, 
the accessibility and the degree of local co-operation anticipated, as well as the 
language barriers were also considered. Finally, EY town in QX County of S 
province was selected as the survey location. 
In conclusion, given the general representativeness of this inner area, this research 
should provide a rich insight into the mechanisms that might likely function in 
China’s other areas (including rural areas). However, given the size and variety of 
China, research findings from this specific location cannot reflect all problems in 
rural China as a whole, but will still give a general reflection of the wider situation. 
                                                
14 Most ethnic minorities inhabit the underdeveloped border areas. 
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2.2.2 Fieldwork 
2.2.2.1 The First Phase of Fieldwork  
This fieldwork was divided into two phases. During the first phase, the primary 
methods of investigation were observation and discussion with officers. This was as 
much an exploratory stage in the research as a period of data collection. It gave me 
my first opportunity to find out exactly what Town level Family Planning Officers do 
and discover what issues could fruitfully be pursued in the later stages of my study. 
The traditional role of observer was adopted during the five-month stay with EY 
town (of QX county) Family Planning Officers. 
During the five months, I joined the officers for the 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. working day and 
accompanied Family Planning officers during their daily office work and village 
visits. During weekdays, they spent most of the morning in the office and dealt with 
such things as administrative duties, planning, training, political studies, and being 
briefed by the town government or an upper level family planning committee; the 
afternoon time was mostly spent in the villages on investigating individual cases, 
general check-ups, collecting unlawful childbirth fees, and arranging work for the 
village women’s chairmen. In addition to visiting the villages, on a fixed date all of 
the village women’s chairmen went to the town family planning office for training 
and to submit a monthly report of new births, deaths, abortions etc. 
As a method for direct data collection, observation differs from most other forms of 
data collection, which reply more on others’ reports. In addition, I believe that my 
long-term observation method provided more reliable data than the surveys of 
opinions for two reasons. The first reason is that attitudes and opinions can be 
checked against their actual behaviour. The second reason is that, after the researcher 
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gets to know and understand what and why the officers are doing, it is more likely 
that the officers will give a straight and honest answer during interviews rather than a 
negligent answer.  
2.2.2.2 The Second Phase of Fieldwork 
The second phase of fieldwork comprised more formal methodological techniques 
than the first, namely in-depth interviews and semi-structured interviews with family 
planning officers, other government officers, local residents, village committee 
members (especially village family planning cadres), and villagers. 
On the ground of the first phase fieldwork, in-depth interviews were arranged with 
every officer of EY town family planning office including the town deputy mayor 
responsible for family planning and the Chief Officer. Most of these interviews were 
open-ended. Depending on the circumstances at that time, the interviews were 
carried out either in small groups of 2-3 persons or individually. With our 
relationships having built up during the course of working with them, they did not 
simply treat me as a stranger who was interviewing them, but as a friend whom they 
could talk openly with. Officers generally seemed to enjoy the interviews and even 
often voluntarily came to me for some discussion and provide me with some more 
information which they thought might be useful to me or help me better to 
understand their work. The value of the first phase of fieldwork was perhaps 
indicated by the number of occasions when officers commented that ‘the researchers 
like you should really come down to the bottom to see [像你们这些学者，应该多
下来基层看看]’, or ‘the grassroots, the grassroots, this is the grassroots, now do you 
understand? [基层，基层，这就是基层。现在你明白了吧？] These comments 
indicate that they thought observation would lead to a better understanding of their 
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work rather than quick questionnaires or surveys. These comments also indicate that 
data collected during interviews after observation might be more reliable than those 
without observation.  
Besides these interviews, I conducted in-depth or semi-structured interviews with 
other town officials, village committee members, and village women’s chairmen. 
Many ad hoc interviews were also undertaken with local residents, such as farmers, 
local shop owners, shop assistants, waiters, guests in restaurants, taxi drivers, 
vegetable vendors, cobblers, and housewives, etc. 
In addition, the author also carried out many discussions with journalists of China’s 
Population Newspaper and many scholars both in China and the US. 
2.2.3 Main Interview Questions 
The interviews, which were partly open-ended and semi-structured, were designed to 
collect the following information:  
1. Local conditions: population of local rural and urban resident, 
migration levels and their influence on the local economy and culture, 
local people’s average incomes and their sources, the main 
enterprises in the local economy, accommodation environment (for 
example, the style, price and surroundings of their homes), average 
education level, customs and spending on marriage and funerals (the 
biggest expenses for Chinese in general), childbirth intentions in the 
local region, views on son-preference, etc.; 
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2. Personal and family information of the interviewees, such as 
education level, related experience in family planning work, family 
income, number of children, accommodation environment etc.; 
3. Organisation of the local family planning institutions: procedures of 
the local family planning institutions, working conditions (office 
location, office supplements, officers’ salary and pension, etc.) and 
their change over time, and the general financial circumstances over 
time; 
4. Implementation Method: How the main work tasks have been carried 
out over time, for example: the enforcement methods for controlling 
the birth rate and migrant levels, the Social Compensation Fees 
collection methods, the methods for publicising the family planning 
law and policy;15   
5. Town Family Planning Office’s training system for professional 
family planning work training, family planning technical services, 
administrative work, IT, etc., to members of each level’s family 
planning institutions, but especially the town level family planning 
officers; 
6. Town Family Planning Office’s fiscal circumstances: main financial 
resources for the county and town family planning institutions, 
distribution of funding; fiscal relationships with local government; 
usage of Social Maintenance fees; 
7. Town Family Planning Office’s supervision system both by same 
level government and higher-level family planning institutions; 
                                                
15 Many enforcement and propaganda jobs were carried out during lunch time and the evening, when 
the villagers in their break, by town family planning officials in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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8. Family Planning Policy making targets and process, such as the 
annual birth rate, etc. (questions relating to the provincial level); 
9. Family Planning Office’s relationships (including fiscal relationships 
and assistant relationships, as well as informal relationships) with 
local government, village committees, and higher level family 
planning institutions, as well as the local residents and farmers; 
10. Officers’ opinions about the use of informal and formal methods of 
enforcement; 
11. Officers’ attitudes towards the PRC’s Family Planning Law and 
policies; 
12. Officers’ attitudes towards the Family Planning Law offences; 
13. Officers’ opinions about the cooperation between the Family 
Planning Office and other departments on family planning control; 
14. Officers’ opinions about using the court as the resolution method for 
unenforceable offenders; 
15. Officers’ opinions about the penalties imposed upon family planning 
offenders; 
16. Officers’ opinions about their discretion and constraints on their 
discretion; 
17. Officers’ self evaluation of their work;  
 
It should noted that, due to the nature of this research, which is about the institutional 
environment and variations between different Family Planning Offices in different 
locations, the town Family Planning Officers in one office are generally referred to 
and regarded as a collective individual rather than separate independent individuals.  
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With this systematic and in depth investigation of the work done by the province, 
city, county, town and village level family planning administrative institutions, in 
particular the town level, this research provides a full and in-depth understanding of 
the implementation environment in which the family planning law and policy is 
implemented by the grassroots level family planning administrative agencies. 
2.3 Difficulties 
It is important to emphasize that gaining access for this study posed a few 
difficulties. The first difficulty is caused by the nature of this research, as the PRC’s 
family planning policy is still a sensitive issue in China. Therefore, in order to have a 
full understanding of the family planning implementation process at the grassroots 
level, all of my fieldwork access was gained via the personal relationships. After 
consideration of the wide variety of local dialects and limited funding, and my 
knowledge of the local culture and society, a rural area in S province was selected as 
my survey location. From August 2009 to the beginning of January 2010, my five-
month long fieldwork was successfully carried out in this rural area in S province. 
During the fieldwork, the grassroots level officials were very open and expressed 
great interest in my research once they knew that my report would not be used by the 
upper levels to assess their performance. They were eager to have attention paid to 
their work. However, in order to protect their confidentiality, assurance of anonymity 
is given to the location and participating persons in this research.  
In addition to the difficulty of gaining access and restricted funding, other difficulties 
also emerged during the fieldwork. Given the political sensitivity of their work, some 
interviewees did not answer my questions directly, or else just provided an official 
response. However, knowledge of the local culture greatly benefited my analysis of 
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the validity of these answers, and more interviews were carried out in order to 
remedy this deficiency. In addition, discussions with scholars studying local areas 
also helped me to fully understand some of those tricky answers. 
2.4 Ethics 
This research followed the ethics code of the LSE Research Ethics Policy issued in 
2008. During the fieldwork, this study and my identity were explained to participants 
orally. The process and results of any publications of this study can be accessed via 
email by the participants. The participants were also informed that taking part in the 
study was voluntary. They were also informed that they could refuse to answer any 
question which made them feel uncomfortable and they were all offered sufficient 
time to consider whether they wanted to take part in the interview. Interviewees were 
also fully aware that the information generated by this study would be published, but 
their personal information would be treated as strictly confidential and no details 
would be released, thus preventing the participants from being identified.  
During this survey, participants did not fill out consent forms in writing, because 
they were uncomfortable with signing the form with their name. However, they had 
given me oral consent and agreed that I could record in writing what they told me in 
front of them unless they stated that some points should not be made public.  
Publicising the location of this research would likely affect the interviewees directly 
and would likely have influenced their answers, hence the location of the fieldwork, 
including both province and town, is not to be released, but replaced by codes to 
conceal their identity. In this research, all respondents are anonymous, except some 
academic scholars whose opinions have been published. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter seeks the research methodology applied to this research. By carrying out 
a case study in a town in rural China, this research investigates the factors that 
influence the grassroots level agencies’ implementation of the family planning 
regulations from a wide social, economic and political perspective. Based on a wide 
range of sources of evidence, which comprises quantitative data, interviews and 
observations, documentations and archival records (secondary and official data), as 
well as other research results, this thesis provides an in-depth analysis of the 
implementation environment at EY town. 
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Chapter 3 Contents of China’s Population Policy 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to better understand China’ population policy, this chapter serves as the 
background and context introduction. As decentralised policies, China’s family 
planning regulations have been mainly made by each individual provincial region 
according to the local cultural and economic conditions. Therefore, it is necessary to 
illustrate the evolution of the family planning campaign at the state level, as well as 
the circumstances at the provincial level. This chapter is divided into three sections: 
the first section is about the evolution of the state level family planning campaign 
from the 1950s to pre-2013, with particular focus on the origin of the 1979 one-child 
policy; the second section gives detailed comparison of the exemptions of China’s 
one-child policy at both state and provincial levels; the third part shows the current 
changes of China’s population policy as well as its prospective future development. 
These provincial variations also indicated the importance of a micro level study of 
China’s family planning implementation.  
3.2 The Evolution of China’s Family Planning Campaign From the 
1950s 
The different stages in the history of China’s family planning campaign are a result 
of China’s economic development, scholars’ academic research and the central 
government’s understanding of population issues. The motivation for China’s family 
planning campaign changed from protecting and improving women’s health, by 
voluntary family planning and restricting contraception and abortion in the early 
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1950s, to stimulating economic development,1 by encouraging, or even enforcing, 
family planning, in the 1980s. Family planning methods shifted from voluntary 
family planning in the 1950s, to encouraging birth control from the 1950s to 1970s, 
then further to mandatory family planning from the 1980s. The family planning 
regulations extended from raising the legal marriage age, to promoting late marriage, 
then to focusing on the number of children born. The focus of locations also 
extended rapidly from urban areas to countrywide from the 1970s. 
In 1978 family planning was for the first time included in the PRC’s Constitution.2 
The new Marriage Law, which came into effect in January 1981, confirmed that 
family planning was a duty rather than a voluntary activity.3 In December 1982, 
China adopted a new Constitution that reiterated the obligation of married couples to 
use birth control: ‘Both husband and wife have a duty to practice family planning’ 
(fuqi shuangfang you shixing jihuashengyu de yiwu 夫妻双方有实行计划生育的义
务).4  The compulsory family planning regulations included not only the legal 
marriage age and encouragement of late marriage, but also the permitted number of 
births and contraceptive methods, as well as the fines and punishment methods for 
those families who broke the rules.5  
                                                
1 Family planning became one of the main objectives of economic development at the end of the 
1970s. See, "The Constitution of the PRC,"  (1982). Article 25, “the state advocates family planning 
in order that population growth is integrated with the economic and social development plan (guojia 
tuixing jihuashengyu, shi renkou de zengzhang tong jingji he shehui fazhan jihua xiang shiying 国家
推行计划生育，使人口的增长同经济和社会发展计划相适应)”. 
2 See, 1978 Constitution Article 53, “the state advocates and promotes family planning (guojia tichang 
he tuixing jihuashengyu 国家提倡和推行计划生育).” 
3 See, "PRC Marriage Law,"  (1981). Article 2 and 12.  
4 See, 1982 Constitution Article 25 and 49. 
5 See, Chapter 3 for more details of these regulations. 
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3.2.1 From Protecting and Improving Women’s Health to 
Stimulating Economic Development  
From the beginning of the 1950s, young couples generally expected to receive 
support from the government on contraception and abortion, their incentives being 
that of more opportunities for work and education as well as an expectation of a 
better quality family life. However, abortion and contraception in China were still 
strictly controlled before 19536 because of the state’s limited ability to produce 
contraceptive devices, and the lack of funds available to import them from abroad. 
The state was also concerned about protecting women from unsafe abortion and 
contraception.7 After the PRC’s first census in 1953, the government realised that a 
large population size8 was a double-edged sword, and so a revision of the strict 
regulations on contraception and abortion was considered.9 In 1954, the Health 
Ministry launched a revised regulation:10 the Report on Improving Contraception and 
Abortion Issues (guanyu gaijin biyun ji rengong liuchan wenti de tongbao 关于改进
避孕及人工流产问题的通报). The new regulations cancelled all restriction on 
                                                
6 On April 20th 1950, the Health Ministry launched The Regulations for Limiting Abortion for Female 
Cadres in the Official Departments and Military (jiguan budui funv ganbu datai xianzhi de banfa 机关
部队妇女干部打胎限制的办法). In 1952, the Ministry of Health introduced another regulation—The 
Temporary Regulation of Restricted Contraception and Abortion (xianzhi jieyu ji rengong liuchan 
zanxing banfa 限制节育及人工流产暂行办法)—which applied to all Chinese women. 
7 Historically, childbearing had caused a high death rate in China due to the non-professional 
‘midwife’ (zhuchanpo 助产婆), as well as unsafe contraception and abortion. 
8 In 1953, Premier Zhou stated that China’s population growth was at a rate of 10 million per year. 
The population would be raised by 100 million after 10 years. Although Chinese farmers prefer more 
sons and daughters, this rapid increase would cause a supply shortage in the long term. This would be 
a heavy burden to China. See, Zhou Enlai, "The Principal Task of the First Five Years Constructive 
Plan （Diyige Wunian Jianshe Jihua De Jiben Renwu 第一个五年建设的基本任务）." 
9 Deng Xiaoping was the first leader in China to support birth planning. As the vice premier of the 
State Council, he had instructed the health department to amend the regulations of restricted 
contraception on 11th Aug 1953. See, State Population and Family Planning Commission, ed. China's 
Population and Family Planning History (Zhongguo Renkou He Jihuashengyu Shi 中国人口和计划
生育史) (Beijing: China Population Press (zhongguo renkou chubanshe 中国人口出版社), 2007). 
p.19. 
10 The Revised Temporary Regulations on Contraception and Abortion (guanyu xiugai biyun he 
rengong liuchan zanxing banfa 关于修改避孕和人工流产暂行办法). 
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contraception use and production, and also started to provide support and advice on 
contraception by medical and health officials. This report was the start of China’s 
family planning campaign.  
Soon after that, the family planning campaign was clearly affirmed by the central 
government. In February 1955, the Birth Control Issues Report to the Central 
Committee of the CPC 11  confirmed that, “… [Chinese couples] should take 
appropriate birth planning.  These voluntary family planning activities should not be 
restricted in the future. (… Shi yingdang shidang de jiezhi shengyu; zai jianglai ye 
buying fandui renmin qunzhong ziyuan jieyu de xingwei. … 是应当适当地节制生育
；在将来，也不应反对人民群众自愿节育的行为.)” This report acknowledged the 
earlier mistakes, the “misunderstanding of the family planning issue which had an 
improper restriction on abortion and contraception” (dui jieyu wenti quefa zhengque 
de renshi, mangmu de bu zancheng jueyu 对绝育问题缺乏正确的认识，盲目地不
赞成绝育).  
This report also suggested the following methods: widely providing contraception;12 
approving necessary support for voluntary abortion and sterilization; broadly 
encouraging birth planning and providing professional training on birth control 
methods to health department staff.13 The central committee of the CPC approved 
and published this report on 1st March 1955. This was the CPC’s first official 
                                                
11 The Health Ministry Party Committee, "The Report to the CPC Central Committee About the Birth 
Control Issues (Guanyu Jiezhi Shengyu Wenti Xiang Zhongyang De Baogao 关于节制生育问题向中
央的报告)," (February 1955). 
12 It was planned to provide contraception devices to 10,000,000 fertile women，which was nearly 
one-third of the population of fertile women in urban China. 
13 State Population and Family Planning Commission, China's Population and Family Planning 
History (Zhongguo Renkou He Jihuashengyu Shi 中国人口和计划生育史). p.27. 
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document which approved of family planning. For the first time, contraception and 
abortion were legal in China.  
However, extensive fertility control was not considered until the end of the Cultural 
Revolution. Influenced by the Malthusian14 and Ma Yinchu15 theory and the priority 
need of improving China’s economic development, birth control became a 
nationwide intensive campaign.16 The signal event for this occurred in 1973 when 
family planning became one of the objectives of both The Five Year Plan of the 
State’s Economic and Social Development and the Annual Plan (GuoJia Guomin 
Jingji he Shehui Fazhan Wunian Jihua he Niandu Jihua 国家国民经济和社会发展
五年计划和年度计划) for the first time.17 In addition, with the developments in 
productive technology, most contraceptive medicines and devices could be mass-
produced in China. As a result, the contraceptive policy changed from reduced fee 
(or free) to free of charge to all. 
                                                
14 Malthus theory suggested that without any limitation on marriage and reproduction, China would 
face a shortage of food and fewer resources and poorer living standards, until population growth was 
controlled by   famine, disease or war. See Malthus, An Essay on Population (1798 Version and 1803 
Edited Version). 
15 Ma Yinchu, a China’s most famous population studies expert and a prominent economist, had 
raised an alert that the rapidly growing population would cause economic problems for China (based 
on his field work in many villages in China) at the beginning of the 1950s. See Yinchu Ma, New 
Population Theory (Xin Renkou Lun 新人口论) (Jilin: Jilin People Press (jilin renmin chubanshe 吉林
人民出版社), 1997).  
However, his opinion was not accepted by the central government. He was wrongly repudiated and 
criticised for many years until around 1979, when the government leadership realised the close 
relationship between population size and economic development. 
16 In 1970, Premier Zhou Enlai, in a speech to all the Military Council officials of the Health Ministry   
(Weishengbu Junguanhui 卫生部军管会), stated that family planning was a planning rather than a 
health issue. See, Peng Peiyun, ed. A Whole Series of China's Family Planning (Zhongguo 
Jihuashengyu Quanshu 中国计划生育全书) (Beijing: China Population Press (zhongguo renkou 
chubanshe 中国人口出版社), 1997). p.136.  
From 1968 to 1972, some important departments were controlled by the military in order to control 
the chaos. Military Councils (junguanhui 军管会) were set up in these departments to maintain order. 
17 Y. T. He, ed., Population Theory in China (London: Croom Helm, 1980). p.15.  
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3.2.2 From Urban to Nationwide 
The family planning campaign focused on the urban areas in the 1960s. But from the 
beginning of the 1970s, some Chinese leaders had realized that the oversized 
population could have a negative effect on the economy. As a result, the focus of 
family planning work, which had concentrated on urban areas, extended rapidly to 
some rural areas with dense populations, and then countrywide. A nationwide family 
planning campaign was advocated. 
On 6th October 1962, the central committee of the CPC and the State Council 
published the Instructions on the Current City [Development] Work Issues.18 These 
instructions clearly stated that, “Population growth in cities especially big cities 
should be strictly controlled for the long term (jinhou yige henchang shiqi nei, duiyu 
chengshi, tebie shi dachengshi renkou de zengzhang, yingdang yange jia yi kongzhi. 
今后一个很长时期内，对于城市，特别是大城市人口的增长，应当严格加以控
制.)”. The Minute of the Second City [Development] Work Conference19 explained 
briefly why urban areas were selected as the focus of population control. In part 6 of 
the minute, it stated that: 
One of the main reasons for China’s rapid population growth in urban 
areas is the high birth rate. In urban China population growth rate was 
36% in 1962 and estimated to increase to roughly 40% in 1963. The high 
birth rate in urban areas would neither benefit the state nor its people. 
Therefore, it is a very important task to promote birth planning and 
reduce the birth rate. (Woguo chengshi renkou zengzhang henkuai, 
chushenglv guogao shi yige zhongyao de yuanyin. 1962 nian, chengshi 
renkou de chushenglv wei 36%... 1963 nian guji quannian keneng dadao 
                                                
18 "The Instructions About the Current City [Development] Work Issues (Guanyu Dangqian Chengshi 
Gongzuo Ruogan Wenti De Zhishi 关于当前城市工作若干问题的指示),"  (The Central Committee 
and The State Council, 6th October 1962). 
19 "The Central Committee  and the State Council's Instruction on the Approved Minute of the Second 
City [Development] Work Conference (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Pizhun Dierci Chengshi 
Gongzuo Huiyi Jiyao De Zhishi 中共中央国务院批准第二次城市工作会议纪要的指示 ),"  
(ZhongFa (No. 699), 22nd October 1963). 
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40% zuoyou. chengshi renkou chushenglv guogao, dui guojia he geren 
doushi buli de. Jiji kaizhan jihuashengyu, jiandi renkou de chushenglv, 
shi yixiang jiqi zhongyao de renwu. 我国城市人口增长很快，出生率过
高是一个重要的原因.1962 年，城市人口的出生率为 36%...1963 年
估计全年可能达到 40%左右.城市人口出生率过高，对国家和个人都
是不利的. 积极开展计划生育，减低人口的出生率，是一项极其重要
的任务.) 
This minute also explained that a lower population growth rate would: reduce the 
burden on agriculture; release the pressure on living resources and accommodation as 
well as other public services in urban areas; and improve the education quality of the 
next generation. It was believed that with a higher-level education and better medical 
support, population controls would bring better outcomes if applied in urban areas 
than in rural areas. 
The focus was extended to the rural areas in 1962. On 18th December 1962 the 
document “the Instructions for Earnestly Advocating Family Planning (guanyu 
renzhen tichang jihuashengyu de zhishi 关于认真提倡计划生育的指示)”20 directed 
that rural areas with a dense population should also start family planning. Some rural 
areas were selected for pilot schemes in 1964. However, only about 400 counties, 
which were just 5% of all counties in China, had advocated family planning in 
practice by 1965.21 On the contrary, the birth rate in urban areas became lower than 
that in rural areas from 1964 as a result of the active family planning practice in 
urban areas. Nevertheless, the overall population in China still grew rapidly despite a 
reduced urban birth rate. In January 1966, the central committee of the CPC 
                                                
20 "The Central Committee and State Council's Instruction on Earnestly Advocating Family Planning 
(Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Renzhen Tichang Jihuashengyu De Zhishi 中共中央国
务院关于认真提倡计划生育的指示) ",  (ZhongFa (No. 698), 18th December 1962). 
21 State Population and Family Planning Commission, China's Population and Family Planning 
History (Zhongguo Renkou He Jihuashengyu Shi 中国人口和计划生育史). p.70. 
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emphasised that more attention should be paid to rural areas,22 and family planning 
work was expanded to the whole country in the 1970s. 
3.2.3 From Soft Family Planning to Hard Birth Control 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the family planning campaign mainly encouraged 
couples to engage in voluntary family planning by advocating “late marriage” 
(wanhun 晚婚) and “late childbearing” (wanyu 晚育) as well as the use of 
contraception. A late marriage age was considered to be particularly important as 
frequent childbearing by young women was considered to have negative effects on 
the health of mothers and their babies. Therefore, during that period, the family 
planning campaign focused mainly on the regulating of the legal marriage age and 
late marriage age.  
However, the population continued to grow rapidly despite all of the above methods 
taken. Meanwhile, despite the fact that famine had been successfully averted in 
China (excepting in the catastrophic years of 1959, 1960, and 1961) through a 
redistribution of supplies within the state and an improvement to the imports of grain 
from abroad since the creation of the PRC in 1949, the provision of textile and other 
light industries enough to meet people’s needs, and supply of the nutritional needs of 
the populace was still barely met.23 Furthermore, economic development was further 
hindered by the initially depressed state of the economy, ill-judged economic 
strategies, and political disruptions, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution. In encountering such an expansive increase in the population and 
                                                
22 See, "The Central Committee’s Official Comments on Family Planning (Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Guanyu Jihuashengyu Wenti De Pishi 中共中央关于计划生育问题的批示),"  (ZhongFa (No. 70), 
28th January 1966). 
23 This was resolved by the end of 1980s. 
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sluggish economy development level, China's communist party realized that the 
current imperative for China is no longer solving class struggle, but to focus on 
economic development and improvement in living standards. 
After Deng Xiaoping assumed control of the party in December 1978, at the Third 
Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, Four Modernization programmes24 were 
reaffirmed again, which were in the fields of agriculture, industry, science and 
technology and national defence. Unfortunately, productivity gains were largely 
matched by population growth, so that production capacity remained unable to 
significantly exceed essential consumption needs, particularly in agriculture. Grain 
output in 1979 was about twice that of 1952, but this was matched by the growth of 
the population.25 As a result, little surplus was produced even during the good years. 
Furthermore, few resources could be spared for investment in capital goods such as 
machinery, factories, mines, railroads, and other fixed assets that could help increase 
productivity. The relatively small size of the capital stock caused productivity per 
worker to remain low, which in turn perpetuated the economy’s inability to generate 
a substantial surplus. In conclusion, up until that time, the ‘over-sized’ population 
was deemed by the leadership to be the biggest obstacle to China's economic 
development. 
The high rate of population growth not only hindered economic development and 
employment opportunities, but also arrested the development of the nation’s 
scientific and cultural standing. With limited investments in education (particularly at 
the tertiary and technical levels) due to a weak economic base, a large percentage of 
                                                
24 The Four Modernisations were introduced by Zhou Enlai in 1975 at the Fourth National People’s 
Congress, as one of his last public acts. 
25 In fact, this is the reason for the Three Steps Strategy launched in 1987, which still set the first step 
towards supply of adequate clothing and food for all people. 
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people had insufficient access to appropriate education or training. In 1981, for 
example, about 6% of children reaching school age could not enter primary school 
and about 12% of primary school students could not continue to high school. Overall, 
only 5% of high school students could enter university.26 Influenced further by the 
demographers, the population policy was approached as an integrated policy for 
modernization, combining wealth-creation, labour and education policy.  
As a result, China began a more sustained birth limitation campaign: the focus of the 
family planning campaign expanded from the legal marriage age and late marriage 
age to the number of children in each family. In 1973, the first slogan about the 
desired number of births was coined: “one is not few, two is just right, three is too 
many (yige bushao, liangge zhenghao, sange taiduole 一个不少，两个正好，三个
太多了)”.27  But soon, “two births are ideal” was replaced by the slogan of “one 
child is the best, but no more than two children (yige zhenghao, zuiduo liangge 一个
正好，最多两个)” on October 197828. This report was subsequently approved by 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in [1978] No. 69 document. 
Then, during January 4th to 17th 1979, State’s Family Planning Leaders Group 
organized the National Family Planning Office Leader’s Conference (quanguo jihua 
                                                
26 Wenming Su, Population and Other Problems, vol. 1, China Today: Beijing Review Special 
Feature Series (Beijing: Beijing Review, 1981).  
27 This slogan came from the “later-longer-fewer (wan xi shao 晚 稀 少)” policy that was announced 
in the First China’s Family Planning Report of December 1973. “Later” meant marriage at age 23 and 
25 for rural women and men respectively while 25 and 27 for urban women and men. “Later” also 
specifically referred to a late childbearing age of 24 or more in rural areas and a slightly higher age in 
the cities. “Longer” was defined as a longer interval between two children. It was generally 3 years in 
the countryside and 4 years in cities. “Fewer” signified that each couple should only have two children 
in urban areas and no more than three children in rural areas. 
28 It was published in the following report and approved by the CPC on October 1978. See, "The 
Notification of the Central Committee Approval of the State Council Leading Group for Family 
Plannning's First Conference Report (Zhonggong Zhongyang Pizhuan Guanyu Guowuyuan Jihua 
Shengyu Lingdao Xiaozu Diyici Huiyi De Baogao De Tongzhi 中央批转《关于国务院计划生育领导
小组第一次会议的报告》的通知),"  (ZhongFa (No. 69), October 26th 1978). 
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shengyu bangongshi zhuren huiyi 全国计划生育办公室主任会议) in Beijing. This 
conference endorsed the central government’s approach, approved the One Child 
Policy as China’s family planning policy. This conference was deemed to be the 
symbolic adoption of China’s ‘one-child policy’ by politicians and academics. 
An editorial of the Renmin Ribao (the People’s Daily) issued ten days after the 
conference stated: 
We strongly support the policy that each couple should have one child 
but no more than two. Individual provinces, cities and autonomous 
regions are allowed to draw up related policies and measures on family 
planning in accordance with their particular local circumstances. Couples 
who give birth to one child only will be praised publicly; whilst those 
couples who give birth to two or more children will suffer economic 
sanctions. (Women tichang yidui fufu shengyu zinv zuihao yige, zuiduo 
liangge. Ge sheng, shi, zizhiqv, keyi genju dangdi shiji qingkuang zhiding 
youliyu jihuashengyu de zhengce, cuoshi. Duiyu sheng yitai, buzai sheng 
diertai de yuling fufu, yao geiyvu biaoyang; duiyu sheng disantai he 
santai yishangde, ying cong jingji shang jia yi biyao de xianzhi. 我们提
倡一对夫妇生育子女最好一个，最多两个. 各省、市、自治区，可以
根据当地实际情况制定有利于计划生育的政策、措施. 对于只生一胎
, 不再生第二胎的育龄夫妇, 要给予表扬; 对于生第三胎和三胎以上
的，应从经济上加以必要的限制.)29 
In 1979 this “one child is best, but no more than two children” policy was restricted 
further to the “one-child” policy. Chen Muhua first advocated the one-child policy in 
her speech at the Conference of All Provinces, Cities and Autonomous Regions’ 
Family Planning Office Heads (ge sheng shi zizhiqu jihuashengyu bangongshi 
zhuren huiyi 各省市自治区计划生育办公室主任会议) in December 1979. She said 
that: 
“The current strategic requirement for population development is [a one-
child policy]: now we refer to ‘one is best’, the latter [phrase] ‘no more 
                                                
29 Editorial, "Maximum Attention Must Be Paid to Planning Parenthood Tasks (Bixu Gaodu Zhongshi 
Jihua Shengyu Gongzuo 必须高度重视计划生育工作)," in People's Daily (27th January 1979).  
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than two children’ has been deleted” (xianzai tichulai ‘zuihao yige’, 
houmian nage ‘zuiduo liangge’ meiyoule. zheshi woguo muqian renkou 
fazhan zhong de yige zhanluexing yaoqiu. 现在提出来 ‘最好一个’, 后面
那个 ‘最多两个’没有了. 这是我国目前人口发展中的一个战略性要
求.).  
In September 7th, 1980, Chairman Hua Guofeng30 further confirmed this one-child 
policy at the third conference of the Fifth National People’s Congress. In 1980 this 
one-child policy was extended to the whole country, except those ethnic minorities 
whose population was deemed to be ‘rare’.31 On September 25th 1980, an open letter 
was issued to the whole country: the Central Committee of the CPC’s Open Letter to 
all Members of the Party and the Youth League Concerning the Issues of Controlling 
Population Growth (zhonggongzhongyang guanyu kongzhi woguo renkou zengzhang 
wenti zhi quanti gongchandangyuan gongqingtuanyuan de gongkaixin 中共中央关
于控制我国人口增长问题致全体共党员共青团员的公开信).32 This letter urged 
couples (especially the cadres) to take the lead by limiting themselves to one child 
per couple, while also promoting this policy to the public:  
With the purpose of control the whole quantity of people in China under 
1200million at the end of the 20th century, the State Council has issued a 
call to the people of the whole country, encouraging each couple to have 
only one child. This programme is an important measure which concerns 
the speed and future of the four modernisations and the health and 
happiness of the future generations. It is a measure that conforms to the 
                                                
30 Hua Guofeng was the premier of the State Council during 1976 and 1980. 
31 Hua Guofeng, "The Speech of the Premier of the State Council on the 3rd Conference of the 5th 
National People’s Congress (Guowuyuan Zongli Zai Diwujie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui 
Disanci Huiyi Shang De Jianghua 国务院总理在第五次全国人民代表大会第三次会议上的讲话)," 
in A Whole Series of China's Family Planning (zhongguo jihua shengyu quanshu 中国计划生育全书
), ed. Peiyun Peng (Beijing: China Population Press (zhongguo renkou chubanshe 中国人口出版社), 
1997). P.40. 
Among 55 minority nationalities in China, some nationalities have a large population, such as Hui 
Nationality. Some have very small populations, such as the Daganer Nationality, Ewenke Nationality 
and Elunchun Natinality in Inner Mongolia, the Dongxiang nationality, Yugu nationality, and Baoan 
nationality in Guangxi province, and Dulong nationality, Deang nationality, Jinuo nationality, Achang 
nationality, Nu nationality, Pumi nationality and Bulang nationality in Yunnan province. 
32 The Open Letter was published by the Central Committee on September 25th 1980.  
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immediate and longer-term interests of the whole people. (Weile zhengqu 
zai ben shiji mo ba woguo renkou zongshu kong zhi zai shieryi zhinei, 
guowuyuan yijing xiang Quanguo renmin fachu haozhao, tichang yidui 
fufu zhi shengyu yige haizi. Zhe shi yixiang Guanxi dao sigexiandaihua 
jianshe de sudu he qiantu, Guanxi dao zisun houdai de jiankang he 
xingfu, fuhe quanguo renmin changyuan liyi he dangqian liyi de zhongda 
cuoshi. 为了争取在本世纪末把我国人口总数控制在十二亿之内，国
务院已经向全国人民发出号召，提倡一堆夫妇只生育一个孩子。这
是一项关系到四个现代化建设的速度和前途，关系到子孙后代的健
康和幸福，符合全国人民长远利益和当前利益的重大措施).33  
Although technically only an approval letter to Communist Party members and 
Communist Youth Leagues of China, in practice this letter was treated as a formal 
order from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to all related 
family planning departments and all local level Communist Party officials. 
However, the 1979 one-child policy was soon revised in 1982. Being a uniform 
policy, the 1979 one-child policy did not distinguish variation between different 
locations which varied by culture, economic development and the families’ special 
requirements. It was also challenged by the new agricultural system present in rural 
areas from the beginning of the 1980s.34 On September 1981, it was decided that the 
one child policy should continue in cities, but that a more flexible policy should 
apply to rural couples, taking into consideration their economic and cultural 
                                                
33 Zheng Liu, "Targets and Policy of Population Control in China," in International Union for the 
Scientific Study of Population (ManilaDecember, 1981). 
34 At the third plenary session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978, the agricultural system 
changed from the Collective Ownership System to the Production Responsibility System. Unlike the 
Collective Ownership System which used work points, and where farmers got similar earnings 
regardless of whether they contributed more or less in a working day, farmers were allowed to 
produce anything under the new agricultural system. A big portion of the household’s income came 
from sideline activities, such as raising pigs or chickens, growing fruit trees, oilseeds, vegetables and 
other agricultural products for sale, providing services, household handicrafts and small industrial 
productions. Accordingly, the grain rations to third or more children were less important to 
households who were able to get their own surplus grain and income. In addition, families with less 
available labour may have found that they did not have enough to do their fieldwork and earn extra 
profit. Furthermore, in some areas, families could have more land if they had more members. 
Meanwhile, the slow process of agricultural modernization also reinforced the culture of dependence 
on more children, especially on male ones. Overall, the incentives to have more children may have 
outweighed the penalties in China’s rural areas.  
Banister, China's Changing Population. p.190.  
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circumstances.35 Finally, the 1979 one-child policy was revised on February 9th 1982 
and has remained as the principal policy until 2013.36 The revised policy confirmed 
that late marriage, late birth and fewer births, as well as healthier children would still 
be encouraged. Generally, the policy supported one child per couple for urban 
residents while a second child could be approved for rural families. This policy also 
allowed some other exceptions in some special circumstances, for example, 
exceptions for minority ethnic nationality families. 37  However “one-child per 
couple” was still the government’s main rule till 2013. 
3.3 Context of the Population Regulations 
3.3.1 1982 Population Policy at the State Level 
As a base of the provincial family planning regulations from the mid-1980s to 2013, 
the 1982 policy revised the 1979 uniformed one-child policy and declared that the 
one child policy should continue in cities, but that a more flexible policy should 
apply to rural couples and minority nationalities, taking into consideration their 
economic and cultural circumstances. This policy was later cited in Article 18 of 
PRC Population and Family Planning Legislation in 2002. The 1982 policy stated 
that: 
In the future, late marriage, late childbirth, fewer childbirths and better 
quality of children would still be encouraged. The concrete requirements 
are: cadres and city residents would be allowed one child per couple 
unless there were some special circumstances. For rural couples, the 
                                                
35 It was discussed and decided on a national conference organized by the State’s Family Planning 
Committee and attended with family planning department leaders from the provinces, cities, and 
autonomous regions in Beijing on September 1981. 
36 See "The Central Committee and the State Council's Instructions for Further Implementing Family 
Planning Work (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Jihuashengyu Gongzuo 
De Zhishi 中共中央国务院关于进一步做好计划生育工作的指示),"  (ZhongFa (No. 11), 9th 
February 1982). 
37 See, ibid. 
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principle would be one child per couple in general. For families with 
special requirements for a second child, it could be allowed after 
approval. However, no third child would be allowed under any 
circumstances for urban and rural couples. Family planning would also 
be encouraged in minority ethnic nationality couples, but these couples 
would not have the same limitation as stated above.38 
Before the 1982 policy, the regional regulations only gave permission for a second 
birth under three rather strict conditions:39  
1. The first child is disabled and is not expected to be able to carry out normal 
labour;  
2. Remarried couples where one partner has one child and the other partner has 
no children;  
3. A couple who adopted one child because they could not conceive their own 
after many years of marriage. If the wife became pregnant after having 
adopted a child, they were allowed to keep both their conceived child and 
their adopted child. 
After the launch of the 1982 national policy, the exemptions for second child permits 
were extended to seven further types, in the national family planning work meeting 
of summer 1982:40 
1. One member of the couple is from a two or three generation single-child 
family; 
                                                
38 Ibid. 
39 "Central Committee Office of CPC and State Council Office Launched the Memo of National 
Family Planning Work Meeting (Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting Guowuyuan Bangongting 
Zhuanfa Quanguo Jihua Shengyu Gongzuo Huiyi Jiyao 中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅转发《全
国计划生育工作会议纪要》),"  (20th October 1982). Section 3. 
40 Ibid. Section 3. 
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2. Peasant families of two or more brothers where only one couple is fertile and 
with only one child, and where the other brothers have not adopted children; 
3. A rural male marries to live with parents-in-law 
4. Both members of the couple are only children 
5. One member of the couple is a handicapped soldier 
6. Both partners (or one party) are now local residents but formerly overseas 
Chinese, or formerly resident in Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan 
7. Rural couples in special settlement areas (remote mountain areas, poor 
quality habitat areas, etc.) 
In 1988, a further exemption of the second child for rural couples was discussed and 
approved.41  Except for those exemptions provided for in the past, every rural couple 
could be approved for a second child, provided that the first child was a girl, and a 
certain number of years have passed after the first birth. Along with it, the central 
government again emphasised that a consistent and constant policy should be applied 
to rural couples.  
After this conference, China’s family planning policies became more consistent and 
uniform. According to the requirement set by the central government,42 all local 
governments except Tibet passed their local legislation by October 1990. On 
December 29th, 2001, China launched PRC’s Population and Family Planning Law, 
which has been in force since January 1st, 2002. This law essentially maintains the 
1982 Family Planning Policy, stating that the concrete executive methods of this law 
                                                
41 This exemption was discussed and approved in the 18th session of the Standing Committee of the 
Central Politburo of the Communist Party of China, chaired by Zhao Ziyang on March 31st 1988. See, 
Zhongtang Liang, "Hard Process: From the One-Child Policy to a Policy for Rural Families with Girls 
(Jiannan De Licheng Cong Yitai Hua Dao Nver Hu 艰难的历程：从‘一胎化’到‘女儿户’)," 
http://www.opentimes.cn/bencandy.php?fid=375&aid=1806 (26th December 2014). 
42 In August 11th, 1990, the State Council held the 117th Office Conference, in which all local 
governments were required to have their local legislation in place before October 1990.  
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will be decided by provinces, autonomous regions and municipality43 level People’s 
Congresses and their standing committees.44  
3.3.2 Conditions for Second and Third Child Permits in Provincial 
Family Planning Regulations45  
Based on the 1982 central government family planning policy, the provincial levels 
soon revised or published their regional legislation. These regional regulations were 
revised twice during the 1990s and 2000s following the central government general 
guidelines. The number of children a couple could have and the conditions under 
which exceptions could be made were revised. The localised aspects of China’s 
population policy can be seen in the birth control regulations designed by each of the 
provinces. 
Including the regulations up to 2013, altogether, these legislation contain 
approximately 50 articles concerning the allowable number of children and criteria 
for exemptions.46 Table 2.2 presents a breakdown of provincial family planning 
legislation, including exemptions for second and third childbirths. 
 
 
                                                
43 The region is a municipality directly under the jurisdiction of the Central Government  
44  "The Population and Family Planning Law of People's Republic of China ",  (2002). Article 18. 
45 The data was updated in 2008. 
46 An analysis of nationwide legislation in 2000 can be found in Baochang Gu et al., "China's Local 
and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century," Population and Development 
Review 33, no. 10 (2007). Also, see, Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy 
and Demographic Development. Pp98-101. But Scharping’s analysis was updated 1999. 
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Table 3. 1 Provincial Population Policy (including Municipality and Autonomous 
Region (Prefecture))47 
Province, 
Municipality, 
Autonomous 
region  
(Date policy 
formed/revised) 
Second child policy Third child policy Gap (year) between two 
childbirth 
 
Populati 
(million) 
/areas 
(km2) 
in 2008  
Beijing 
 
2003.9 
1, 2, 3, 4.1; 
11, 12, 14, 16;  
G, E 
 4 years 
or women over 28 
15.38/ 
16,800  
Tianjin 
 
2003.9 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 6; 
10,11, 12,14, 16; 
G, E 
 4 years or women over 
28, or women has first 
childbirth in remarriage, 
or in category 3 
10.46/ 
11,000 
Shanghai 2004.4 1, 2, 3, 4, 4.5, 4.7, 4.8, 
5, 8; 
12, 19,  
G, E 
 No limitation 17.78/ 
5,800  
Chongqing 
1999.3/ 
2002.11 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.1; 
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20; 
a; 
 3 years or women over 
28 
27.74/ 
82,300 
                                                
47 All legislation was updated June, 2008. All local legislation was cited from PRC Population 
Information Website. www.cpirc.org.cn 
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E 
Heilongjiang 
2003.1 
1, 2, 3, 4(with 4 years 
gap), 6; 
9, 17, 
E, F (2 years) 
iv 4 years gap or no gap 
for category 1, or no gap 
if the couple’s first 
childbirth is late birth 
38.16/ 
460,000 
Liaoning 
2003.4 
1, 2, 3, 4, 4.1, 4.2, 8; 
9.1, 10, 16; 
a (women is rural 
resident) 
E 
 
 Women over 26, or no 
gap for category 4.1 
42.28/ 
150,000  
Jilin 
2002.11 
1, 2, 3, 4, 4.5, 4.6; 
9, 10, 11, 12, 16; 
c; 
E, F (4 years) 
 No limitation 27.08/ 
180,000  
Shandong 
1988.7/ 
1996.10 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.4, 5, 5.1, 
8.1,  
11, 12, 13,  
a, E  
 Women over 25 for the 
first childbirth and over 
30 for the second 
childbirth 
92.84/ 
150,000  
Shaanxi 
2002.9 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 6; 
9, 12, 13, 16; 
c, E, 
 4 years gap or women 
over 28. 
 37.05/ 
190,000  
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Shanxi 
1999.4/ 
2002.9 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.3, 4.4, 6; 
9, 11, 12, 13; 
E 
 Women over 28 33.35/ 
150,000  
Hebei 
2003.10 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8,  
12, 18; 
c, D, 
 4 years gap if women 
over 26; or shorter gap 
if women over 28; or no 
gap in category 4 
68.69/ 
190,000  
Henan 
2003.1 
1, 3, 4.1, 5, 6, 8.1 
12, 13, 14 
a, E 
 4 years or women over 
28 
97.17/ 
160,000  
Sichuan  
2002.10 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.3; 
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; 
 
 4 years gap or women 
over 30. 
87.50/ 
480,000  
Jiangsu 
2002.12 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.3, 5, 6, 7, 
8.1; 
10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18 
E, F (5 years)  
 Women over 24, or in 
category 4.1. 
74.32/ 
100,000  
Hubei 
2003.1 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.3,  
6; 
9, 12, 15, 16; 
a, E, D,  
F (2 years) 
 4 years or women over 
28 
60.31/ 
180,000  
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Hunan 
2003.1 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.5, 6; 
9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 20; 
D, E,  
F (3 years) 
 4 years gap if women 
over 25; or 2 years gap 
if women’s first 
childbirth is a late one; 
or no gap if women over 
28 
61.64/ 
210,000  
Anhui 
1990.6/ 
2002.7 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.3, 5, 6, 
8.1,  
9, 10, 12, 14, 
a, E, F (3 years) 
 The first child over 3 or 
women over 26. 
62.28/ 
130,000  
Guizhou 
1998.7/ 
2002.9 
1, 2, 3, 4.1,  
9, 12, 20, 21; 
D, 
ii 4 years or women over 
30 
39.04/ 
170,000  
Jiangxi 
2002.9 
 
1, 2, 4.1, 5, 6, 8.1,  
9, 11, 12, 15, 
a, E 
 Women over 25 years 
and with 4 years gap; or 
women over 28 with 2 
years gap; or no gap for 
the first child dead and 
children in overseas in 
category 6 
 
42.17/ 
160,000  
Zhejiang 
 
2002.9 
1, 2, 4.1, 4.3, 5, 8.1, 9,  
12, 15, 20,  
a, E, F (5 years)  
 4 years gap or women 
over 28; or no gap for 
category 1 
47.20/ 
100,000  
Guangdong 
 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.3, 8, 9, 21; 
f,  
ii 4 years gap; or no gap if 
women over 28 or in 
category or 3. 
88.89/ 
180,000  
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2002.9 
Gansu 
1989.11/ 
2006.1 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5; 
9, 12, 20; 
b, c,   
vi No limitation 26.19/ 
390,000  
Fujian 
1988.4/ 
2002.9 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.2, 5, 6, 
8.1; 
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21; 
A, E,  
ii, iii 4 years gap if women 
over 25, or no gap if 
women over 30 
35.11/ 
120,000  
Hainan 
 
 
2003.12 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.3, 4.4; 
21; 
b, D,  
F (3 years) 
v No gap limitation 7.28/ 
160,000  
Qinghai 
 
2003.1 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; 
20, 22; 
e, D. 
i 4 years gap; or women 
over 26 in category 1 
and 3; or no gap in 
category i. 
5.91/ 
720,000  
Yunnan 
 
2002.9 
 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 6; 
22; 
D, 
vii, viii 4 years gap 44.15/ 
380,000  
Guangxi 
 
2002.9 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 5;  
9, 11, 12, 17; 
E,  
 4 years gap or women 
over 28 
48.50/ 
 
230,000  
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Ningxia 
1990.12/ 
2003.1 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.3, 4.5, 6, 
8;  
a, e, D, 
iii, iv 4 years gap or no gap in 
category e 
6.02/ 
66,000  
Xinjiang 
 
2003.1/ 
2006.5 
1, 2, 3, 4, 4.1, 4.9, 5, 8; 
e, C, D,  
Rural Han nationality 
couple. 
Rural Minority nationality 
couples; rural Han nationality 
couple and urban minority 
nationality couples under 1, 2, 3, 
4, 4.1, 4.9, 5, 8. 
 
Encourage birth gap 
only 
19.63/ 
 
1,600,00
0  
Inner Mongolia 
 
2002.12 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.3, 8; 
9, 16; 
c, B, F, 
2 children policy for 
rural Mongolian; 
Rural Mongolian couple; 
iv, 
4 years for Han 
nationality; 3 years gap 
for minority nationality; 
2 years gap for late birth 
of first child 
23.85/ 
 
1,100,00
0  
Tibet 
 
1992.5 
Han nationality: 
1, 2, 3, 4.1, 4.3, 5, e; 
Rural Zang nationality 
Rural Zang nationality in 
catalogue 1 and 5;  
Encourage less than 3 children 
for Rural Zang nationality; 
No limitation for Zang 
nationality in Border areas. 
Han nationality: 
3 years gap or women 
over 35; 
3 years gap for Rural 
Zang nationality. 
2.74/ 
 
1,200,00
0  
 
3.3.2.1 Exceptions for the one-child legislation: 
Applicable to all couples: 
1. The first child is disabled and is not expected to be able to carry out 
normal labour (All local legislation have this exemption); 
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2. Both partners are only children (except Henan); 
3. The couple adopted one child because they could not conceive their own 
after many years of marriage. If the wife becomes pregnant after they 
have adopted a child, they are allowed to keep both their conceived child 
and their adopted child; 
4. Remarried couples: 
4.1 One partner has no child and  the other partner has one child; 
4.2 One party’s ex-partner died and the present couple has two children in 
total;  
4.3 One party’s ex-partner died and has two children, the other partner has no 
children; 
4.4 Both partners have one child and the children are living with their ex-
partners; 
4.5 Both partners have one child each and one of the children is disabled; 
4.6 Both partners are rural residents and one party has no child; 
4.7 Both partners are only children in their own family and have one child 
each with an ex-partner; 
4.8 One partner is a rural resident and one partner is an only child and neither 
has more than one child with an ex-partner; 
5. One party is disabled or an invalid soldier, or one party is an only child 
of a revolutionary martyr’s family: 
5.1 One party is disabled and has one daughter; 
6. Both partners are now local residents but formerly overseas Chinese, or 
formerly resident in Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan. They have resided 
in China for less than 6 years; 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
7. One party is the only child in two generations;  
8. Miners and fishermen, or border residents or island residents; 
8.1 Miners and fishermen, border residents or island residents with one 
daughter;       
Applicable to rural couples: 
9. Rural couple with one daughter: 
9.1 The female party is a rural resident and the only daughter is a rural 
resident as well; 
10. One member of the rural couple is an only child; 
11. The male partner is the only child who has reproductive ability among 
his brothers, and the other brothers have no child; (* the condition in Jilin 
and Hunan is that one party is the only child with reproductive ability 
among his/her siblings.) 
12. The male partner is married to a female only child and resides with her 
family (to support her family); 
13. Rural couples in special settlement areas (remote mountain areas, poor 
quality habitat areas, etc.); 
14.  Rural couples in special settlement areas (remote mountain areas, poor 
quality habitat areas, etc.) or with special requirements (such as being in 
a poor economic condition) with one daughter; 
15. One party in two generations has one child only; 
16. One party is disabled or an invalid soldier, or one party is an only child 
of a revolutionary martyr’s family;  
17. Miners and fishermen, border residents or island residents; 
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18. Miners and fishermen, border residents or island residents with one 
daughter; 
19. One party is a rural resident and one party is a single child; 
20. One party belongs to a minority nationality; 
21. Both parties belong to a minority nationality. (Hunan: one party is a rural 
resident; Hainan: both parties belong to small population minority 
nationalities); 
22. The couple has a special requirement for a second child (Qinghai and 
Yunnan only) 
Applicable to ethnic minority nationality couples: 
a. Both couples belong to minority nationalities;  
b. One party belongs to a small population minority nationality in one of 
the autonomous regions; 
c. Both parties belong to a small population minority nationality; 
d. Both parties have settled in or worked in the village area of a 
minority residence for more than 5 years; 
e. One party belongs to a minority nationality; 
f.   Both parties belong to minority nationalities and one party is a rural 
resident with one daughter; 
Three children policy: 
1-8  (same as the second child condition for all couples category 1-8) 
i. Minority nationality couples who work as herders or are settled in 
pastoral areas or forest areas or are from a small population 
nationality; 
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ii. One of the two children is handicapped and is not expected to be able 
to carry out normal labour and both parties are from minority 
nationalities settled in rural areas; 
iii. Both parties belong to minority nationalities and are the only child in 
their own families; 
iv. Both parties belong to small population minority nationalities; 
v. Both parties belong to minority nationalities and are settled in rural 
areas with two daughters; 
vi. Both parties are rural residents and one party belongs to a small 
population minority nationality; 
vii. One party belongs to a small population minority nationality; 
viii, Both parties belong to minority nationalities and are settled in border 
areas; 
Some definitions: 
A. If one party is of Han nationality, the other party is of minority 
nationality, and the Han party is settled in the minority nationality 
party’s residence area, the minority nationality family planning 
policies may be applied; 
B. A couple could choose their preferred policy if they belong to two 
different minority nationalities; 
C. If one party is of Han nationality and the other party is of minority 
nationality, the couple can choose to apply the minority nationality 
policies; 
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D. If one party is a city resident and the other party is a rural resident, 
they are subject to the city policy (in Hainan, this depends on the 
female party) 
E. If the female party is in rural residence, the couple would be subject 
to the rural policy; 
F. The couple’s registration was changed from rural residence to urban 
residence because of city reconstruction. In this case the rural policies 
are still applicable for a certain period of years (ranging from 2 to 5 
years);  
G.  Job transfer residents of ethnic minority origin or from frontier 
regions who had previously received permission to have a second 
child. 
3.3.3 Conclusion 
On the basis of the above comparison, these exemptions can be grouped into four 
broad categories: cultural, economic, political and entitlement. Each of these 
suggests the feasibility of implementation and rationales for particular localities.  
3.3.3.1 Cultural Exemptions 
Most of these cultural exemptions refer to people settled in rural areas where the sex 
preference is deeply rooted. They include rural couples with one daughter (category 
9), or where the male partner is the only child who has reproductive ability among 
his male siblings (category 11), or the male partner is married to a female singleton 
and resides with her family (to support her family) (category 12), or one party whose 
two generations above them have only had one child (category 15). To take an 
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example, the Fujian48 Population and Family Planning Legislation, 2002, Article 10 
states: A rural couple can have a second child after it is proved that either 1) each 
member of the couple is an only child; 2) the male partner is the only child who has 
reproductive ability among his brothers, all of whom have no children; 3) the female 
partner has no brothers and has only one sister; 4)the male partner is married to a 
female singleton and resides with her family (to support her family); 5) the couple 
has only one daughter.  
However, these cultural based exemptions are also a primary source of 
discrimination against girls and the main cause of China’s imbalanced sex ratio.49 
3.3.3.2 Economic Exemptions 
These economic policies exist in most provinces in remote mountainous areas or 
poor quality habitat areas (such as category 13 and 14), as well as areas where 
occupational specialisation involves a high risk of mortality, such as fishing or 
mining (for instance categories 8, 17 and 18). The government leaderships realised 
that more labour is necessary in areas with a special geographical character, such as 
Shaanxi.50 Shaanxi Family Planning Legislation Article 22 (3) states that a rural 
couple can have a second child provided that they are living in remote and poor 
quality habitat mountain areas. Other examples are Fujian, which is a coastal area but 
also mountainous, and Shandong, which has some tough mountain areas, as well as 
Sichuan and Shanghai, where some people are occupied as fishermen. 
                                                
48 Fujian is a coastal and mountainous region in Southeast China. It is a less developed region when 
compared to Shanghai or Beijing. Gender culture is deeply rooted in this region. Emigration is 
common. This not only includes migration from county to city, from Fujian to Beijing, Shanghai, or 
Shenzhen, but also includes migration to overseas. Sea and forest resources are rich in this area.  
49 Chu, "Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion in Rural Central China." 
50 Shaanxi is a developing region with many mountains and is less rich in resources. It is situated in 
Northwest China.  
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3.3.3.3 Ethnic/ Political Exemptions 
The population policy also grants more generous treatment to those people who 
either belong to an ethnic minority nationality,51 or are returning overseas Chinese 
(category 6), or where one partner is an invalided soldier or the only child of a 
revolutionary martyr’s family (category 6).  
According to China’s Minority Nationality’s Policy and its practice, family planning 
policies are less strict for minority nationalities than for the Han nationality: ‘In 
general, minority nationalities can have two or three children; minority nationalities 
residing at borders or in areas with a poor quality environment or with a sparse 
population may have more than two children; there is no limitation for Zang 
nationality herdsmen.’52 According to local provincial legislation, most minority 
couples can have two children if they reside in a rural area, and they can have three if 
they reside in an autonomous region and belong to certain minorities with small 
populations, or occupy the border areas or live as herders. For example, in Section 15 
of Xinjiang Weiwuer Autonomous Region’s Population and Family Planning Statute, 
it states that: ‘Urban citizens of Han nationality may only have only one child, while 
urban citizens of minority nationalities can have two children; peasants and 
                                                
51 According to China’s Minority Nationalities Policy and its Practice, which was launched by the 
State Council’s News Office, Beijing, 1999, minority nationalities have less strict family planning 
policies applied to them than the Han nationality: ‘In general, minority nationalities can have two or 
three children; minority nationalities residing at borders or in areas with a poor natural environment or 
with a sparse population can have more than two children; there is no limitation for the Zang 
nationality herdsmen’. 
For example, in Section 15 of Xinjiang Weiwuer Autonomous Region’s Population and Family 
Planning Statute, it states: ‘Urban citizens of Han nationality may only have one child, while urban 
citizens of minority nationalities can have two children; peasants and herdsmen of Han nationality can 
have two children, while those of minority nationalities can have three children.’ 
52 State Council News Office, "China’s Minority Nationality Policy and Its Practice (Zhongguo 
Shaoshu Minzu Zhengce He Shijian 中国少数民族政策和实践 )," www.china.com.cn/ch-
book/shaoshu/ishaoshu.htm (2nd June 2008). 
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herdsmen of Han nationality can have two children, while those of minority 
nationalities can have three children.’  
Another group ‘the only-child of a revolutionary family’ (category 5) can be seen in 
most regions where the revolution was centred, such as Beijing and Chongqing.  
3.3.3.4 Entitlement/replacement Exemption 
These exemptions are general principles in most provinces. Among these 
exemptions, one is that couples are entitled to a second child if their first child is 
disabled and is therefore unable to carry out normal labour (category 1),53 as are 
couples where both parties are only children themselves (category 2 and 10).54 
Another category included is the couples who had adopted one child after being 
unable to conceive their own after many years of marriage (category 3), but then the 
wife had become pregnant afterwards. In such as case the couples are allowed to 
keep both their conceived child and adopted child. Furthermore, there are several 
categories included where the child is born in remarried families (category 4, 
although the rules are slightly different according to province).  
In addition to rules for the allowed number of children and the criteria of the 
exemptions for second and third childbirths, late marriage and late births are 
encouraged at all levels, from central to local government. According to the PRC 
Marriage Law, the legal marriage age is 22 years for men and 20 years for women. 
However, at a provincial level, it is a generally accepted view that an acceptably late 
                                                
53 This is a general exception of population policy and can be found in all provincial Population and 
Family Planning Legislation. For example, Henan Province Population and Family Planning 
Legislation, 2002, Article 17 (1) states that the couple can be approved for a second child provided 
that the first child is not expected to be able to carry out normal labour and the disease was not 
inherited. This medical check must be identified by a county level authenticated organization and 
approved by the provincial level medical authenticating organization.  
See, e.g., Article 15 (1) in Shanxi Province Population and Family Planning Legislation, 2002.   
54 This exemption can be found in most regions except Henan, which has a very large population. 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
marriage is 3 years over the legal marriage age.  To ensure that birth occurs at a later 
stage in the marriage, most provinces encourage childbirth for women when they are 
over 24 years old55 as a principle. Fujian and Shaanxi are exceptions to this: a late 
birth age for Fujian occurs after a male’s 30th birthday or a female’s 24th birthday; 
Shaanxi does not have a definition of a late birth. In addition, Ningxia Hui 
Nationality Autonomous Region and Xinjiang indicate that the late marriage age for 
minority nationalities is 23 years for men and 21 years for women. Tibet has no 
related legislation.    
In addition, most local legislation also sets the criteria for the gap (in years) between 
two childbirths as a further step to maintaining a low population growth rate. The 
general guideline for the distance between the first and second childbirth is four 
years. Usually, the couple will not be limited by the 4 years gap under the following 
circumstances: (1) when a married woman is over 28 years; (2) if the first child is 
handicapped; (3) if the wife is pregnant after they have adopted one child because 
she was diagnosed as infertile or they were unable to conceive many years after 
getting married.  
However, some provinces/municipalities have different rules about gaps:  Chongqing 
sets the interim period at three years; Shanxi does not specify a period, but requires 
women to be over 28 years for their second childbirth; Jiangxi requires women to be 
over 25 years old prior to a second childbirth and requires a four years gap between 
two births (or a gap of 2 years for women over 28 years); Hainan sets no time 
limitation for approved second childbirths. 
                                                
55 Some provinces, like Fujian, set the pregnancy and childbirth after their late marriage as their late 
birth principle. In fact, if a woman marries when she is 23 years old, the childbirth will be nearly on 
her 24 years birthday. In this way, all the provincial legislation about the late marriage are similar.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
China’s current population policy is not, contrary to some Western media portrayals, 
a uniform one-child policy. In some senses, ‘China is special but not that special: 
…it is a typical East Asian country with “family” at the centre of most people’s 
universes.’56  However, China is different because of the extent of its internal 
geographical, cultural and economic diversities. With a territorial space similar to 
Europe and the U.S.A., China has a population of over 1.3 billion (2008), which is 
1.8 times that of Europe and 4.3 times that of U.S.A.57 In addition, 56 nationalities58, 
with the Han being the largest59, reside in China. Some of these minority nationalities 
have a homogenous settlement area, such as the Zang nationality who live in Tibet, 
while others reside alongside other nationalities. Different nationalities have different 
cultures and religious principles. Furthermore, from an economic perspective, 
although China is still a developing country on the whole, the internal differences are 
distinctive. Some cities, like Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen, have reached the level 
of developed countries; while most areas are still at the level of developing countries. 
In addition, there are some very poor regions whose residents just reach a basic 
living standard. For example, in some mountainous areas in Shanxi, because of its 
special geographical characteristics, harvesting enough grain or other foods from the 
field is still a huge task for local farmers. In these areas, having extra children does 
                                                
56 W. T. Murphy, "China's Laws and Flaws," The Modern Law Review 70, no. 6 (2007).  
57 In 2008, the population was 709,608,850in Europe is, and 304,025,505 in U.S.   
58 There are 55 ethnic minority nationalities in China. The majority of these people have their own 
areas of residence, which includes 5 autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures, and 120 
autonomous counties. 
59 Han Chinese constitutes about 91.9% of the total population. The remaining 8.1% are Zhuang (16 
million), Manchu (10 million), Hui (9 million), Miao (8 million), Uygur (7 million), Yi (7 million), 
Mongolian (5 million), Tibetan (5 million), Buyi (3 million), Korean (2 million), and other ethnic 
minorities. See Population Reference Bureau, 
http://www.prb.org/Datafinder/Geography/Summary.aspx?region=163&region_type=2 (May 30th 
2008). 
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not just mean having enough manpower for the fields but also means there’s the 
possibility of extra economic income by sending those (grown up) children to the 
city to work. In contrast, these extra children may be considered a burden in cities 
because people expect a higher standard of living for their children.  
Based on these variations, population policies vary from area to area depending on 
the nationalities present, the region’s general economic level, the geographical nature 
of the local area, and the special needs of the families.60 Therefore, under the central 
government’s principle of “one child per couple, no more than two”, the population 
rules vary from area to area. 
China’s current population policy with respect to families is dictated by the state’s 
long-term modernization, wealth-creation, labour and educational objectives. In 
addition, according to Ma Yinchu’s theory of ‘less quantity means better quality’, 
China has adopted a eugenics policy by emphasizing Yousheng  (High Quality 
Reproduction) and Youyu (Better childrearing) and recently Youjiao (Superior 
education). Included in this is the encouragement of late marriage and late childbirth, 
and the prohibition of reproduction among those with DNA-related ailments for the 
purpose of maximizing resource allocation and distribution – including food, 
consumer goods and energy – and to improve healthcare and education. Through this 
eugenic policy, China is trying to shape its citizens by genetic, environmental and 
educational means to meet what the government sees as the nation’s needs.61  
                                                
60 See Isabelle Attane, "China's Family Planning Policy: An Overview of Its Past and Future," Studies 
in Family Planning 33, no. 1, Family Planning Programs in the Twenty-first Century, (Mar.) (2002). 
Susan E Short and Fengying Zhai, "Looking Locally at China's One-Child Policy," ibid.29, no. 4 
(1998). Winckler, "Chinese Reproductive Policy at the Turn of the Millennium: Dynamic Stability." 
61 Susan Champagne, "Producing the Intelligent Child: Intelligence and the Child Rearing Discourse 
in the People’s Republic of China" (Stanford University, 1992). pp135-136. 
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In 2013, China started to relax its four decades old one-child policy. On 12th 
November 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee approved 
the Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms 
(zhonggongzhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de 
jueding 中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定). This decision allowed 
couples to have a second child if one parent was an only child. By the end of 2014, 
except Xinjiang, all other provincial regions had approved the second-child policy.62 
                                                
62 See, Xinhua Net, "Two More Chinese Provinces Relax One-Child Policy," 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/863191.shtml (2nd June 2014). 
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Chapter 4 The Vertical Relationships in the Family 
Planning Agencies Hierarchy 
The purpose of this chapter is to study the organizational structures of China’s family 
planning institutions. A systematic understanding of the role of these administrative 
organization settings provides a base for explaining the implementation process.1  
This chapter traces the historical family planning organizational developments in the 
PRC from central government to grassroots level, as a means of giving a detailed picture 
of the functions and limitations of the family planning administrative organizations at the 
grassroots level and the village level. This chapter is also designed to set out the 
background for understanding the “grassroots level agencies’ autonomy” (chapters 5 and 
8). 
The first part of this chapter reviews, in chronological order, the PRC’s family planning 
organizational development from state to grassroots level. The grassroots level agencies’ 
organizational structuring and their functions are explained in detail. In order to better 
illustrate the duties of the town level officials, EY town family planning assistant Gu 
was selected as a case study for this chapter. This chapter also explains the practical 
relationship between the family planning administrative organizations and other related 
public institutions and the affiliated organizations at the town level. Finally, the 
administrative relationships between the upper level and the grassroots level family 
planning organizations are analysed. 
                                                
1  Some scholars have studied the PRC’s family planning organization system from different 
perspectives. See Pi-Chao Chen, "Birth Control Methods and Organization in China," in China's One-
Child Family Policy, ed. Elisabeth J. Croll, Delia Davin, and Penny Kane (London: Macmillan, 1985). 
Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development. 
Merli, Qian, and Smith, "Adaptation of a Political Bureaucracy to Economic and Institutional Change 
under Socialism: The Chinese State Family Planning System." 
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4.1 Introduction  
Between the 1950s and 2010, China’s family planning campaign changed from 
restricting contraception in order to protect and improve women’s health, to limiting 
the number of children in order to stimulate economic development. The family 
planning regulations extended from raising the legal marriage age to promoting late 
marriage. The focus of family planning locations extended rapidly from urban areas 
in the 1960s to countrywide from the 1970s.  Birth control methods also shifted from 
encouraging voluntary family planning before the 1970s, to enforcing mandatory 
contraceptive methods from the 1980s.  
Along with the family planning campaign development, China’s family planning 
administrative system was also gradually being formulated. It has evolved from a 
minor agency to a major independent institution at the state level. In the 1950s, the 
state level family planning agency was under the charge of the health department and 
only had one officer, and it remained an informal organization until the beginning of 
the 1980s. In 1981, it developed into an independent major state institution with over 
100 officials and developed further during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.2 In 2013, the 
family planning agency was reorganized. Following the relaxation of population 
regulation, family planning once again became a normal health issue and the family 
planning agency was merged with the health department 
 
 
 
                                                
2 The number of administrative establishments in the state family planning commission were 60 in 
1981, 120 in 1982, and 140 in 1988. See State Population and Family Planning Commission, China's 
Population and Family Planning History (Zhongguo Renkou He Jihuashengyu Shi 中国人口和计划
生育史). pp690-691. 
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Table 4. 1 State Level Family Planning Organization Revolutions 
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4.2 Early Stage Family Planning Organizations: 1950s -70s:  
4.2.1 State and Provincial Level 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, Birth-control measures remained under the jurisdiction 
of the Maternity and Child Care Bureau (fouyou weishengsi 妇幼卫生司) of the 
Health Ministry.3 Those ‘specialist’ birth control organizations set up during the 
1960s and 1970s were neither a formal administrative institution nor a sufficient 
organ to implement family planning. Their main functions were advocating family 
planning campaigns and coordinating cooperation from all departments. 
4.2.1.1 One Staff Responsible for Family Planning and Family Planning Section 
During the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, no specialist family planning 
institution was set up in China. In 1956, one staff member from the Maternity and 
Children Care Bureau was appointed to be responsible for this job. At the end of 
1962, after launching the Instruction of Earnest Advocating Family Planning 
(Document 698), a special Family Planning Section (jihuashengyu chu 计划生育处) 
was set up in the Maternity and Children Care Bureau. Its main function was to 
organize family planning technical service work.  
4.2.1.2 State Council’s Family Planning Commission 
On January 1964, the State Council’s Family Planning Commission (guowuyuan 
jihuashengyu weiyuanhui 国务院计划生育委员会) was set up following the central 
government’s 1963 directive that of “family planning commissions should be 
established at all levels from state to local… (zhongyang he defang douyao chengli 
                                                
3 Peng Peiyun, A Whole Series of China's Family Planning (Zhongguo Jihuashengyu Quanshu 中国计
划生育全书). p.437. 
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jihuashengyu weiyuanhui 中央和地方都要成立计划生育委员会)”.4 The head 
secretary of the state council was appointed as the Commission’s Director (zhuren 主
任). The members were drawn from related state departments (including the Health 
Ministry), academics, and representatives from mass organizations (Women’s 
Federation, the Trade Union and the Communist Youth League), and the army.5 
Under this commission, a Family Planning Office of State Council (guowuyuan 
jihuashengyu bangongshi 国务院计划生育办公室)6 was set up to be responsible for 
the daily work, but it was managed by the Maternity and Children Care Bureau. The 
Commission’s duty was to popularize family planning policy, coordinate respective 
policies and regulations, inspect and encourage the lower level’s family planning 
work, and serve as a model for the lower level family planning organization.7 But the 
technical support work was still the responsibility of the Health of Women and 
Children Bureau.8  This commission was not a formal executive administrative 
department but rather a coordinating organ.  
At the local level, following the central government’s 1962 Document of Earnestly 
Advocating Family Planning9 and the 1963 directive from the Minutes of the Second 
                                                
4 "The Central Committee  and the State Council's Instruction on the Approved Minute of the Second 
City [Development] Work Conference (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Pizhun Dierci Chengshi 
Gongzuo Huiyi Jiyao De Zhishi 中共中央国务院批准第二次城市工作会议纪要的指示)." 
5  Honggui Li, "The Development of China's Family Planning Institutions at the State Level 
(Zhongguo Jihuashengyu Lingdao Guanli Jigou De Lishi Bianhua 中国计划生育领导管理机构的历
史变化)," http://www.shz100.com/article-4210-1.html (3rd May 2014). 
Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development. 
p.160.  
6 This office is not an administrative organization but an ‘office’ (banshi jigou 办事机构) to carry out 
the family planning issues. 
7 Peng Peiyun, A Whole Series of China's Family Planning (Zhongguo Jihuashengyu Quanshu 中国计
划生育全书). p.437. 
8 See interview LiangE 270314. 
9 "The Central Committee and State Council's Instruction on Earnestly Advocating Family Planning 
(Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Renzhen Tichang Jihuashengyu De Zhishi 中共中央国
务院关于认真提倡计划生育的指示) ". 
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City [Development] Work Conference, family planning organizations were rapidly 
set up in most regions. At the provincial level, 25 out of 28 provinces10 had 
established Family Planning Commissions (or Leading Group for Family Planning) 
by the end of 1964.11 Similar to the state level, these commissions/leading groups 
were also the umbrella organizations bringing together representatives from the 
related departments and organizations. 12  As these commissions’ ‘administrative 
body’,13 a family planning office was usually set up to carry out the actual work. 
These offices were managed by provincial health departments.  
However, all these family planning organizations from the state to local levels soon 
ceased their work in 1966 due to the Cultural Revolution. They didn’t make much 
impression on family planning work. 
4.2.1.3 Leading Group for Family Planning 
In 1971 the family planning work was restored. With help from Premier Zhou Enlai, 
the State Council approved the Report of Making a Good Job of Family Planning in 
                                                
10 There are twenty-one provinces, five centrally administered Municipalities and 2 autonomous 
regions in 1964. Tianjin was allocated as a city level Municipality of Hebei Province between 1958 
and 1967.  
11 Li, "The Development of China's Family Planning Institutions at the State Level (Zhongguo 
Jihuashengyu Lingdao Guanli Jigou De Lishi Bianhua 中国计划生育领导管理机构的历史变化)"  
(3rd May 2014). 
Li Honggui, the former vice-deputy of National Family Planning Commission (1994-99). This article 
was originally available at National Population and Family Planning Commission website, 
http://chinapop.gov.cn (accessed on March 26, 2008), which had replaced by the National Health and 
Family Planning Commission website: http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn. 
12 Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development. 
p.160. 
13 The ‘administrative body (banshi jigou办事机构)’ is differed from the ‘administrative organization 
(xingzheng jiguan 行政机关)’ in this thesis. The former refers to those offices that do not have direct 
administrative functions but assist other administrative organizations to carry out some particular 
tasks, such as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council (国务院侨务办公室) or 
Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council (guowuyuan fazhi bangongshi国务院法制办公室). 
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1971. 14  This report requested that all the provinces, autonomous regions and 
centrally administered municipalities should be conscientious and make a good job 
of family planning, and an administrative office should be set up in the Health 
Department’s establishment. On July 1973, a new organisation—the State Council’s 
Leading Group for Family Planning (guowuyuan jihuashengyu lingdao xiaozu 国务
院计划生育领导小组)—was set up. A general office was set up to carry out the 
daily work but no subordinate offices. As with the former office, this weak and 
understaffed general office remained under the charge of the Health Ministry until 
the 1980s. The Leading Group at its first session had 23 members including 1 head 
and 3 deputy heads. These members comprised leaders from the State Council and 
representatives from the state departments of civil administration, planning, public 
security, health, production and distribution of contraceptives, as well as cadres from 
the Party’s Propaganda Department and Disciplinary Commission, the Youth 
League, the Women’s Federation and the Trade Union, the Army and some 
representatives from provincial level agencies.15 The groups were responsible for 
drawing up a population development plan, laying down a contraceptive devices’ 
production plan and a family planning research program, carrying out birth control 
technical guidance, and popularizing birth control knowledge and population 
theory.16 Nevertheless, this technical support work was still the responsibility of the 
Health of Women and Children Bureau.17  However, as with the former State 
Council’s Family Planning Commission, this State Council’s Leading Group for 
                                                
14 "The Report of Making a Good Job of Family Planning (Guanyu Zuohao Jihuashengyu Gongzuo 
De Baogao 关于做好计划生育工作的报告)," (GuoFa (No. 51) July 8th, 1971). 
15 State Population and Family Planning Commission, China's Population and Family Planning 
History (Zhongguo Renkou He Jihuashengyu Shi 中国人口和计划生育史). p.689.  
16 Ibid. p.689. 
17 See interview LiangE270314. 
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Family Planning was also an informal administrative body. It did not have the 
implementation authority but was confined to discussion and coordination.18  
4.2.2 Embryonic Grassroots Level Organizations  
During the 1950s and 1960s, grassroots level family planning organizations had not 
been set up widely in China. There were no full time family planning personnel at 
grassroots level in S province. In the 1970s, local family planning organization 
rapidly developed. Family planning organizations were set up at all levels. But the 
full time family planning personnel were not put in place at the grassroots level until 
1979. Before the beginning of the 1980s, the major responsibility for the 
implementation of the family planning lay with the health administration. The 
Ministry of Health, acting on policy instructions from the State Council, issued 
directives to the provincial health departments, which in turn gave instructions to the 
health bureaus of the cities and counties. At the bottom of the administration, the 
health units or equivalent agencies in the city neighbourhood and in people’s 
communes19 were responsible for publicity and providing the technical support.20 
In S province, the family planning work started from the mid 1950s. Following the 
central government’s instruction, the focus of the family planning work was to 
publicize the birth control campaign, advocate contraceptive methods and provide 
technical advice in the urban and dense population areas. In 1963, with the focus 
extended from the urban to rural areas,21 the first family planning organization – 
                                                
18 Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development. 
p.162. 
19 It is the town hospital at the commune level.  
20 Y. C. Yu, "The Population Policy of China," Population Studies 33, no. 1 (Mar.) (1979). p.134. 
21 "S Province Women and Children's Health Work Proposal in 1963 (S Sheng 1963 Nian Fuyou 
Weisheng Gongzuo Fangan S 省 1963年妇幼卫生工作方案),"  (S Province Health Department, 
1963). 
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Family Planning Commission – was set up in S province.22 This commission was led 
by the vice governor of the province. Family planning work was responsible by the 
health department at each level. 
Following on, all the above county levels set up family planning commissions while 
only 40% of communes and 20% of production brigades (shengchan dadui 生产大队
)/villages had leading groups for family planning.23 At this embryonic stage, family 
planning work faced many difficulties: insufficient funding and contraceptive tools, 
lack of professional personnel and insufficient technical support. Without making 
very impressive progress, these family planning organizations were soon suspended 
by the Cultural Revolution in 1966.  
In the 1970s, family planning work recovered and S provincial level leading group 
for family planning was set up in 1971.24 After the first conference organized by the 
leading group for family planning on June 1971, the revolutionary council approved 
the conference memo’s request. 25  It requested the wide advocating of family 
planning and training to grassroots level family planning officials, as well as 
extending the family planning work to the villages, factories and the street level. In 
responding to this ‘memo’, family planning organizations or special family planning 
officials were widely set up or appointed at prefecture/city, county and commune 
                                                
22 SX History Records Research Institution (Shizhi Yanjiuyuan 史志研究院), ed. Sx Local History 
Record (Sx Tongzhi  Sx通志), vol. 6th, Population History Record (Renkou Zhi 人口志) (China Book 
Bureau (zhonghua shuju 中华书局), 1999). p.360. 
23 Shilin Bi, ed. S Province [Population] Section (S Fence S分册), China's Population (Zhongguo 
Renkou 中国人口 ) (Beijing: China's Finance and Economy Press (zhongguo caizheng jingji 
chubanshe 中国财政经济出版社), 1989). p.347. 
24 Peng Peiyun, A Whole Series of China's Family Planning (Zhongguo Jihuashengyu Quanshu 中国
计划生育全书). p.347. 
25 "S Province Revolutionary Council Approved the Memo of the First Conference Organized by S 
Province Family Planning Leading Group (S Sheng Gemingweiyuanhui Pizhuan Sheng Jihuashengyu 
Lingdaozu Diyici Huiyi Jiyao S 省革命委员会批转省计划生育领导组第一次会议纪要),"  (June 
25th, 1971). 
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level between 1971 and 1973;26 and the advocating of the family planning policy and 
technical support for contraceptive methods were spread all over the province. These 
leading groups were led by the local CPC and the Revolutionary Council. Similarly, 
at the provincial level, a family planning office, known as the ‘administrative body’, 
was set up under the jurisdiction of the health bureau to carry out the daily work. 
However, these family planning offices were empty shell organizations. They were 
not independent offices and most of their personnel were concurrent officials of the 
health department.27 This was described as “two organizations with one group of 
personnel (liangge jigou yitao renma 两个机构一套人马 )”. 
The QX County leading group for family planning was set up in 1972.28 The deputy 
head of the health bureau was appointed as the concurrent family planning office 
head.  
Below the county level, all the communes had appointed concurrent officials to be 
especially responsible for it.29 It was normally the head of the town hospital,30 
supported by the female vice-leaders at each unit and women’s federation head at the 
commune level. At the production brigades and production teams (shengchan dui 生
产队), only some big villages appointed specialist family planning officials. In most 
villages, it was the county level health department which led family planning work 
                                                
26 A Whole Series of China's Family Planning (Zhongguo Jihuashengyu Quanshu 中国计划生育全书
). p.1276. 
27 Interview TanE190514. 
28 QX County Difang Zhi Bianzhuan Weiyuanhui [Local History Compile Committee], ed. Qx County 
Records (Xianzhi 县志) (SX: SX Guji Press, 1999). p.101. 
29 SX History Records Research Institution (Shizhi Yanjiuyuan 史志研究院), Sx Local History Record 
(Sx Tongzhi  Sx通志). p.361. Qx County Records (Xianzhi 县志). p.102. 
30 The town hospital is the administrative institution at the town level. 
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and was supported by the barefoot doctors (chijiao yisheng 赤脚医生)31 and the 
women’s leader (funv zhuren 妇女主任). 
However, with the increasing heavy duties entailed by the continuous tightening of 
the family planning policy, these part time personnel were found to be inadequate to 
carry out the work. At the production brigade and production team levels, they had to 
send (women) cadres or themselves to attend the birth-control meetings organised by 
the people’s commune or county and carry out the family planning activities. These 
extra family planning tasks were unpaid jobs in addition to their many other assigned 
duties. For the People’s Commune level, the commune hospital had to assist the 
county level’s family planning work and provide the technical service, as well as 
collecting the data reported from the lower levels and set up the annual birth quotas 
for the town and individual villages.32 In late 1978, regular tabulation of report 
figures were also required by the State Council leading group for family planning.33 
A specialist family planning organization or officials became necessary to take on 
these increased tasks.  
                                                
31 The barefoot doctors are the health care assistants at the village level. They had received basic 
medical training and could provide some basic treatment to the villagers. 
32 In 1971, the central government set up a new population quota for the Fourth-Five-Years (1971-
1975) Plan in The Report of Making a Good Job of Family Planning. It requires that the population 
growth rate should be controlled to below 15% in rural and below 10% in urban areas by 1975. See  
State Population and Family Planning Commission, China's Population and Family Planning History 
(Zhongguo Renkou He Jihuashengyu Shi 中国人口和计划生育史). p.332. 
S province took these quotes as its SiWu [Fourth-Five-Years] population goals. Under this guidance, 
the population quota was distributed to all the individual regions level by level. See SX History 
Records Research Institution (Shizhi Yanjiuyuan 史志研究院), Sx Local History Record (Sx Tongzhi  
Sx通志). p.384. 
33  This tabulation is mainly about the original figures collected about the married/unmarried 
population, pregnant women and children number of fertility age women. In addition to the data 
collected by the family planning department, the data recourse also coming from the department of 
statistic, public security and health, as well as civil affair. However, at this time, the grassroots level 
family planning statistic database had not been set up in S province. See Sx Local History Record (Sx 
Tongzhi  Sx通志). p.388. 
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4.3 Formal Organizational Stage: 1980s - 2013 
During the 1950s to the 1970s, the mobilization campaign has been the main method 
of implementing family planning regulation in China. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
the decentralised provincial regulations were rapidly formulated in all regions, but 
the party-led mobilization campaign was still the only campaign to ensuring the 
implementation and maintain the coordinates among different departments.34 The 
local government found it hard to execute the one child policy and firmly extended it 
to the rural areas without a proper administration organization. The former family 
planning organizations lacked the administrative capability to enforce the regulations 
and request the coordination. Therefore, formal family planning administrative 
organizations were soon set up from state to local levels.  
4.3.1 State and Provincial Level 
It was only from the 1980s that the family planning organization became an 
independent and formal institution. With the dramatic development in family 
planning campaigns and related academic research in the 1970s, alongside the 
comprehensive policy introduced in 1979 35 , a more effective administrative 
organization was required to replace the insufficient State Council’s Leading Group 
for Family Planning.  
On March 1981, after discussion at the 17th conference of the Fifth Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, a new institution was established: the 
State Family Planning Commission (Guojia Jihua Shengyu Weiyuanhui 国家计划生
育委员会 ). This commission had 26 ordinary members from the Standing 
                                                
34 White, "Implementing the 'One-Child-Per-Couple' Population Program in Rural China: National 
Goals and Local Politics." p.315. 
35 It refers to the 1979 one-child policy. 
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Committee of the National People’s Congress, the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference, various ministries and commissions, the People’s 
Liberation Army and a number of mass organizations.36 This State Family Planning 
Commission was different from the former organizations. Firstly, unlike the former 
organizations confined to discussion and coordination, this commission was a formal 
administrative institution with executive authority and structures, as well as regular 
work to carry out. Secondly, this new organization was an independent institution 
that was independent of the Health Ministry and under the charge of the State 
Council. Thirdly, unlike the former organizations which had no subordinated 
institutions, this commission had its own functional departments.  
Since the establishment of the State Family Planning Commission in 1981, 28 out of 
31 provincial level regions had set up their own provincial level family planning 
commissions by 1984.37 The family planning commission became the only family 
planning administrative institution in China from state to county level. The leading 
group for family planning was either kept or revived at later times at all levels as a 
coordinating organization only. Led by the head38 of the People’s Government, more 
members were involved in this group compared to the 1970’s leading group. In 2009, 
31 departments were involved in the leading group for family planning: the 
departments from the government and party committee, and the departments of legal, 
education, technology, public security, civil affairs, finance, human resources, 
construction, agriculture and forestry, health, taxation and Administration department 
                                                
36  See Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic 
Development. p.161. 
37 State Population and Family Planning Commission, China's Population and Family Planning 
History (Zhongguo Renkou He Jihuashengyu Shi 中国人口和计划生育史). p.177. 
38 It could be the (deputy) head or (deputy) party secretary. 
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for industry and commerce, publicity, statistics, commodity prices, religious affairs 
and the mass organizations.  
A general office was set up under the state Family Planning Commission, and 5 sub-
divisions39 of 60 officials were set up under the office in 1981.40 During the 1980s, 
the Family Planning Commission was constantly enlarged and strengthened by 
setting up more competent divisions with large numbers of officials. By 1998, the 
organization had developed to 7 divisions41 and 120 personnel.42 Additionally, this 
commission established its vertical structure of family planning commissions at all 
levels in China (except Tibet43). Therefore, the State Family Planning Commission 
was the first formal and systematic family planning organization in China. 
In 2003, this institution was renamed the State’s Population and Family Planning 
Commission (guojia renkou he jihua shengyu weiyuanhui 国家人口和计划生育委
员会) as a result of the institutional revolution at the 1st Conference of the 10th 
National People’s Congress. Then, all the provinces followed the central government 
step and renamed their Family Planning Commissions, “Population and Family 
Planning Commission”. 
                                                
39 These five divisions were ranked as Chu (division). They are: Secretary division (mishuchu 秘书处
), publicity and education division (xuanchuan jiaoyu chu 宣传教育处),  policy research division, 
planning and finance division (jihuacaiwu chu 计划财务处), foreign affairs division (waishi 外事) 
40 See State Population and Family Planning Commission, China's Population and Family Planning 
History (Zhongguo Renkou He Jihuashengyu Shi 中国人口和计划生育史). pp688-702. 
41 These divisions are ranked as si (department). They are: general office (bangongting 办公厅), 
policy and legislation department (zhengcefagui si 政策法规司), planning and finance department, 
propaganda and education department, science and technology department (kexue jishu si 科学技术
司), personnel department (renshi si 人事司), international cooperation (guoji hezuo si 国际合作司).  
42 See State Population and Family Planning Commission, China's Population and Family Planning 
History (Zhongguo Renkou He Jihuashengyu Shi 中国人口和计划生育史). p.695. 
43 Because of Tibet’s weak governmental apparatus, its family planning work still mainly relied on the 
health department. See Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and 
Demographic Development. p.162. 
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4.3.2 Grassroots Level  
From 1979, the grassroots level family planning organizations were rapidly set up 
followed by the appointment of professional and full time family planning officials. 
At the town level, the family planning assistants, excess-birth fine administrator, and 
contraceptive tools administrator were gradually appointed and formed the necessary 
personnel to implement the population policy at the grassroots level. The setting up 
of the family planning technical service station at the county level and technical 
assistance at the town level further improved these grassroots level agencies’ 
implementation ability. At the beginning of the 1980s, the village level also 
appointed professional family planning officials to assist the town level family 
planning office’s work,44 which further strengthened the family planning’s 5-tier 
administrative system.  
 
 
  
                                                
44 See chapter 5 for more details.  
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Figure 4. 1 Grassroots Level Family Planning Organization Structure 
4.3.2.1 1979-: Developed Grassroots Level Institution 
The grassroots level family planning organization was widely developed from 1979. 
In 1978, with the launching of the new family planning policy of “one is the best and 
no more than two” in Document 69, a specialist family planning organization was 
required at each level by the central government. It also requested that the 
appropriate family planning offices should be set up with competent family planning 
officials above county level: a full time family planning official must be appointed to 
be responsible for the work below the county level, i.e. neighbourhoods, major 
factories and companies and publicly funded institutions, and People’s Communes 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
(Renmin Gongshe 人民公社).45 According to this instruction, most neighbourhoods, 
factories, and communes set up their family planning organizations and appointed 
full time family planning officials. Generally, normal communes had 1 family 
planning staff members, while the big communes with more than 50,000 populations 
had 2 members of staff.46 Consequently, by the end of the 1970s, China had 
formulated a five level family planning administrative system: state, province, 
city/prefecture, county (Xian 县), and town (xiang 乡) or commune (gongshe 公社).  
Following the central government’s 1978 Document 69 instruction, QX County 
family planning office was separated from the health bureau and named the Family 
Planning Leading Group Office (jihua shengyu lingdaozu bangongshi计划生育领导
组办公室), even though the office head was the concurrent deputy head of the health 
bureau. These offices were independent units47 and ranked as keji (section) units. But 
they did not become formal government departments until they were upgraded to 
‘commissions’ in 1984. 
Town Level Family Planning Assistant 
At the town level, a full time family planning assistant (jihua shengyu zhuli 计划生
育助理) was appointed at the beginning of the 1980s following the provincial 1979 
                                                
45  The lowest levels of government are neighbourhood communes in the urban and people’s 
communes in the country.  
See "Regulations of the Organization of the Urban Residence Committee (Chengshi Cunmin 
Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Tiaoli 城市村民委员会组织条例 ),"  (1954). Article 3 Section 1:  A 
neighbourhood committee consists of fifteen to forty households. 
Each committee has several sub-committees responsible for such local tasks as civil affairs, security, 
social services, culture, health, and women’s activities. In each people’s commune, there are a number 
of production brigades in each of which there are a number of production teams. These lower socio-
economic units of the commune carry out the commune’s productive work and other activities, and 
are similar to those of the neighbourhood committees in the city. 
46 State Population and Family Planning Commission, China's Population and Family Planning 
History (Zhongguo Renkou He Jihuashengyu Shi 中国人口和计划生育史). p.709. 
47 It is same for the city, prefecture and provincial level. 
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Notice of Recruiting Full Time Family Planning Officials at the Communal Level. 
Some towns set up a family planning agency (xiangzhen jisheng zhan 乡镇计生站). 
However, with only one office equipped, family planning agencies had very limited 
functions. With help from the town hospital for publicity and technical support, the 
family planning agencies’ mainly focused on data collection and statistical work 
during that time. 
These assistants were appointed as cadres (ganbu 干部) with public institution 
establishment (shiye bianzhi 事业编制)48. The majority of them were transferred to 
the administrative establishment in 1982 and became formal cadres.49 All recruited 
personnel would have an urban hukou. This particularly benefited those agricultural 
(rural) hukou holders, as they would be authorised to transfer to a non-agricultural 
                                                
48 Generally, China has three types of establishment (payroll): the administrative establishment 
(xingzheng bianzhi 行政编制), the public institution establishment (shiye bianzhi 事业编制) and 
enterprise establishment (qiye bianzhi 企业编制). The state controls the apparatus by controlling these 
bianzhi. The administrative establishment refers to the authorized number of the personnel (the 
number of established posts) in a Party or government organ (jiguan 机关). The personnel with the 
administrative establishment means that they perform government service lawfully and are part of the 
national administrative system, and their wages and office expenses are met from national funds. 
These officials were called Cadres in the past and are known as civil servants (gongwuyuan 公务员) 
currently. They are also said to ‘eat imperial grain (chi huangliang 吃皇粮)’. The public institution 
establishment refers to personnel in the public service organizations rather than making profit. They 
can be fully funded or partly funded by the state or even self-funded, such as schools, hospitals, 
research centres etc. An enterprise establishment has the purpose of making profit. The staff in state-
owned enterprises have the enterprise establishment. People normally name the first group and state 
fully funded public institution establishment holders as having the Iron Rice Bowl (tie fanwan 铁饭碗
).  
See Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, "Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China," The China 
Quarterly, no. 170 (2002). 
49 SX History Records Research Institution (Shizhi Yanjiuyuan 史志研究院), Sx Local History Record 
(Sx Tongzhi  Sx通志). p.423. 
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(urban) hukou.50 In the first couple of years, there was normally one assistant for 
each town. The candidates were from the health department and the urban youth51 
(zhishi qingnian 知识青年) with junior secondary school or above education level. 
They were recruited based on an overall evaluation after they passed the qualification 
exam. Before the town level family planning office was set up, these assistants were 
directly under the administrative control of the town government.52  
In addition to publicizing family planning policy, their routine work also involved 
political study, regulation and technical training, regular inspection, house visiting, 
distribution of contraceptive tools, routine collection, updating and tabulation of data 
collected/reported from the lower levels, reporting to the upper level family planning 
institution, and fixing of annual birth quotas and their breakdown by villages. In 
order to ensure the veracity of the information reported from lower levels, these 
grassroots level officials usually had to visit every individual family personally, 
                                                
50 The Hukou system is an important China organizational mechanism. One’s hukou records include 
the categories of the hukou (agricultural or non-agricultural), legal address and location, unit 
affiliation (employment), and a host of personal and family information. The urban hukou holder had 
much better access to political, economic and social opportunities, activities, and benefits, such as job 
and education opportunities, urban benefits and subsidies in medical care, housing, job training and 
social welfare programs, public service of electricity, gas, water, phone, etc. See Fei-Ling Wang, 
Organizing through Division and Exclusion -- China's Hukou System (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2005). 
51 It was limited to the urban youth “sent down” to the mountains and countryside (shangshan 
xiaxiang上山下乡) before 1975. Shangshan Xiaxiang refers to the movement of send the urban youth 
(high school student mainly) up to the mountains and down to the countryside. It was happened during 
the Culture Revolution. The purpose of it is to learn from the workers and farmers, declared by Mao. 
52 During that time, Family Planning Assistant and some other assistants were called Ten Main 
Assistants (shi da yuan 十大员). They are: Cinema Projectionist (fangying yuan 放影员—he/she is 
responsible for broadcasting the film. During 1979 and the beginning of the 1980s, broadcasting the 
film publicly for free was very attractive for the villagers as one of the very limited forms of organized 
entertainment. It was also used as a valid method of popularizing the new policy and regulation.) 、
Newscaster (guangbo yuan 广播员)、Irrigational Assistant (shuili yuan 水利员)、Forester (linye 
yuan林业员)、Civil Affairs Assistant (minzheng yuan民政员)、Family Planning Assistant (jisheng 
yuan 计生员)、Statistical Assistant (tongji yuan 统计员)、Agriculture Machine Assistant (nongji 
yuan农机员)、Organizational Assistant of the CPC（zuzhi yuan组织员）、and Judicial Assistant 
(sifa yuan司法员). They are under the direct leadership of the town level government. Some of these 
assistants were cancelled later on, such as the Cinema Projectionist. The others were developed into a 
professional institution, such as Family Planning Assistant, Civil Affairs Assistant. See interview 
FENGZY250214 and FENGZY130314. 
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particular those families with women of reproductive age.  Even with the help of the 
village officials, due to very limited staff, these assistants worked very hard. During 
that time, most families in the countryside were still mainly reliant on agriculture. 
Therefore, these assistants had to work both early morning and late afternoon to meet 
the villagers to carry on their investigation and confirm the data reported by the 
village committee. These original data made a great contribution to the subsequent 
family planning work. 
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Table 4. 2 EY Town Family Planning Basic Information Statistical Form in 19791 
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1 See DSCN3595/12252009, Q County Fieldwork. 
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A Case Study: Family Planning Assistant Gu’s work at EY Town 
At EY town, Gu was recruited as a family planning assistant in 19831 and ranked as 
an administrative cadre (xingzheng guanli renyuan 行政管理人员). Before the 
setting up of the EY town family planning office in 1984, she did not have her own 
office but shared an office with the head of the Women’s Federation (funv zhuren 妇
女主任). Normally, she left home before sunrise (about 5am) and returned home 
around 10-11pm and worked 7 days a week. She visited all the households (about 
20,000 people in 13 villages 2) at EY town by cycling and walking. In one 
conversation, she said, “During that time, I worked twenty days a month in villages. 
Normally, I just bring some Mantou (馒头3) and some pickles (Xiancai 咸菜). In the 
middle of the day, some cold bread, pieces of pickles, and some hot water provided 
by the local villagers was my normal lunch. Summer was ok; winter was extremely 
tough with the temperature from 0oC to -20oC even without mentioning the extreme 
bad weather.” 
In the evening, she went back to the office to summarize and tabulate all figures. The 
information she was required to collect included: figures about population change 
(including the total population, births and deaths number, population increase and 
related quota), information about women of reproductive age (including the number 
of reproductive age women and their children’s number, pregnant women’s 
information, and total fertility rate), contraceptive data for women of reproductive 
age (see table above), the number of women in their first marriage (such as the 
                                                
1 This position was open to the public with certain conditions and 5 people applied for this position. 
Gu finally got it after the overall evaluation, which included education level, previous work 
experience, political background etc. 
2 After some urban and rural planning between the 1950s and the beginning of the 1990s, EY town 
currently has 24 villages.  
3 Mantou is a kind of plain bread. 
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number of women within the first marriage, women with an early marriage age and 
late marriage age individually, as well as the related quota), and the only child 
family’s (dusheng zinv jiating  独生子女家庭) information (including numbers of 
certificated one-child family and economic bonus information for the only child 
families), and the information about excess born families (particularly those CPC 
members). Below is a sample of the form about women of reproductive age. 
Table 4. 3 Pregnancy Survey Form for Women of Reproductive Age4 
Village Wife Name Husband Name The current children Notes 
Born Pregnant Month5 
     
 
A meeting was held on the 7th of every month at QX County family planning office. 
In addition to reporting all the above information to the county level family planning 
office, Gu also needed to report it to the family planning leadership at the town level. 
In addition to the monthly report, she was also requested to prepare a quarterly 
report, half yearly report and the annual report. Without any modern calculator, she 
had to calculate all the data with an abacus or on paper. For all of the above report, 
she normally prepared one copy for herself (town level family planning office) on an 
A5 size Hongqi (红旗) softcover notebook, and hand copied the other 2-3 copies for 
the upper levels. Without any photocopy machine or even premade forms, all of 
these copies were hand written.  
                                                
4 See interview GQX251209. 
5 The “month” refers to the age of the fetus: such as three months old, marked as 3+. 
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Moreover, as a grassroots level official, she also had to pass on all the information 
from the upper level institutions to the villages, and train village leaders about the 
relevant family planning regulations. At the beginning of every year, she had to fix 
the annual birth quotas and their breakdown by individual villages.  
In addition, she also had to undertake some administrative work, such as issuing 
certificates for the only child families, and issuing the 2nd child permission for 
qualified families;6 take the training course for new regulations; attend political study 
courses organised by the party committee; distribute contraceptive tools etc. The 
scale of these tasks made the town level family planning work very intensive for the 
very limited personnel. 
4.3.2.2 1980s: Strengthened Grassroots Level Institution 
At the beginning of the 1980s, most county and town levels established their 
independent family planning organizations in response to central government’s 1982 
Document 11 instruction.7 At the county level, a formal section (keji 科级) unit of 
the family planning commissions was set up widely. Its head was appointed by the 
county level People’s Congress. At the town level, most regions established an 
independent family planning agency with full time family planning officials — 
family planning assistants. 
A formal family planning organization equipped with full time officials was also 
established at EY town during that period. QX County family planning commission 
and EY Town family planning agency were both set up in 1984. A deputy town head 
                                                
6 The second-child ‘permission’ was normally called ‘the second-child quota (er hai zhibiao 二孩指
标) in China. As the state set up the population growth target every year, limited indexes were set up 
for the second child in each province, each town and each village every year.  
7 This document requires that family planning commissions or other similar organizations should be 
set up in provinces, cities and counties. 
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was appointed as the concurrent town family planning agency head to be responsible 
for the practical work.8 
At this time, the family planning commission above county level or family planning 
agency at the town level became the only family planning administrative institution. 
In addition to providing the family planning service, they also had administrative 
authority to enforce the implementation of the family planning regulations. The 
former leading groups for birth planning were either kept or reinstated at a later time, 
led by the (deputy) head of the people’s government or (deputy) party secretary of 
the party committee. They were still not a formal administrative organization, but an 
informal body which functioned as a coordinating body, such as organizing an 
annual conference of the related departments and issuing the documents for better 
cooperation. Among these bodies, the town level’s leading group was more like an 
empty shell as the deputy town head or party secretary was directly responsible for 
family planning work.9 
During this time, the town level family planning personnel was also enlarged across 
the province as a whole. The excess-birth fine officials were recruited and the family 
planning assistants were strengthened. A substitute family planning assistant was 
recruited when the original staff members were relocated to another department, and 
an extra assistant was also appointed for big towns with over 10,000 people.10 
Compared to those assistants recruited in 1979 who had permanent appointments, 
these casual administrative staff (xingzheng linshi guding renyuan 行政临时固定人
员) were more like contract staff for a fixed term. Their salary was decided by the 
                                                
8 See interview GQX251209. 
9 See interview FENGZY270214. 
10 L County Family Planning Commission, ed. L County Population Annals (Lxian Renkou Zhi L县人
口志) (1992). p.117. 
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town government and they were not entitled to change their agriculture hukou status, 
nor did they receive any medical benefits for cadres or pensions. 
After 1984, all towns with a population of less than 10,000 had at least 1 family 
planning assistant, while those with a population of over 10,000 had at least 2 
assistants.11 Overall, the number of town level family planning officials expanded 
from 1897 assistants in the whole provincial area in 1979, to 3840 (including the 
excess-birth fine officials) in 1985. For all 2057 towns, this equates to 1.86 family 
planning officials on average in each town in 1985.12 
Later, a specialist family planning deputy town head position was created and the 
post was filled among the family planning assistants at the end of the 1980s in order 
to strengthen the family planning team. In L County of S province, three out of 
twenty towns promoted family planning assistants to the full time family planning 
deputy town head position in the first batch. They were all ranked as deputy section 
chief (fukezhang 副科长). At EY town, G was appointed as full time family planning 
town deputy head in 1993. By that time, most towns in QX County had a full time 
family planning deputy head. However, in 2001, due to central government’s 
instruction to simplify the organization (jingjian jigou 精简机构), some towns 
abolished this position. They reverted to the role of family planning officials but 
retained their rank of deputy section chief. Instead, a deputy town head was 
appointed to be responsible for the family planning work. 
In 2002, QX County family planning commission was renamed “QX County Family 
Planning Bureau (xian jisheng ju 县计生局)” and the town family planning agency 
                                                
11 Ibid. p.117. 
12 SX History Records Research Institution (Shizhi Yanjiuyuan 史志研究院), Sx Local History Record 
(Sx Tongzhi  Sx通志). p.382. 
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was renamed “the town family planning office (jishengban 计生办)”. In 2005, after 
the State Family Planning Commission was renamed “the State’s Population and 
Family Planning Commission”, the County Family Planning Bureau was further 
renamed “County Population and Family Planning Bureau”. 
Excess-Birth Fines Official (chaosheng fei guanli yuan 超生费管理员) 
In addition to the family planning assistants, another type of grassroots level family 
planning official was also widely appointed for the town family planning office in S 
province at the beginning of the 1980s. In 1982, the central government issued a 
further instruction (zhishi 指示) about competent family planning organization at the 
grassroots level and new regulations for fines to be imposed on families who broke 
the family planning regulations.13 In response to this central government instruction, 
S province launched its provincial regulation regarding the fines.14 The specialist 
excess-birth fine officials were requested at each town to “unify government control 
over fine-collecting and expenditure (tongshou tongzhi 统收统支 )”. 15 16  In S 
                                                
13 See "The Central Committee and the State Council's Instructions for Further Implementing Family 
Planning Work (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Jihuashengyu Gongzuo 
De Zhishi 中共中央国务院关于进一步做好计划生育工作的指示)." Part 3: Having Necessary 
Award and Restriction in order to Assure the Smooth Development of Family Planning Work (shixing 
biyao de jiangli he xianzhi, baozheng jihuashengyu gongzuo de shunli kaizhan 实行必要的奖励和限
制，保证计划生育工作的顺利开展): para 4, some appropriate economic restriction should be 
applied (for those families who) broke family planning (policy)… (duiyu bu an jihuashengyu de, yao 
geiyu shidang de jingji xianzhi 对于不按计划生育的，要给予适当的经济限制).  
Part 5, Each Level Party Committee and Local Government Must Strengthen the Lead to Family 
Planning Work (geji dangwei he zhengfu yao jiaqiang dui jihuashengyu gongzuo de lingdao 各级党
委和人民政府要加强对计划生育工作的领导): para 2, … the complete professional family planning 
cadres should also be appointed at the commune level … (gongshe yao peiqi zhuanzhi ganbu公社要
配齐专职干部). 
14 See "S Province People’s Government Family Planning Regulations (S Sheng Renminzhengfu 
Guanyu Jihuashengyu De Ruogan Guiding S 省人民政府关于计划生育的若干规定) (Invalid),"  
(SZhengFa (No. 142), 1982). Part 3—Restriction. 
15 See "The Proposed Regulation on Strengthening the Excess-Birth Fine Management in S Province 
(S Sheng Guanyu Jiaqiang Chaoshengzinvfei Guanli Shixing Banfa S省关于加强超生子女费管理试
行办法),"  (S Province Finance Bureau and Family Planning Commission, 2nd June, 1984). 
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province, the fine-collecting started generally from 1983.17 By 1984-85, most towns 
recruited one excess-birth fines officials. All had secondary school education level.18 
They were normally recommended by the town and appointed by the county level 
based on the assessment. In contrast to the family planning assistants, the status of 
these fine officials varied. Only some of them were entitled the administrative 
establishment. Their salary level was determined by the county level family planning 
commission and paid by the collected excess-birth fines. In addition to the salary of 
family planning officials, the fines were also used to cover the office expenditure of 
the town family planning office.19 At EY town, an excess-birth fine official was 
appointed in 1993. Before that, the fine was administered by the ⎯ “league 
accountant” (lianxiao kuaiji联校会计)20 on behalf of the town government.21 
                                                                                                                                     
16 There are two stages to the excess-birth fine. The first stage started from the end of 1979 following 
the S Province Temporary Regulations on Family Planning Work. The families who broke the 
regulation would have part of both partners’ salary or work points deducted. These fines were used for 
their own danwei’s collective welfare. The second stage was from 1982, instructed by S Provincial 
People’s Government Family Planning Regulation, that ‘earmarked a fund for its specified purpose 
only (zhuankuanzhuanyong 专款专用)’: the above fines could only be used for the family planning 
work. 
17 See interview DUCZ121109. 
18 Due to the impact of the Cultural Revolution, the university entrance exam was not reinstated until 
1977 in China. As a result, secondary school education level was a higher education level in China at 
that time. 
19 See interview DUCZ121109. 
The general policy regarding the excess birth fine is that it is collected by the family planning 
organization (shou yu jisheng, yong yu jisheng 收于计生，用于计生).  
During 1982-1992, the fine was unified controlled by the town government over fine collecting and 
using (xiangshouxiangguan tongshoutongzhi 乡收乡管 统收统支). It was requested by central 
government’s 1982 Provisional Regulation on Strengthening the Excess-Birth Fine Management 
(guanyu jiaqiang chaosheng zinvfei guanli de zanxing guding 关于加强超生子女费管理的暂行规
定). 
After 1994, it was collected by the town and allocated by the county through the accountant 
(xiangshou xianguan caizheng jiandu 乡收县管 财政监督). It was laid down that the fine was 
‘managed by one level (the county level) but used by two levels (the county and town level)  (yiji 
guanli, liangji shiyong 一级管理，两级使用), in which the town level takes a higher percentage. 
20 During the 1970s and 1980s, an accountant from the other departments of the town was often in 
charge of the excess-birth fine on behalf of the town government before the appointment of the 
excess-birth fine official. The league account is one of them. The league was a management 
department on behalf of the town government for the schools in a town or several villages. 
21 See interview GQX251209. 
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The penalty collection of those excess-births started at the early 1980s brings China’s 
birth-control regulations implementation into a further compulsory step. From 1981 
to 1994, an extremely serious control on birth have been carried out in QX County 
and the whole nation.22  
Contraceptive Tools Administrator 
In 1985, a contraceptive tools administrator (yaoju guanli yuan 药具管理员) was 
also appointed in some towns. These roles were usually combined with the role of 
excess-birth fine official into one position.23 Their appointed task was to strengthen 
the management of contraceptive device, and improve publicity about how to use 
these devices. In addition to these tasks, they also shared normal administrative tasks 
with the other family planning officials. These personnel were normally recruited as 
‘casual staff (linshigong 临时工)’ without the guaranteed period of employment 
although most of them never had a real risk of losing the job. Their salaries were 
normally paid by the excess-birth fines but they were not entitled to any cadre 
medical benefits or pensions. 
In 1994 and 1995, according to the provincial document, most of the casual staff who 
joined the family planning work before 1988 were promoted to cadres (tigan 提干).24 
They were entitled to public institution establishment25 and agricultural hukou 
holders were entitled to transfer to non-agricultural status. This improved job 
security further strengthened the completeness of the grassroots level family 
                                                
22 22/12/2009 Interview with Dongnanfang village’s family planning official. 
23 See interview LIUL280909. 
24 1994, S Province Party Committee’s Document of Fixing Post (S shengwei dingbiandinggang 
wenjian S省委定编定岗文件). See SX History Records Research Institution (Shizhi Yanjiuyuan 史
志研究院), Sx Local History Record (Sx Tongzhi  Sx通志). p.424. 
25 See footnote 48. 
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planning organization. However, even after a couple of general promotions, the town 
level family planning officials with formal establishment are still very limited in 
numbers. Mostly, there are only 2-3 officials with administrative establishment. In 
EY town, there are 7 family planning officials in total but only three of them have 
administrative or public institution establishment. One is the family planning deputy 
town head who was promoted from the family planning assistants. The second is the 
office head, and the third is a senior official who joined the family planning office 
before 1990. All the other officials are contract employees and their salaries were 
paid by the town government from the collected excess-birth fines. They had neither 
job security nor many other benefits. 
4.3.3 Other Family Planning Organizations 
From the beginning of the 1980s to 2013, the (Population and) Family Planning 
Commission/Bureau/Office is the main and only family planning administrative 
organization at each level to implement these provincial regulations. In order to 
support the administrative organization’s work, some public institutions were set up, 
such as the Population and Family Planning Study Organization, Population Medias, 
Population Education and Training Centre, and Technical Service Centre. In addition 
to these organizations directly led by the family planning administrative 
organization, some affiliated organizations, i.e. the Family Planning Association, 
Population Society, Population Cultural Society and Population Welfare Foundation, 
were also set up. Most of these organizations were only set up at the national and 
provincial level. At the grassroots level, there are only the technical service centre – 
Technical Service Station – and the Family Planning Association. 
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4.3.3.1 Family Planning Technical Service Station 
During the 1980s, the grassroots level family planning institutions were further 
strengthened after the establishment of the family planning technical service team. 
Many family planning service tasks, which were carried out by local hospitals, have 
gradually been transferred to the county and town family planning service stations.26  
During the1950s and 1960s, the family planning service work was mainly focused on 
technical advice. At the grassroots level, family planning was understood as a 
technical issue for women only. In QX County, the earliest family planning technical 
team was organized in 1962, when a family planning technical support team (jishu 
zhidao xiaozu 技术指导小组) was organized by QX County People’s Hospital.27 
The team had 5 members who were either surgeons or specialists from the 
Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology (fuchanke 妇产科). It mainly focused on 
family planning technical research rather than practice. The team’s work was 
interrupted during the Cultural Revolution and recommenced in 1973.  
In the 1970s, the family planning technical service was mainly provided by the local 
hospital. At the town level, it was the town hospital head and women’s leader 
(funvzhuren 妇女主任) who was responsible for family planning. It was normally the 
nurse or assistant nurse (weishengyuan 卫生员) or health visitor from the town 
hospital and Women and Children Health Hospital (fuyou baojian yuan 妇幼保健院) 
who provided the general service before 1979. These services included insertion and 
                                                
26 Joan Kaufman et al., "The Creation of Family Planning Service Stations in China," International 
Family Planning Perspectives 18, no. 1 (1992b). 
27 Generally, the People’s Hospitals were set up in each level in China: from provincial level to town 
level. They are normally the main hospital in its level, particular at county and town level. See 
interview FENGZY050314. 
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removal of IUDs, distributing contraceptive tools and oral contraception and 
performing general IUDs and pregnancy checks.  
In the village, regular visits were organized by the county hospital assisted by the 
barefoot doctors and women’s leader.28 They were responsible for publicizing the 
birth control regulations and providing the contraceptive service. Their services 
included a general IUD check and pregnancy check, providing contraceptive tools, 
such as distributing condoms and providing IUD services (insertion and removal of 
IUDs), while abortion and sterilization were mostly provided from the 1980s.29 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the publicity and advice focused only on women 
as family planning was considered to be the women’s responsibility.30 Later on, 
when family planning had been more widely accepted, it was encouraged by way of 
an extensive mass campaign. The advertisements and promotional slogan were 
posted widely on walls and by main roads, and mobilizing meetings were also 
organized at the village (production team) meetings.31 
At the beginning of the 1980s, central government requested that not only the 
grassroots level formal family planning organizations, but also the grassroots level 
family planning technical service team be set up. 32  Following this central 
government instruction, S province approved the establishment of the county level 
“family planning service station” (jihua shengyu fuwu zhan 计划生育服务站) in 
1984 when the county and town level family planning organizations had been set up. 
                                                
28 SX History Records Research Institution (Shizhi Yanjiuyuan 史志研究院), Sx Local History Record 
(Sx Tongzhi  Sx通志). p.382. 
29 See interview FENGZY250214 and FENGZY010414. 
30 At an early stage, publicising the family planning policy or contraceptive methods was not accepted 
by the villagers. They often laughed a lot during the meetings. 
31 See interview FENGZY250214 and FENGZY010414. 
32 See  1982’s Document 11 requested to set up the county level family planning publicity and advice 
station (jihuashengyu xuanchuan zhidao zhan 计划生育宣传指导站). 
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In 1985, S province issued instructions on how to set up county and town level 
family planning service stations.33 It included regulations on publicity, technical 
service, family planning devices management etc. By the end of 1985, the grassroots 
level family planning service station34 had been set up in one third of the counties 
and towns in S province, and this expanded to 50% by the end of 1990. With more 
funding support from state, provincial, and local levels, the technical facilities at 
these stations were greatly improved between the 1990s and the 2010s.  
After setting up the county level service station, the family planning technical work 
has been gradually separated from the family planning commission. The family 
planning service station ⎯ as a fully funded public service institution (quan/e shiye 
danwei 全额事业单位 ) 35  ⎯ was under the charge of the family planning 
commission.  
At the town level, the family planning service station and the family planning office 
are usually one team. The family planning technical assistant is also a member of the 
family planning office and shares all the other work. The family planning service 
office (fuwushi 服务室) was also set up in most villages after the 1990s. But it is an 
empty shell and does not have any practical function beyond being a place for storing 
documents and forms, as well as a reception for the upper level inspection. 
                                                
33 See "The Proposed Regulation of the Family Planning Publicity and Technical Service Work Net at 
Countyside in S Province (S Sheng Nongcun Jihuashengyu Xuanchuan Jishu Gongzuo Wangluo 
Shixing Banfa S 省农村计划生育宣传技术工作网络试行办法),"  (S Province Family Planning 
Commission, 1985). 
34 The family planning service station was named as fuwu zhan [service station] at county level and 
fuwu suo [small service station] at township level. 
35 In China, the public service institute (shiyedanwei 事业单位) could be state fully funded (quane 
yusuan 全额预算), state partly funded (chae yusuan 差额预算) or self funded (zishouzizhi 自收自支
).  
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Compared with the town level technical teams, the county level family planning 
service stations are equipped with better facilities and staff.36  In addition to the 
general service, such as publicity and education in the family planning regulations 
and birth control advice, and training the lower level family planning technical 
officials, most county level service stations were qualified to provide the following 
services independently by the end of 2010: general prenatal check and sishu [four 
operations: IUDs insertion and removal, abortion, sterilization]. The town family 
planning service station could generally provide ultrasound and sancha [three types 
of check: it refers to IUDs check, pregnancy test, and urine test for married women 
of reproductive age here]. Some of them could provide IUDs services (insertion and 
removal of IUDs) and abortion. For those service stations, which could not provide 
an abortion service, such as EY town, villagers either went to the town hospital37 or 
the county level family planning service station. Most town family planning service 
stations have not qualified to perform sterilizations, which can only be done in the 
county level hospital or some county level family planning service stations. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, ‘the Concentrate Quality Service Period (jizhong youzhi 
fuwu yue 集中优质服务月)’ was often arranged by the county level family planning 
service station. The surgeons who are from the county level hospital and city or 
provincial level hospitals were invited to the town level hospitals for a particular 
period38 every year. In addition to complex operations, such as sterilization, abortion, 
or induced labour, the service also provided IUDs and pregnancy tests and insertion 
                                                
36 Most of the county level family planning service station personnel have health related backgrounds 
and all the medical personnel have obtained professional certificates. 
37 Since the 1980s, most town hospitals have the ability to perform the abortions. 
38 It was normally about one month. 
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of IUDs. This type of intensive contraceptive service was stopped in QX County 
after 2010 when the enforced contraceptive methods were relaxed.  
Technical Assistants 
Since setting up family planning service stations (jihuashengyu fuwu suo 计划生育
服务所) at the township level from the middle of the 1980s, most towns recruited 
technical assistants (jishu yuan 技术员). In practice, the town family planning office 
and family planning service station were normally one team with two names. These 
technical assistants were selected by the town level family planning office, but paid 
by the town government as occasional officials. Like the excess-birth fine officials, 
these technical assistants also carried out other office work.  Most of them were not 
formal officials and their salaries were paid by the town government from the excess-
birth fines. There were normally 1-2 technical assistants in small towns and 2-3 in 
big towns. Since the setting up of these technical assistant posts, family planning 
technical support work has gradually been transferred from the town hospital to the 
town family planning office. After professional training, most of these technical 
assistants  obtained the Family Planning Technical Service Certificate (jihuashengyu 
jishu fuwu renyuan hegezheng 计划生育技术服务人员合格证) and the Medical 
Practitioner Certificate (zhiye yishi zige zheng执业医师资格证). 
At QX County, the family planning service station was set up in 1985. By the middle 
of the 1990s, most towns had set up a town level family planning service station. EY 
town family planning service station was set up in 1994 when a technical official was 
appointed. So far, a competent family planning organization was established at EY 
town. The family planning commission at the county level and the family planning 
office at the town level are the only family planning institutions with the 
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administrative authority to enforce the implementation of the family planning 
regulations. The family planning service station is a public institution under the 
charge of the same level family planning administrative organization.  
4.3.3.2 Family Planning Associations 
The Family Planning Associations were established as a mass organization 
comprised of members from all areas who are enthusiastic about family planning 
work. After the state level family planning association set up in 1980, local level 
associations were rapidly set up. The original purpose of these associations was to 
encourage the public to join the family planning campaign, be family planning 
pioneers and advocates of family planning, as well as support and supervise family 
planning organizations’ work. 
At QX County, the family planning association was set up at the beginning of the 
1990s. The association was not a formal institution until the beginning of the 1990s 
when it became a state funded public institution and ranked as a ‘deputy section’ 
(fuke 副科) unit. The leader of the county government or party committee was 
normally concurrently appointed as the president and the deputy president of the 
association. The association also included one secretary and 1 to 2 deputy secretaries 
and some members. One deputy secretary was normally assigned to manage the 
association’s work,  such as ‘reproductive care (shengyu guanhuai 生育关怀)’.39 In 
addition to their internal work, the association largely joined the family planning 
administrative department’s work. They shared the working space and carried out the 
same work as the family planning administrative officials. In practice, all these 
officials are directly led by the county family planning bureau but assigned to 
                                                
39 It refers to some special care for those family-planning families, i.e. single child families or families 
with two girls.  
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different tasks. Who is in which team all depends on which team the officials could 
hold an establishment for the job security. In reality, this is how grassroots level 
organizations cope with central government’s instruction to “streamline 
administration structure (jigou jingjian 机构精简)” while holding on to the essential 
personnel: the original administrative staff were moved to the public institution’s 
establishment or to another department’s establishment.40 At the town level, the 
family planning association is normally “one team and two names” with the family 
planning office. Because no establishment was allocated to the town association, 
there are even often no ‘named’ association members in the town offices. Overall, 
the family planning association at the local level has lost its original purpose as an 
organization independent from the family planning organization but instead has 
become part of the organization. At the grassroots level, the family planning 
associations have become an empty shell. Their only practical purpose is to give 
better job security to more officials by taking advantage of the association’s 
establishments. 
4.3.4 Summary 
In China, population control is decentralised. Because of China’s vast geographical 
space, unprecedented social change, uneven economic development, diverse cultural 
milieu and unique ideological evolution, it is hard for central government to 
formulate a concrete and centralised population regime which is applicable to all 
                                                
40 “Establishment occupying” is a common phenomenon at grassroots level in China. Because of the 
limited administrative establishments, the officials sometimes have to take the establishment from 
another administrative department or related public institutions to get job security or promotion, but 
without practical change to their job. For example, the family planning service station often took the 
establishments from the contraceptive tools management station.  
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local circumstances. Therefore, in order to increase flexibility, the 
province/municipality level has been authorised to make their local population 
regulations, depending on local conditions within the general framework of central 
planning.  
According to central government’s regulations,41 the main responsibilities of the state 
family planning commission are:  to draft the state’s population development plan 
and strategy, as well as the relationship with the economy, society, resources, 
environment at the macro level, and give advice for its goal and task. It is responsible 
for the state’s long term and medium term population policy design, and has to 
supervise and assess the implementation of the policy in order to maintain the low 
birth rate. It has to draft population and family planning legislation and regulations, 
and is in charge of co-operation with all other related departments and mass 
organizations, and makes suggestions on the sex ratio balance to other departments. 
It organizes the training program etc. 
The sub-national family planning commissions above county level have similar 
obligations to those on the state level: to draft local level population development 
plans, sketch out local regulations and legislation, supervise lower level work, give 
suggestions to these lower levels and organize their training programs. In addition, 
upper level governments can abolish or amend the sub level’s unsuitable regulations 
or legislation. However, the town level family planning office has no power over 
policy-making but is the most direct organization for policy implementation. 
                                                
41 "The Regulation of State’s Population and Family Planning Commission’s Main Obligations and 
Initial Institution and Staff Organization (Guojia Renkou He Jihuashengyuweiyuanhui Zhuyao Zhize 
Neishe Jigou He Renyuan Bianzhi Guiding 国家人口和计划生育委员会主要职责内设机构和人员
编制规定) ", http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/jgzz/ (1st July 2010). 
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In brief, the state and provincial family planning administrative organization is 
responsible for the framework of the state/provincial population development 
strategy and family planning regulations. They are the main actors in the formulation 
of regulations. Then the rules are handed down to the city/prefecture level, then to 
the county level, and finally to the town/township/district level. The city or 
prefecture gives more detailed instructions for implementation. The county, and 
especially the town level, implement the regulations. 
The chart below is a summarized family planning system structure map from the 
state to the town level. The leading groups for family planning from the provincial 
level down are either the remains of the former 1970s leading groups or were 
established later on. They are not formal institutions and their functions are the same 
as the previous leading groups: an umbrella organization for coordination. At the 
county level, in addition to the family planning bureau’s administrative department, 
another important department is the family planning technical service station. The 
oral contraception and conceptive tools management station has been merged into the 
family planning technical service station in many locations and become a sublevel 
department of the service station in practice. The family planning association is 
merged into the administrative department.  
At the town level, the main membership of the family planning office is composed of 
the family planning assistants, the excess-birth fine administrator, and the 
contraceptive tools administrator as well as the technical assistant. It is normally 7-8 
officials in a medium sized town in which only 2-3 members are formal cadres. The 
rest are either temporary staff or contract staff recruited by the town government and 
their salaries are paid by the excess-birth fines. At this level, the family planning 
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association also exists in name but it is normally included in the family planning 
office. It is even hard to say who is the particular family planning association 
member in the office. The leading group is also set up in name because the town 
level’s family planning work is directly led by either the town head or the party 
secretary.  
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Figure 4. 2 PRC’s Family Planning Organizational Structure from State to Town 
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4.4 The Administrative Relationship Among the Family Planning 
Organization System 
During the development of family planning campaigns since the 1950s, the FP 
agencies have formed a complete system from the state to the town and even village 
level. From province to town, family planning agencies are not only under the 
control of the higher level family planning agencies but also the local government. In 
China, this management system — a vertical (tiaotiao条条) and lateral (kuaikuai 块
块) system — has been applied broadly at the town level to balance the central 
government’s power concentration and local government’s sectionalism. The 
departments, which are primarily under the administrative control of the higher level 
authorities, are named as the tiaotiao section; while those departments who are under 
the jurisdiction of the local government solely and directly take professional 
instructions from the upper level department are the kuaikuai section. The distinction 
between the tiaotiao and kuaikuai sections is decided by the central state. 
The town level family planning is a kuai section. It is “led” (lindao 领导) by the 
town government and “guided” (zhidao 指导) by the upper level family planning 
organization. In other words, the higher level family planning organizations only 
control professional work, but the town government oversees its personnel 
arrangements and provides funding. The “guidance” from the family planning 
administrative system refers to professional training, guiding and inspection. 
Professional training is normally organized level by level. Provincial level agencies 
normally organize training for the prefecture and city level officials monthly. Then 
the prefecture or city level delivers training to the county level. For the town family 
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planning officials, it is normally the county family planning bureau which provides 
training. The city and provincial level agencies only organize training for the town 
level officials twice a year, particularly for new tasks or new working systems such 
as computer use and the online database. Such professional training includes general 
education, the introduction and explanation of state and local population and family 
planning regulations, statistical work training, IT training and the family planning 
technical service training. 
The family planning system’s professional work is normally guided by the “family 
planning professional quotas” (jihuashengyu gongzuo zhibiao 计划生育工作指标). 
The quotas required by the family planning system are called “internal quotas” while 
the regular quotas required by the family planning responsibility commission42 are 
called “open quotas” (gongkai zhibiao 公开指标). In addition to the regular quotas, 
such as population growth number/rate, contraceptive rate, excess-birth rate and fine 
collecting rate, the internal quotas are periodically required and cover all aspects of 
the family planning professional work, such as the fines collection amount for the 
year, IUDs insertion number or rate, sterilization number or rate. In contrast to those 
commissions, which are signed at the beginning of every year as a contract and 
delivered down from the provincial level, these professional quotas are normally 
delivered to the lower level by the “internal document” (wenjian 文件), and any 
                                                
42 In order to implement the family planning regulations well, some hard inspection system were 
applied to the town level leaders, which directly related to their personal political life or economic 
award, such as the leadership responsibility (lingdao fuze zhi 领导负责制), comprehensive annual 
performance evaluation (zonghe niandu mubiao zerenzhi kaohe 综合年度目标责任制考核) and 
family planning responsibility commission (renkou he jihuashengyu gongzuo mubiao guanli zerenshu 
人口和计划生育工作目标管理责任书), as well as the ‘veto issue’ (yi piao fou jue 一票否决). See 
Chapter 5 for more details. 
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upper level family planning administrative authorities could set up the quotas for the 
lower level.43 
In addition to these irregular professional quotas, the grassroots level family planning 
agencies were also inspected by upper level family planning administrative agencies 
on a monthly, quarterly, half a year and annual basis. The county level agencies 
carried out most routine inspections of the town level. Restricted due to the limited 
personnel, most of these inspections are not competent checks and do not include 
individual house visits. Out of all the inspections, the most important one is the 
annual random inspection carried out by the provincial family planning commission 
in November each year.44  
Led by the director of the provincial family planning commission, and assisted by the 
deputy directors and the members from the leading group for family planning, the 
annual inspection team was organized mainly by the provincial family planning 
commission officials, and other directly led institution as well as the family planning 
officials from the prefecture or city level.45 It is a competent check which inspects 
not only the family planning administrative system’s performance but also the local 
                                                
43 Unlike the open quotas, which are decided by the population professionals at the provincial family 
planning commission, some sub-province quotas set up by the local officials were not scientific, 
which are mainly for the political performance marks rather than based on serious statistic calculation. 
Before the 2000s, it happened in some areas that the required ligation number in continued couple 
years has over the total population number. The town family planning officials said that, “Ok, that was 
(just) the ‘quotas’. Even the men should all have done the ligation based on the ‘quota’, but the quotas 
still require more ligation on women. (nashi jieza zhibiao. Nande dou jieza le, nv de haimei jieza.  那
是结扎指标，男的都结扎完了，女的还没结扎.)” Without a good system of supervision, and with 
town level family planning officials over-loaded with work, particularly those impractical tasks, the 
only way for the family planning office to cope is to “play the numbers game (wan shuzi youxi 玩数
字游戏)”. See, interview with Tan16122009. 
44 The statistical year of family planning is from 1st October to the next 30th September. So the annual 
check is carried on November each year. 
45 The whole S province was divided into two groups, in which both set up one prefecture level 
inspection team, two county level inspection teams and six village level inspection teams. Each team 
has on average six personnel. The random selecting standard is two counties selected for the 
prefecture level, three towns and three villages for county level. 
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government support on family planning. The inspection covers three areas: local 
government support (dangzhengxian 党 政 线 ), family planning agencies'’ 
performance (jishengxian 计生线)，directed led public institutions and affiliated 
organizations performance (shengzhixian 省直线).46 As explained above, because all 
the other family planning organizations at the county and town level have been 
integrated into the administrative agencies in practice, the grassroots level agencies 
are responsible for all the jishengxian and shengzhixian duties. This annual 
inspection uses multiple methods to check actual job performance and confirm the 
accuracy of the data. For example, for the village inspection, the village was 
randomly selected on the morning of the inspection by the inspection team members. 
Without any advance notice, the village committee and the town level government 
were only notified when the inspection team arrived at the selected place. By 
conversing with village committee members, visiting local schools, the village health 
station, the policy station, village health doctors and individual houses, the inspection 
team focused on checking births, contraceptive operations and excess-birth fine 
collection, as well as other family planning work performance. This information is 
further compared with the reported annual information to check on possible 
concealment of information. Those units or regions who failed to fulfill the family 
planning responsibility commission’s quotas, particularly those jishengxian quotas, 
or are found to have concealed information, would receive criticism, an alert or even 
a “yellow alert”. These units will be disqualified from an excellent evaluation 
(pingyou 评优) and the leaders responsible for the family planning work in the unit 
                                                
46 Dangzhengxian refers to veto issue and comprehensive management, family planning funding 
investment and employment condition, as well as the accuracy of the statistics and official training; 
jishengxian refers to the rate of planned births, non-permitted third and beyond births, and long term 
contraception, as well as the social maintenance fees collecting; shengzhixian refers to quality of 
births, sex-ratio and migration. See chapter 5 for more details about the family planning responsibility 
commission. 
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will not be promoted. The town government or party committee leader will be 
dismissed from office if they get a “yellow alert”. 
4.5 Conclusion 
During the 1980s, China formulated a competent formal and independent family 
planning administrative system from the state level down to the province, 
prefecture/city, county and town level. Among these 5 levels, it is the county and 
town level family planning agencies that are the grassroots levels. The county level 
makes the most detailed decisions for the local levels, and does so by following the 
central government’s direction and the provincial level regulations. The town level 
enforces provincial regulations in practice with assistance from the village level. 
Located at the sharp end of resource allocations, the town level family planning 
offices always faces understaffing, tight budgets, and heavy workloads. With limited 
personnel at the town level, one official is normally responsible for several villages. 
The ratio of town level family planning officials to villagers is normally 1 official to 
(at least) 1000 villagers47. In order to carry out the work, they need to rely on 
assistance from the village level to provide updated information and assist in the 
publicity and education. But because the village family planning officials are not part 
of the formal family planning system, the town offices do not have the authority to 
request their assistance or cooperation in carrying out their work. As a result, the 
town government was assigned to take the lead on family planning work, and 
coordinate the work between the town family planning office and the village 
committee.  
                                                
47 It was about one official to 3000 villagers in EY town in 2009.The total population at EY town was 
about 24,500 by the end of 2009. 
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The town government is responsible for the family planning office’s personnel and 
funding, so it has direct leadership of the family planning office. In addition, because 
more than half the officials at the family planning office are informally employed, 
and their salaries are paid by the town government rather than the county or state, the 
town government has more control than the upper level family planning agencies. 
In the family planning administrative system, the most important function provided 
by the upper level agencies is professional training and the laying down of the 
quotas. These quotas provide specific guidance for the work of the town level family 
planning agencies. But how these quotas are fulfilled is down the town officials’ 
discretion. This will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 Because of the above factors, the upper level family planning organizations have 
very limited control over the lower level’s performance. In order to supervise the 
lower level’s work, the upper level family planning agencies still have to draw on the 
local government’s authority. Therefore, the family planning responsibility 
commission was signed between each level of government rather than between the 
family planning agencies. Thus, in order to understand fully how the bureaucracy 
works to implement the family planning regulations at the town level, it is necessary 
to understand how local government leads the family planning work. This will be 
analyzed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 The Lateral Relationships between Town Family 
Planning Agency and Town Government 
5.1 Introduction 
In China, most government organizations at the local level, particular the town level, 
are under the dual management of both the higher department levels and the local 
government. These vertical and horizontal organizational structures have shaped the 
interests of the grassroots actors and their actions in pursuing those interests. 
Regarding the town level family planning agency, the upper level (vertical [tiao 条条]) 
family planning departments provide “guidance” (zhidao 指导) by professional 
training, guiding and inspection and the local governments (lateral [kuai 块]) “lead” 
(lingdao 领导) the work through personnel arrangement and funding allocations. 
This indicates that the town government has more influence on the execution of the 
family planning regulations than the higher level family planning agencies.  
 However, China’s administrative structure at the town level is different from 
Western countries. As O’Brien and Li have pointed out, “unlike street-level 
bureaucrats in many other countries, Chinese rural (grassroots) cadres are not 
employees of a single agency assigned a limited number of tasks, but rather 
bureaucrats-cum-politicians answerable to a region’s all-around governance and 
development. They provide technical assistance to farmers and enforce the birth 
control policies. They work to develop the economy and collect tax.”1 In other 
words, in addition to family planning, the town officials also face many other tasks, 
                                                
1 Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China," Comparative 
Politics 31, no. 2 (1999). p.168. 
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which all directly relate to and cover almost every aspect of local people’s lives. 
Therefore, in facing these multiple tasks, the town level officials have to distinguish 
which tasks take priority and which tasks are less important.  
Nevertheless, it does not mean that the popular policies would necessarily be better 
executed, nor unpopular policies be more poorly executed. The family planning 
programme was deemed to be the hardest and most unpopular programme by most 
officials because, in its nature, it conflicts with China’s traditional reproductive 
culture of pronatalism and son-preference. However, compared with other 
regulations, family planning has been one of the most successfully implemented 
policies in general, although its level of success varies from place to place.  
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to explain the discretion autonomy of the 
town government on the family planning execution. The chapter begins with an 
explanation of China’s government system, and the “vertical and lateral” systems at 
the grassroots level, and then explores how the responsibility system, particularly the 
Comprehensive Annual Performance Evaluation (zonghe niandu mubiao zerenzhi 
kaohe 综合年度目标责任制考核 ) system, influenced the grassroots level 
governments’ decision over implementation priorities. After this follows an analysis 
of how the town government’s discretion to carry out the family planning work has 
been influenced by the Population and Family Planning Responsibility Commission 
(renkou he jihuashengyu mubiao guanli zerenshu 人口和计划生育工作目标管理责
任书), the Leadership Responsibility leadership (yi ba shou zerenzhi一把手责任制
), and constraints used to limit their discretion.  
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5.2 Bureaucratic Structure at PRC’s Grassroots Level 
5.2.1 The Grass-roots Level in Rural China 
The current PRC has a five-tier administrative system from central government to 
province/municipality, prefecture-level city (dijishi 地级市 ), county, and the 
township/town/district in most provinces, and a two-tier system in Centrally 
Administered Municipalities (zhixiashi 直辖市).2 The prefecture-level city, which 
does not appear in the PRC’s Constitution,3 was formerly named as the ‘field agent’ 
(paichu jigou 派出机构) of the provincial administration. It is an additional formal 
layer which appeared in rural prefectures from the mid-1980s as a result of gradual 
urbanization.4 In the PRC’s hierarchy of government administrative structures, the 
prefecture level (diji 地级) is the second level of sub-national authority, below the 
provincial level (shengji 省级) and above the county level (xianji 县级).5 It is 
normally called ‘cities leading counties’ (shi guan xian 市管县) by the Chinese. 
Among all these bureaucratic levels, the county and town are the basic levels of 
Chinese governmental organs. In these two levels, the town level government is the 
foot soldier level which directly governs vast rural areas on behalf of the Chinese 
central government.  
                                                
2 The urban districts (shiqu 市区) are the top level of local administration, whereas the street 
administrative offices (jiedao banshichu 街道办事处) are their sub level administration. 
3 See the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 30. 
4 The prefecture level consists of four types of administrative units: (1) prefecture (diqu 地区), (2) 
autonomous prefecture (zizhizhou 自治州), (3) league (meng 盟), (4) prefecture-level city (diji shi 地
级市).  
See Jae Ho Chung, "The Evolving Hierarchy of China's Local Administration: Tradition and Change," 
in China's Local Administration: Traditions and Changes in the Sub-National Hierarchy, ed. Jae Ho 
Chung and Tao-Chiu Lam (Oxon: Routledge, 2010). 
5 Ibid. p.4. 
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Historically in China, county and town have continued unchanged to a remarkable 
extent in terms of their administrative structure and functions. The county system 
was set up in the Chu state of the Spring and Autumn Period (chunqiu 春秋) (770-
476 B.C.) around 690 B.C.; 6 and was widely adopted during the Warring States 
period of 403-221 B.C.; it became the standard system of local governmental units 
nationwide in the Qin Dynasty (221-206 B.C.).7 Overall, it has been continued 
without interruption for over 2,000 years. The central government has relied heavily 
on the county government for the implementation of its policies and for maintaining 
local stability. To summarise, the main functions of the county government in its 
history are: administering local affairs concerning justice, public order, tax 
collection, economic development, agriculture, education, military defence, religious 
rituals, and the promotion of culture and traditions.8  
The township as an administrative level of government dates back to the Western 
Zhou period (1122-771 B.C.).9 It was formally called the xiang-ting（乡廷）or 
xiang-li （乡里） system and it ruled about 10,000 households: five households 
constituted a wu (伍); two wu were a shi (什); ten shi constituted a li (里); ten li 
constituted a ting (廷); and ten ting constituted a xiang or a township.10 This system 
was institutionalised at a basic government administrative level during the Qin and 
                                                
6 Qingkui Xie, Yang Xiao, and Jirong Yan, Contemporary Chinese Government (Dangdai Zhongguo 
Zhengfu 当代中国政府) (Shenyang: Liaoning People's Press (liaoning renmin chubanshe 辽宁人民
出版社), 1991). p.302. 
7 Yang. Zhong, Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below (New York: M.E. 
Sharps, 2003). p.18. 
8 Ibid. p.45. 
9 Jin Tang and Chuan Shui Zheng, A History of Chinese State Organs (Zhongguo Guojia Jigou Shi 中
国国家机构史) (Shenyang: Liaoning People's Press (liaoning renmin chubanshe 辽宁人民出版社), 
1993). p.30. 
10 Tianding Diao, Jialing Chen, and Houan Zhang, An Overview of Chinese Local Government Organs 
(Zhongguo Difang Guojia Jigou Gaiyao 中国地方国家机构概要 ) (Beijing: Legal Press (falv 
chubanshe 法律出版社), 1989). p.308. 
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Han dynasties.11 However, unlike the county system, the town system was weakened 
at the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty due to a series of civil wars and it was 
abolished during the Sui Dynasty (586-618) until late in the Qing Dynasty in 1840.12 
During this period, various forms of self-government were set up to run local affairs. 
Among them, the most practical system was the bao-jia system13, which is similar to 
the villagers’ committees and villagers’ small groups in contemporary rural China.14 
During the Qin and Sui Dynasty, the township government lasted for about 800 years 
(221 B.C.—595 A.D.). Its main functions were collecting taxes, ensuring local 
security, administrative justice and conscription. 
After the establishment of the PRC, the township/town government, as the most 
basic level government, was re-established. During the period between 1949 and 
1979, the township government has been named as Township People’s Government 
Committee in 1950, and Township People’s Committee in 1958, then People’s 
Commune between 1958 and 1979. Its function developed from a mechanism with 
limited authority on carrying out land reform, fulfilling the state crop procurement 
quota and eradicating local anti-government elements, to a political entity, and then 
                                                
11 Zhong, Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below. p.20. 
12 Ibid. p.20 
13 Bao-jia system was started from the Song dynasty. It was ten households as a bao (保), five bao as 
a big bao and ten big bao as dubao (都保). In Yuan Dynasty, twenty households are one jia (甲); and 
in Qing dynasty, ten households are one pai (牌), ten pai are one jia and ten jia are one bao. It was 
also a basic level government system during the Republic of China, when it was regulated as ten 
households as a jia and ten jia as a bao. This bao-jia system controls the household as its basic unit 
rather than the individual. By grouping the households into different levels and taking the “lianzuo 
[related responsibility]” system to supervise each other, this unofficial or semi official network well 
organized the local areas. See, Haikun Yang and Xunzhen Cao, "The History Roots, Current Problems 
and Prospect About Self Governance in Chinese Villages (Zhongguo Xiangcun Zizhi De Lishi 
Genyuan Xianshi Wenti Yu Qianjing Zhanwang 中国乡村自治的历史根源、现实问题与前景展望
)," http://study.ccln.gov.cn/fenke/zhengzhixue/zzjpwz/zzzgzz/72371-3.shtml (July 5th 2014). 
14 See, ibid. 
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the largest collective political-economic units. 15  The cadres in the township 
government also developed from being fairly small in number, with non-full-time 
paid government officials16 during the period 1949-1958, to a large number of state 
cadres on the government payroll (quan tuo chan guojia ganbu 全脱产国家干部) 
since 1958. The current town government structure was formulated in 1979 after the 
collapse of the commune system. The town government replaced the commune and 
took over its political and governmental functions. Its legal status was confirmed by 
the 1982 PRC’s Constitution.  
5.2.2 Grassroots Level Government’s Organizational Structure ——
Tiao and Kuai Relationship 
China’s organizational structure and the functions of the government are quite 
complicated. Most government organizations at the local level, particular the town 
level, are under the dual control of both the higher (or ‘vertical’) level department 
and the local government (or ‘lateral’ level).17 This vertical (tiaotiao 条条) and 
lateral (kuaikuai 块块) system efficiently maintains the central state’s main interests 
and avoids power concentration and sectionalism at the local government level. The 
central state keeps the authority to decide whether it is a tiaotiao or kuaikuai section. 
Among China’s five-tier bureaucratic system, the town government – the bottom 
                                                
15 The idea of the People’s Commune is to combine “governmental functions of town government and 
economic functions of Agricultural Production Cooperatives into a big collective unit” (zhengsheheyi 
政社合一). The People’s Commune divided into production brigades and production teams in turn. 
The commune was responsible for the agricultural production and the industry, business and 
education and public security. 
16 During the period of People’s Committee, there are no full-time paid township government 
officials. Only township mayors and deputy mayors were part-time (ban tuo chan 半脱产) officials. 
All the other members, such as committee and subcommittee members, were activist volunteers. 
17 "PRC Local People's Congress and Local People's Government Organization Law,"  (1979 (revised 
in 2004)). Article 66. 
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level – was influenced more by this tiao and kuai relationship than other higher 
levels.18  
The tiaotiao section means that the departments are primarily under the 
administrative control of the higher department authorities while the kuaikuai section 
means they are directly under the jurisdiction of the local government and only take 
professional instructions from the upper department levels.  
In the past, these government organizations or public institutions at the town level 
were generally called qisuobazhan [seven organizations and eight stations 七所八站
],19 and most of which were tiaotiao sections. The kuaikuai organizations were quite 
limited. However, in order to strengthen the town government’s authority on local 
affairs, some tiaotiao organizations were restructured to kuaikuai sections in 2002’s 
government organizational restructuring and some organizations were deleted.20 At 
EY town, after this restructuring, six centre were established. All the kuaikuai 
sections were catalogued into these six centres: Finance and Economy Centre21 
                                                
18 Zhenchao Zhou, ed. Research of the Relationship between the Government Functional Departments 
and Local Government in Contemporary China (Dangdai Zhongguo Zhengfu De Tiaokuai Guanxi 
Yanjiu 当代中国政府的条块关系研究) (Tianjin: Tianjin People's Press (tianjin renmin chubanshe 天
津人民出版社), 2008). p.33 
19 The ‘seven’ and ‘eight’ does not refer to the accurate number here. Actually, there are in total 
around 30 suo and zhan at town level, although it slightly varied from town to town because of its size 
and local circumstance. Suo refers to the government organizations, such as the tax office, post office, 
etc; while zhan refers to public institutions, such as the cultural station, agricultural technic station, 
etc. Guanglei Zhu, The Government Processes of Contemporary China (Dangdai Zhongguo Zhengfu 
Guocheng 当代中国政府过程) (Tianjin: Tianjin People's Press (tianjin renmin chubanshe 天津人民
出版社), 2002). p.406. Zhong, Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below. 
p.72. 
20 For example, the deleted organizations included the housing control office (fangguan suo 房管所), 
the stable food control office (liangguan suo 粮管所), the public transport station (keyun zhan 客运), 
and the urban construction office (chengjian zhan城建站). The restructured kuaikuai organizations 
were the finance station (caizheng suo 财政所), the culture station, the irrigation station, the 
agriculture technical station, the agriculture equipment station, and the coal management station. 
21 It includes a finance station (caizheng zhan 财政站), an agricultural economic station21 (nongjing 
zhan 农经站), a statistics station, an enterprise office (qiye ban 企业办). Agriculture economic station 
is responsible for the village’s finance. 
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(caijing zhongxin 财经中心), Culture Centre,22 Public Security Comprehensive 
Management Centre (shehui zhian zonghe zhili zhongxin社会治安综合治理中心),23 
Agriculture Centre,24  Family Planning Centre, Safe Production and Inspection 
Centre25  (anquan shengchan jiandu zhongxin 安全生产监督中心). Except for 
kuaikuai sections in these six centres, the rest are all tiaotiao organizations.26  
The kuaikuai departments only take work guidance from the upper level department: 
their personnel arrangements and finances are under the administrative control of the 
local government. They are headed by the mayor and deputy mayors and managed 
by the town government directly.27 
In EY town, like most areas in China, the town family planning office is located in 
the ‘government yard’ (zhengfu dayuan 政府大院). This yard has one main four 
level block building and several bungalows around it and is located in the most 
populated and industrialized village, DY village. This is also the town Party and 
government location, as well as other important leading departments, such as Town 
People’s Congress, Town Disciplinary Inspection Committee (jijianwei 纪检委), 
Town People’s Armed Department ( renmin wuzhuang bu 人民武装部)’28, and ‘the 
                                                
22 It includes a culture station, a Broadcasting and a TV station. 
23 It includes a justice office (sifa suo司法所), a comprehensive management office, an appeal office 
(xinfang ban 信访办).  
24 It includes an agriculture equipment station, an agriculture technical station, an irrigation station, a 
forestry station, and an animal husbandry station. 
25 It includes a coal management station. 
26 The main tiaotiao offices usually include Industrial and Commercial Office (gongshang suo 工商所
), State Tax, Local Tax, bank branches, Credit Union, Post Office branch, Supplies and Sales 
Cooperative, Electric Management Office (dianguan suo 电管所), Land Management Office (tuguan 
suo 土管所), Public Health Station and Clinics, Public Security, Justice Office, middle school. See 
Interview YZH22102014. 
27 Zhong, Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below. p.82. 
28 It is responsible for the recruit soldiers from local areas. 
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Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (C.P.P.C.C.)’s Liaison 
Organization (zhengxie gongzuo zu 政协工作组)’.  
As a kuaikuai section, the town family planning office is under directly management 
of the Town Party and government. The town government is responsible for the 
family planning office’s funding, personnel arrangements, and supervising and 
monitoring the family planning office’s work. In the Eleventh Five Year Plan in S 
province (2006-2010), standardizing the town level family planning offices is a new 
project set out at the provincial level. In line with this policy, the town governments 
are required to provide space for the new family planning offices and guarantee their 
smooth construction.  
In addition, the town government is also responsible for the cooperation between the 
family planning office and the civil council (minzheng 民政), health department and 
local police as these departments are responsible for matters related to family 
planning implementation – marriage certification, childbirth and household 
registration. Moreover, the town government has the duty to monitor the family 
planning office’s work to fulfil the targets. The most important responsibility is that 
the town government leaders are required to supervise the fulfilment of ‘family 
planning single veto (yipiao foujue 一票否决)’. The single veto means that the 
individual and their department, and department leader need to be checked with the 
local family planning office before any promotion, and they would be disqualified 
from the promotion or award if they break the regulations.  
In conclusion, while the tiaotiao government strengthened the central government 
control of local officials, the kuaikuai government decentralised central government 
power over local government. For the kuaikuai section, whether the policy can be 
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successfully implemented is heavily determined by local government cooperation, as 
in the saying, “the biggest, biggest, difficulty will not be difficult as long as the most 
powerful person cares about it (lao da nan, lao da nan, lao da chu lai jiu bun an le 
老大难，老大难，老大出来就不难了)”. In this saying, the ‘most powerful person’ 
refers to the town level’s first leader (yi ba shou 一把手) and the ‘biggest difficulty’ 
refers to family planning. This saying indicated the vital influence of the local 
government on implementation of the family planning regulations. 
5.3 Town Government Scope for Implementation Discretion 
The town level government, directly led by the county level government, was 
assigned to carry out all the decisions and regulations passed and adopted by the 
higher authorities, 29 which are not limited tasks but related to all aspects of a 
region’s development and management. Its work is trivial, complex but practical, and 
it is directly related to and covers almost every aspect of local people’s life. So the 
town level government leaders are often called “Parental Officials (Fumu Guan 父母
官)”.  
However, while implementing higher level decisions and regulations, it also has to 
consider the local environment. On the one side, it has to fulfil the tasks required by 
the upper level government, even though the policies maybe unpopular;30 on another 
                                                
29 The Local Government Organization Law (zhonghua renmin gongheguo defang geji renmin daibiao 
dahui he defang geji renmin zhengfu zuzhi fa 中华人民共和国地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级
人民政府组织法) was promulgated by the National People’s Congress (NPC) on 1st July 1979, had 
the fourth amendments on 27th October 2004 by NPC’s Standing Committee. Article 61. 
30 Popular and unpopular policies are defined depending on the villager’s attitude. As Kevin J. O'Brien 
and Lianjiang Li noted that the unpopular policies include “birth control, revenue collection, and 
funeral reform”; the popular policies include “fee limits, the Organic Law of Villagers' Committees 
(which establishes village-level elections), the Administration Litigation Law (which allows villagers 
to sue officials who break the law), circulars forbidding corruption, and central efforts to promote rule 
by law”. 
See, O'Brien and Li, "Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China." p.170. 
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side, it has to practically maintain the relationship with the local population. In 
addition, it does not have much authority on policy/regulation making, but it has to 
take major responsibilities for and deal with the consequences of the 
policy/regulation execution.31 It also has to directly face pressure from the masses. 
As a result, the town government is often caught between the superior county 
government and the resentful population that it governs. These conflicts distort the 
way that town government works. 
This sort of regulation distortion is hardly new, either in the West or in China, 
especially at the grassroots level. As many scholars observed, the clarity of 
regulations,32 the influence of political systems,33 the coercive method and economic 
incentive methods, 34  the structure of government control, 35  and the regulation 
evaluation system36 all influenced the success of regulations implementation. In the 
Maoist China, the "overlapping and reinforcing set of mechanisms" that 
"maintain[ed] organizational discipline" guaranteed generally successful policy 
                                                
31 Yang Zhong, "Chinese Township Government: Between a Rock and a Hard Place," in China's 
Local Administration: Traditions and Changes in the Sub-National Hierarchy, ed. Jae Ho Chung and 
Tao-Chiu Lam (Oxon: Routledge, 2010). 193. 
32 Harry Harding noted that vague policy directives tended to cause poor execution. "when there was 
serious division over policy among the central elite," and "when the program in question ran counter 
to bureaucratic interests." See, Harry Harding, Organizing China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1981). pp350-51. 
33 Merli, Qian, and Smith, "Adaptation of a Political Bureaucracy to Economic and Institutional 
Change under Socialism: The Chinese State Family Planning System."; Croll, Davin, and Kane, 
China's One-Child Family Policy. 
34 Thomas Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic 
Development (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Saith, "Economic Incentives for the One-Child 
Family in Rural China."; Winckler, Re-Enforcing State Birth Planning. 
35 Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, trans. Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard 
Bendix (New York: The Free Press, 1955); Rosemary Santana Cooney and Jiali Li, "Household 
Registration Type and Compliance with the "One-Child" Policy in China, 1979-1988," Demography 
31, no. 1 (February) (1994). They noted that the household registration system, a unique system of 
government control, contributes to the successful implementation of the family planning regulations.  
Harry Harding concluded that "over lapping and reinforcing set of mechanisms" that "maintain[ed] 
organizational discipline" was the main factor of the successful policy implementation in Maoist 
China. See, Harding, Organizing China. pp350-51. 
36 See, O'Brien and Li, "Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China." Zhong, Local Government 
and Politics in China: Challenges from Below; Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister, "Fertility Policy and 
Implementation in China, 1986-88." 
 
 
 
 
 
142 
implementation.37 However, in the Reform era, because of the new households 
responsibility system, the new political reform of the village committees’ elections, 
and decentralisation of government control on personnel appointments from “two-
level-down management” to “one-level-down management” 38 , the regulation 
distortion became intensified at the grassroots level in rural China. By facing many 
tasks, the town government has to decide which policy has priority and which policy 
can be safely ignored. The more popular policies may not be the ones with the higher 
priority or be better executed. In some cases, unpopular regulations are even better 
implemented than popular regulations because a high degree of political attention has 
been paid to them. This high degree of political attention finally transferred to either 
a more comprehensive and systematic policy monitoring and evaluation system or to 
an intensive mass movement (qunzhong yundong 群众运动). 
5.3.1 Evaluation System about Town Government Work 
As for the town level government, they are responsible for around thirty types of 
work. All these types of work are assigned by the county level department. 
Depending on the attention paid by the higher authorities, the monitoring 
mechanisms involved in supervising policy implementation, the clarity of the policy 
goals (including setting quantifiable targets in policy evaluation), the intractability of 
the issue, and the conflict or potential conflict with local interests, these types of 
work are catalogued as routine or key tasks by the county level government.  
A routine task is normally a matter of implementing the policies passed down from 
the central government or the provincial government. Therefore, although the 
                                                
37 Harding, Organizing China. pp350-51. 
38 Under this new arrangement, the town government is directly responsible to its superior—the 
county level. 
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concrete policy and the importance of the implemented policies vary between areas 
and over time, the routine work normally includes similar fields and directions, 
especially in the same provinces/municipalities. They include both the routine 
administrative work and the long term goals set by the central or provincial levels.  
For example, in EY town, the routine administrative tasks include Party work; 
management of social security (shehui zonghe zhili 社会综合治理); secrecy and 
information; propaganda; health; education; social security of labour and 
employment; science and technology; labour unions; regions work; statistics; tax 
collecting and the people’s armed forces (renmin wuzhuang 人民武装). The latter 
includes: communication development; poverty alleviation (fupin 扶贫), peasants’ 
average personal annual income, public security, nongovernmental business and 
family planning.  
The key tasks are normally emphasized and declared to be top priority by the upper 
level authorities in recent years. For example, by learning the lessons from the 
disastrous earthquake that happened at Wenchuan, in Sichuan province, in 2008, in 
which many victims were schoolchildren, most places in China began to emphasize 
the reinforcement of the safety of school buildings. In EY town, all the primary and 
secondary schools have been required to be consolidated to be able to resist an eighth 
degree earthquake since 2008. Therefore, the safety of schools has been the key issue 
since then. In 2009, the key targets set for the EY town government have been about 
the drawing of foreign capital investment (zhaoshang yinzi 招商引资), controlling 
the complaints and appeals to the upper authorities, the environment, new village 
developments (xin nongcun jianshe 新农村建设) and reconstruction of school 
buildings. 
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In order to examine and control local government’s collective and individual work 
effectiveness on policy implementation, a comprehensive ‘annual performance 
evaluation’ has been used. In this evaluation, most tasks are ranked with varied 
credits; compared with meeting routine targets, performance in implementing the key 
tasks by the township officials is allocated a heavier weight in the cadres’ 
performance evaluation. For example, in EY township’s performance evaluation in 
2009, nine of the key tasks took 98 points, while the routine work of twenty three 
jobs took only 82 points of the total 180 points. Except for the credit work, some 
matters did not receive any credit in the total of 180 points, but could cause a 
reduction in the total score if they occurred, e.g. public security, complaints and 
appeals to the higher authorities (shangfang 上访 ), and the preventing of 
malfeasance. For example, the negative points for complaints and appeals to the 
higher authorities are incurred depending on the number of persons who complained 
and the level of government that they went to. Normally, an individual “appeal 
(xinfang 信访)”, which is no more than three persons, will cause a 0.5 point loss in 
the whole score; while a group “xinfang” involving more than three persons will 
cause a reduction of at least 1 point. There are more negative points for higher level 
appeals. Then, in addition to the routine and the key work, the rest of the twenty 
points are determined by a democratic evaluation (minzhu pingjia 民主评价). This 
democratic evaluation involves about thirty people from the leaderships of the county 
level Party Committee, the government, the congress, and the CPPCC. Based on 
these, each township/town will be given an overall evaluation by these leaderships. 
The targets guideline is normally distributed to the one-level-down Party and 
government at the beginning of the year. However, how these targets will be ranked 
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in the annual comprehensive evaluation is not known by the lower level government 
until near the end of the year when the evaluation will be conducted. In addition, the 
performance targets can be adjusted and new ones added in response to changing 
circumstances. For instance, in 2010, the ‘targets of cleaning out the village 
environment’ (cun xiang huanjing zhengzhi 村乡环境整治) was added to the key 
targets in a comprehensive evaluation at nearly the end of the year as the provincial 
leaders made negative comments on the local environment. As a result, in the last 
two months the whole county was making a concentrated effort for the cleaning and 
tidying up of the external environment.39 
5.3.2 Town Government’s Policy Selection 
A slogan which is very popular among the town officials could exactly describe the 
town officials work and limitations, "there are thousand threads on the top, but only 
one need at the bottom. (shang you qian tiao xian, xia you yi gen zhen 上有千条线，
下有一根针). It indicates not only that there are too many responsibilities on the 
town level department, but also the limited nature of their resources and authority. It 
also means that the township officials tend to bear more responsibilities than their 
counterparts in county bureaux. Therefore, by facing these multi tasks and with 
limited resources and authority, the town governments always have their own 
internally ranked targets in importance which are quite often different from the 
county level’s requirements.  
As grassroots level officials, in addition to fulfilling the targets requested by the 
upper level authorities and maintaining their political benefits, they also face the 
challenges from the mass to those unpopular policies but with the responsibility to 
                                                
39 Group interview with local official at EY town in 9th December, 2010. 
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maintain social and political security. Thus, the town officials are usually two sided 
game players in order to maintain this balance.  
With the criteria of weight in the evaluation and toughness of these issues, the 
township level officials catalogued these policies into hard targets (ying zhibiao 硬指
标) and soft targets (ruan zhibiao 软指标). Automatically, if the task/policy is 
ranked as a priority target it will be paid more attention by the local Party and 
government. Except for the local conditions, this internal ranking again closely links 
to the supervision and evaluation system. 
Normally, “soft targets” are those policies without any quantifiable requirements, 
and which do not conflict with local villagers’ interests. For example, the Party work, 
which composes the heaviest points out of 10 in the routine work, is one of the easily 
manageable tasks. The improvement of the peasant’s average annual income is 
another piece of soft work. Because personal income tax is not very seriously 
enforced in China, especially for peasants, it is hard for any upper level superior to 
check whether the reported data is true. Therefore, it is easy for the town level 
officials to make a false report in the statistics in order to carry out their 
responsibility. False reporting even happened among those emphasized policies. One 
example is the environment issue. With some other issues, such as reinforcing school 
buildings, the safety of drinking water, new village developments, these are popular 
policies for the local villagers. Therefore, once the funding is available from the 
upper level government, the township/town level officials have no difficulty in 
carrying out these polices. 
For the township/town level officials, the “hardest policies” are those related to the 
villagers’ personal interests. Briefly, the policies are issues that are straight forwardly 
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related to the peasant’s personal interests: money (qian 钱), land (di 地), and person 
(ren 人). The saying ‘collecting money, grain, and person’ (yao qian, yao liang, yao 
ren 要钱，要粮，要人) in the planned economy has switched to ‘collecting money, 
land, and person’ in the market reforms. This not only reveals what the peasants are 
most concerned about but also what are the toughest policies to implement. In 
conclusion, the policies related to money are: tax collecting40, peasants’ pension 
insurance, peasants medical insurance; those related to the land are: communication 
development and the drawing in of foreign capital and business (zhaoshang yinzi 招
商引资 ), 41  as they quite often involve taking up peasants’ farming land and 
residential land; the person related one is the family planning policy. In addition, 
complaints and appeals to the higher authorities (shangfang 上访)42 are also an area 
of work to which the township/town level officials pay great attention. 
These policies are hard for the local officials not only because they involve conflicts 
of interest with local residents, but also because they are evaluated by the upper level 
authorities using quantifiable performance targets (zhibiao hua kaohe zhibiao 指标化
                                                
40 Tax collecting is referring to local enterprises not individuals. The township/town government does 
not directly involve in the tax collection, which is normally taken by the town level state and local tax 
offices.  
41 After drawing funding, the township/town level officials need to find the place to build up the 
factory. Then this will involve the relocation residential house and occupy the farming land. 
42 In China, the citizens often make complaints and comments of the mistreatment or injustices by 
local officials to the upper level people's governments or the relevant departments of the people's 
governments through correspondence, E-mails, faxes, phone calls, visits, and so on. However, after 
1989’s Tiananmen incident, maintaining political and social stability has become a paramount concern 
by the central government. Public demonstrations, sit-ins, riots are not uncommon in rural China as a 
result of excessive fee/tax collection, land grab by developers, official corruption and violation on 
local people’s human rights, such as force abortion. The central government has repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of controlling these resistances as they pose serious threat to China’s 
social and political stability. Township Party officials are held personally responsible if any large-
scale social unrest or disturbance occurs in their area of jurisdiction. Therefore, whether the grassroots 
level government have been successfully controlled this kinds of complain and appeal have been 
repeatedly emphasised and list as the key issues for many years.  
See, Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "The Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China," China 
Quarterly 143 (1995). 
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考核指标). For local officials, these targets are relatively hard to feign by a sleight of 
hand. As one deputy mayor described it: ‘It is hard to make a false report on the 
actual number of persons who paid the pension insurance, and the actual person who 
was born.’ (Yanglao baoxian shi jiaoqian de shi, jiao le duoshao jiushi duoshao, 
buhao nong xu de; jihuashengyu yeshi. 养老保险是交钱的事，交了多少就是多少
，不好弄虚的；计划生育也是。)43 Although each target is assigned a weight in a 
responsibility commission, the scores for soft policies tend to cluster near the top, 
while those attached to hard policy targets vary more and usually supply the crucial 
points that separate success and failure.44 As one local official said, most of the soft 
policies are easy to reach depending on the local leaders’ relationship with the upper 
level authorities, but the points for these hard policies are difficult to feign by a 
sleight of hand. (Dabufen ruan zhengce de fen shi kao lingdaomen he shangmian de 
guanxi, danshi zhexie yingzhibiao biaojiao kunnan. 大部分软政策的分是靠领导们
和上面的关系，但是这些硬指标比较困难.)  45 
Compared with the county level, the township/town level has less resources and staff 
but they carry on all regulations passed down from the upper level authorities. In EY 
town, there are only seven family planning officials in charging of the 25,600 
population of the town. It is impossible for this limited labour force carry on all tasks 
evenly. Therefore, without these over loaded tasks and limited sources, it is easier for 
town government to pay more attention on the tasks which would bring them better 
political achievement. 
                                                
43 Interview with one deputy mayor, 11th Dec, 2009. 
44 Similar opinions are also hold by the O’Brien and Li. See, O'Brien and Li, "Selective Policy 
Implementation in Rural China." 174. 
45 Ibid. 
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In conclusion, the cadre responsibility system helps secure reliable implementation 
by close attention paid by the local government to some tough targets, but it also 
creates a selective implementation method. In particular, it entices local cadres to 
ignore some policies that higher levels cannot readily turn into binding targets, such 
as the peasant’s personal average annual income, and environment issues. However, 
it also needs to be noticed that the effective implementation of family planning 
regulation is only valid relatively comparing with other soft policies. Family 
Planning regulation implementation variation still differs from place to place. The 
local cadres are frequently using their discretion to implement all policies, even the 
hard policies, in a selective manner. The birth control story in O’Brien’s paper46 is a 
typical case in rural China.  
5.4 Town Government Discretion Over Family Planning 
Implementation 
5.4.1 Population and Family Planning Responsibility System47 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, population and family planning responsibility 
system has become the main method of monitoring and evaluating the grassroots 
level family planning work. Starting from the provincial level, each level of the Party 
and the government is required to sign a ‘Population and Family Planning 
Responsibility Commission (renkou he jihua shengyu mubiao zeren shu 人口和计划
生育目标责任书)’ with its subordinate level Party and government. For example, 
the city level government would sign a performance contract with the provincial 
                                                
46 O'Brien and Li, "The Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China." 
47 renkou he jihuashengyu mubiao zeren shu 人口和计划生育目标责任管理制 
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level; then the county level government would sign a contract with the city level, 
then the same at the levels of town and county, village and town.  
The commission has a set of rules about the setting of quantitative goals; the use of 
economic incentives to encourage goal fulfilment; and the appraisal of performance 
with the main purpose of improving implementation.48 In detail, it regulates the ratio 
of births, permitted second births, the third and above births; the long term 
contraception rate; the amount and percentage of the social compensation fees 
collected; annual family planning funding per person; key issues; requirements for 
the family planning organisation’s setting and training; and the responsibility of local 
Party and government leaders. 
5.4.1.1 Quotas 
Most of these targets of the Family Planning Responsibility Commission are 
quantifiable measurements. Starting from the state’s national birth rate targets, which 
set up the standard for each province, the lower administrative levels must establish 
quotas in line with these targets. After 2000, the main central document about the 
population is the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China and the State Council on the Strength of the Population and Family Planning 
Program and the Stable Low Level of Birth Rate49 and the Decision of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Fully 
Enhancing the Population and Family Planning Program and Comprehensively 
                                                
48 More detailed introduction of this New Public Management model can be found in the following 
articles. See, Patrick. Dunleavy and Christopher. Hood, "From Old Public Administrative to New 
Public Management," Public Money & Management 14, no. 3 (1994). Peter Self, Government by the 
Market? The Politics of Public Choice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). 
49 "Decision of the Central Committee and the State Council on Strength Population and Family 
Planning Program and Stable Low Level of Birth Rate (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu 
Jiaqiang Renkou Yu Jihuashengyu Gongzuo Wending Di Shengyu Shuiping De Jueding 中共中央国
务院关于加强人口与计划生育工作，稳定低生育水平的决定),"  (ZhongFa (No. 8), 2000). 
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Addressing Population Issues50, which set up the long-term goal for 2020 and the 
short-term goal for 2010 and 2020. According to these two documents, the targets for 
the total population until 2010 and 2020 are 13,600 and 14,500 million, respectively; 
the annual birth rate is less than 15,000 million from 2000 to 2010. Then, guided by 
these central targets, the individual provinces set up their provincial targets of birth 
rate complying with the policy, the second unpermitted birth rate and the third and 
above birth rate. In order to achieve a higher political performance, these targets are 
often increased unreasonably level by level. Then it becomes very high when the 
targets arrived at the town level. In EY town, the target of the birth rate conforming 
to the policy has increased from 86% at the province level to 90% at the town level. 
At the village level, the quotas have been allocated as an exact number to each 
village. However, this number is not calculated by subdividing the town allotment to 
the village, but maintained as a ‘unified town team’ for births. Therefore, rather than 
using a formula based solely on territorial population, some specific factors are also 
considered, for example, the number of couples who are newly married but childless 
and the projected number of newlyweds. For example, in FS village, a mountain 
village with a population of 1031 in 2008, the quota for 2009 births is no more than 
eight persons, which includes six first-birth and two second-birth; while in DY 
village, a plain village with a population of 7371 in 2008, the quota for 2009 births is 
no more than 58.     
                                                
50 "Decision of the Central Committee and the State Council on Fully Enhancing Population and 
Family Planning Program and Comprehensively Addressing Population Issues (Zhonggong 
Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Quanmian Jiaqiang Renkou He Jihuashengyu Gongzuo Tongchou 
Jiejue Renkou Wenti De Jueding  中共中央国务院关于全面加强人口和计划生育工作统筹解决人
口问题的决定),"  (ZhongFa (No. 22), 2006). 
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5.4.1.2 Evaluation 
Although each target is assigned a weight in a responsibility commission, only the 
scores for key targets vary more and usually supply the crucial points for assessment 
and ranking. The key targets in the family planning responsibility commission are the 
birth rate, include the birth rate, the third and above birth rate, the long-term 
contraception rate51 and the social compensation fees collecting rate. As one town 
family planning office said, ‘it is easy to carry out the sex ratio or migration work as 
there is no hard ratio in the assessment. What we need to do is just compile these 
records and conduct some propaganda’.52 
In EY town, the assessment is organized by ordinary checks and annual assessments, 
which take up 60% and 40% respectively. The ordinary check is carried out at the 
county level and the city level. The annual assessment is carried out at the province 
level. In the ordinary check, only some keys targets about the birth ratios are checked 
by the upper level, but the annual check is an overall check.  
The assessment generally includes three aspects: the management of the local family 
planning program, maintaining the low birth rate, other issues regarding the family 
planning policy, such as the quality of birth, sex-ratio, migrant control, etc. The first 
field is mainly concerned with the leadership’s supervision of family planning, such 
as the ‘veto issue’ (yi piao fou jue 一票否决), and investment in family planning 
                                                
51 Following the relaxation of the population policy in 2013, the assessment has also been less 
restrictive. The recording of long-term contraceptive data, such as using of IUDs and sterilization, has 
disappeared from the comprehensive ‘Annual Performance Evaluation’ (niandu mubiao zerenzhi 
kaohe 年度目标责任制考核). It was replaced by a synthesis of contraceptive data (zonghe biyun lv 
综合避孕率). This meant that rather than having enforced contraceptive methods, people could make 
their own choice. See interview FENGZY010414. 
52 Zhexie gongzuo bushi kaohe de fanwei [meiyou ying zhibiao], bijiao haozuo. Jiushi diaochadiaocha 
xuanchuan xuanchuan. 这些工作不是考核的范围[没有硬指标]，比较好做。就是调查调查，宣传
宣传。 Interview with EY town family planning office, August 20th, 2009. 
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programs. The second field is the hard target with a qualitative ratio for the family 
planning program, which includes the birth rate, the third and above birth rate, the 
long-term contraception rate and the social compensation fees collecting rate. The 
third field has no hard ratios, so it is not considered by the local officials as the key 
task. The concrete assessment standard is not shown to the responsibility commission 
until the time of the annual check. 
Table 5. 1 Population and Family Planning Responsibility Commission Quote 
Targets Goals Value 
the 
management 
of the local 
family 
planning 
program 
Veto Issue  
Comprehensive 
Management 
 420 100 
Family Planning Funding 
Investment 
 120 
Employment Condition   100 
Statistics Accuracy  
Official Training 
5% 100 
maintaining 
the low birth 
rate 
Rate of Planned Births 90% 330 100 
Non-permitted Third and 
Above Births 
0.3% 50 
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Long Term Contraceptive 
Rate 
80% 100 
Social Compensation Fees 
Collecting Rate 
75% 80 
other issues 
regarding the 
family 
planning 
policy 
Quality of Births 70% 250 90 
Sex-Ratio: Care for the 
girls (guanai nvhai 关爱女
孩) 
 50 
Migration   60 
Else  50 
Total  1000 
 
5.4.2 Leadership Responsibility System and Single Veto System 
5.4.2.1 Leadership Responsibility System (yiba shou fuze zhi 一把手负责制) 
Leadership responsibility is the most important supervising system on family 
planning regulations implementation. This means that the top leader of each level of 
government or organisation is responsible for policy failure in the areas and 
organisations in his charge. Since 1984, by carrying on the ‘one-level-down 
management’ (xia guan yi ji 下管一级) system, each level of the Party and 
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government is supervised by its superior level of the Party and the government.53 By 
signing the “responsibility commission (zeren zhuang 责任状)”, the Party secretary 
or the government mayor, and the deputy township/town mayors who are specifically 
in charge of family planning programs take personal responsibility for reaching 
programme goals and held responsible for failure to implement the targets.  
Based on the assessment results, the local governments and government leaders’ 
performance are judged to be excellent (youxiu 优秀), competent (chenzhi 称职), 
basically competent (jiben chengzhi 基本称职) or incompetent (bu chenzhi 不称职). 
Normally, the verdict of excellent is only awarded to 15-20% of governments and 
their leaders who are top ranked. 54  Both economic and political rewards and 
punishments are used for the reward and punishment. However, bonus-penalty rules 
are hardly carried out in practice although they are clearly listed in the family 
planning regulations. 
For those honoured ‘excellent’ governments, their top leaders and specific leaders on 
family planning (family planning special deputy town mayor (jihuashengyu zhuanzhi 
fuxiangzhang 计划生育专职副乡长)) are awarded some economic bonus. At the 
village level, the bonus is normally shared among the village committee members. 
The bonus ranges from hundreds of CNY to about one thousand CNY from place to 
place.  
                                                
53 After 1984 personnel appointment was decentralized, with ‘two-level-down management’ replaced 
by ‘one-level-down management’. Under this new arrangement, officials at each level gained full 
authority to appoint their subordinates. County leaders, for instance, are now empowered to decide, 
without approval from a prefectural organization department, who will serve as a township Party 
secretary or head of government.    
"The Key Issues of CPC (1984) （Zhongguo Gongchandang Dashiji 中国共产党大事记 )," 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-10/15/content_2093977_2.htm (13th January 2011).  
54 Interview with township officials on 10th January, 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
156 
Regarding those governments who failed to attain these targets or who are ranked at 
the bottom will disqualify the government, organisation, and their top leader and 
direct leader from any further commendation and promotion in the next year even if 
they perform well in all their other work.55 For some serious faulty of fraud or failure 
to meet the vita quotas, he local government leader might be dismissed from office if 
they had received a “yellow notice” (huangpai jinggao 黄牌警告). 
5.4.2.2 Single Veto System (yipiao foujue zhi一票否决制) 
In 1991, after the central government further guideline of strengthen the family 
planning work and strictly control the population increase, a family planning single 
veto system was carried out in all the regions.56  This Single Veto system was 
applied to both the individual who broke the family planning regulations, and 
government or work unit. If the government or work unit did not pass the assessment 
set in the population and family planning responsibility commission, or any 
employee in the unit broke the family planning regulations, or poor performance in 
birth control, can all be the overriding reason for disqualifying the individual and 
their leaders from promotion.  
Comparing with the leadership responsibility system, this Single Veto system has 
more serious influence on the local government leaders. 
                                                
55 S province Population and Family Planning Responsibility Commission, 2009. 
56 Central Committee of CPC and The State Council, "A Decision Made by Central Committee of 
CPC and the State Council About Strenthen the Family Planning Work in Oder to Strictly Control the 
Population Increase (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Jihuashengyu Gongzuo 
Yange Kongzhi Renkou Zengzhang De Jueding 中国中央、国务院关于加强计划生育工作严格控制
人口增长的决定)," (ZhongFa (No.9), 12th May 1991). 
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5.5 Constrained Supervision System on Town Government 
Discretion 
5.5.1 Democratic Evaluation (minzhu pingyi 民主  评议) 
The cadre responsibility system involves two parts of democratic evaluation. One 
part is the evaluation of the government organisation and another part is related the 
government leaders. The evaluation to the government is an overall evaluation by the 
upper level authorities. It involves about thirty people from the leaderships of the 
county level Party Committee, the government, the congress and the CPPCC. In this 
evaluation, each township/town will be given an overall evaluation by these upper 
level authorities. This part of the evaluation takes about 10% in the overall cadre 
responsibility system.  
Another part of the evaluation is regarding the local Party and the government 
leaders: the Party secretary, the government mayor, the deputy mayors, the deputy 
Party secretary, the chairman of the Town People’s Congress and the secretary of the 
Town Disciplinary Inspection Committee (jijianwei 纪检委)’. This part of the 
evaluation involves not the upper level authorities but the representatives of the local 
residents, such as the village Party secretary, the town People’s Congress 
representatives, the representatives of the retired cadres, the representatives of local 
enterprises, etc., about 100 people. By adopting no name records, all the main leaders 
of the town Party and government are evaluated.  In addition, these mass 
representatives also evaluate the local Party and government work in general. Based 
on the evaluation, about 20-30% of government leaders are awarded the title of 
‘excellent’.  
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However, there is little democratic influence in this evaluation. First of all, this 
evaluation only takes up 3% of the overall evaluation. Secondly, most of the 
representatives involved in the evaluation are the superior of the local residents 
rather than the basic level masses (jiceng qunzhong 基层群众), such as the village 
Party secretary, representatives of the retired cadres, and representatives of local 
enterprises. Since they know this fact very well, these representatives normally do 
not really make their voices heard in the evaluation. It is very common that almost all 
the officials are evaluated as competent. One local official commented on the 
democratic evaluation that, ‘[these evaluations are] not all substantial assessments. 
The key assessment is decided by the upper level superiors rather than the ordinary 
masses. Except for those who have personally had conflicts with the officials, most 
of the evaluation result is competent’. ([zhexie kaohe] dou shi xu de. Guanjian 
[kaohe] haishi shangmian de, laobaixing de kaohe meiyong. Chule gebie de you 
siren maodun de wai, dabufen doushi chenzhi. [这些考核] 都是虚的。关键还是上
面的， 老百姓的考核没用. 除了个别的有私人矛盾的外，大部分都是称职.)57  
5.5.2 Town People’s Congress 
The current township/town government is composed of three sectors: Township 
People’s Government (zhen renmin zhengfu 乡镇人民政府), Township/Town Party 
Committee (xiang dangwei 乡镇党委), and Township/Town People’s Congress 
(xiangzhen renda 乡镇人大 ). As same as the upper level governments, the 
Township/town Party Committee is the political leader of the government. It has one 
town Party Secretary (shuji 书记 ) and several (generally 2-4) Deputy Party 
Secretaries. The Township/Town Mayor position (xiang zhang 乡长) is usually taken 
                                                
57 Interview with EY town deputy mayor on 10th January, 2010. 
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by a Deputy Party Secretary.  Consequently, the township/town Party secretary, 
instead of the township/town magistrate, is the most influential decision-maker, or 
the first hand, at the township/town level. In addition, practically, the town level’s 
Party Committee and the People’s Government are often intertwined intimately 
because of their relatively small size. This caused another consequence which is that 
the party and government use one group of staffs (dang zheng bu fen jia 党政不分
家).  
At the township/town level, the Town People’s Congress is under the firm control of 
the township/town Party Committee and the Township People’s Government. The 
legislative-executive relations at the town level should be considered a division of 
labour, not a separation of powers. Being a chair of the Township/Town People’s 
Congress is viewed as an honour rather than a duty or a genuine voice for a 
constituency.  
In the past, the township/town Party Secretary often concurrently held the position of 
chairman of the Township/Town People’s Congress or was at least a member of the 
township/town Party Committee; or the position was held by a former township/town 
mayor or a former township/town Party Secretary who had left his leading post (tui 
ju er xian 退居二线). But the recent trend is that the chair becomes more and more 
independent, with the improvement of the local People’s Congress’s political status. 
In addition, unlike the Town People’s Congress general members, who are directly 
elected by local people, the chair of the Town People’s Congress must be nominated 
and finally decided on by the county level Party Committee. 
In conclusion, the town People’s Congress has little power over local affairs 
including family planning. First of all, it has no role in legislation formulation 
 
 
 
 
 
160 
according to the PRC’s Constitution, the Legislation Law and the Local Organisation 
Law58; secondly, although it was given authority by the Local Organization Law over 
selecting Township People’s Government officials and in shaping and affecting 
township/town government decisions, it is impossible to use this power since it is 
under the firm control of the township/town Party committee and the Township 
People’s Government. The annual meeting of the Town People’s Congress is 
normally held one day annually, and the daily work after the annual meeting is 
carried out by the general office of the Township People’s Government. The actual 
role is taken by the Town Party Committee and the Town People’s Government. 
Therefore, the town People’s Congress has little supervision role in relation to local 
Party and government work on family planning. 
In conclusion, even though the Chinese central government has set up many forms to 
improve political democracy, democracy plays a small role in supervising the town 
level Party and government in practice. The organization settings is the main 
constraint of this democracy, which makes the democracy evaluation team and 
People’s Congress  inability on the supervision.  
5.6 Conclusion 
By analysing the administrative relationships at the town level government and the 
kuaikuai management relationship between the town family planning office and the 
town Party and government, as well as the supervision system over this kuaikuai 
relationship, this chapter explained how the administrative system at the town level 
influenced the implementation of the family planning regulations. Several 
conclusions were drawn from this analysis. 
                                                
58 PRC’s Constitution Article 100, Local Organization Law Article 17, and PRC’s Legislation Law 
Article 63. 
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First of all, the cadre-responsibility system constrained the local family planning 
officials’ autonomy to a great degree. By the use of quantifiable targets, the town 
level family planning officials were strictly monitored in the process of policy 
implementation. In order to fulfil these targets, the town level government and the 
family planning officials resorted to using non-legal or tyrannical administrative 
methods, such as forced abortions, detaining property, or detaining the persons 
themselves who had broken the family planning regulations.  Since 1995, with the 
gradual transformation from rule of person to rule of law in China, most of these 
administrative methods have been prohibited.59 In addition, after about 15 years of 
implementing the family planning regulations and the development of the Chinese 
economy and evolution of the reproductive culture, most people have started to 
accept the family planning regulations. As one local family planning office stated, 
‘Now, the people who have accepted the family planning regulation are not the 
problem any more, but those who still intend to have more children or sons are hard 
to persuade, (Xian zai, bushing de jiu bushing le, sheng de haishi yao sheng. 现在，
不生的就是不生了，生的还是要生。)60 As a consequence, policy cheating and 
distortion occur when the policies of the higher governmental authorities clash 
directly with local government interests, or when specified quantifiable policy goals 
are simply out of reach. In these cases, town officials deliberately make false reports 
and carry out statistical fabrications in order to reach their targets. 
                                                
59 In July, 1995, the State Family Planning Commission issued the Notice of the Insisting Seven 
Forbidden Actions in the Family Planning Implementation（zai jihuashengyu xingzheng zhifa zhong 
jianchi 'qi ge buzhun' de tongzhi 在计划⽣生育⾏行政执法中坚持‘七个不准’的通知). This ‘Seven 
Forbidden Actions’ prohibited the unlawful actions during the family planning execution. 
60 Interview with EY town family planning office on November 20th, 2009. 
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A second conclusion drawn from this chapter is that the town government leadership 
(who is usually the party secretary but sometimes the mayor) and the structure of the 
town Party and government all contribute to how the family planning officials 
implement the family planning regulations. Because of the special structure where 
‘the Township/Town Party and government use one group of staff (dang zheng bu 
fen jia 党政不分家)’ and the Town People’s Congress has a limited function, the 
township/town Party secretary is the most influential decision-maker. He is often 
regarded as the ‘Top Person’ by the locals and his personal attitude towards affairs 
determines whether legislation or policy will be implemented smoothly.  
Thirdly, regarding the overall policy implementation, supervision systems tend to 
lead to selective policy implementation. By focusing on the policies which have hard 
targets which nevertheless might seriously conflict with local people’s interests, the 
town level officials choose to implement well these ‘hard’ tasks and neglected the 
‘soft’ tasks even though they might be popular policies among the local people. 
The fourth conclusion concerns the ‘Population and Family Planning Responsibility 
Commission and Leadership Responsibility’ system, which determines that the town 
government would exercise discretion over the family planning execution. The result 
is that although there are many tasks to do for the family planning work, only tasks 
which have hard measurable targets were carried out seriously. These key tasks 
include the birth rate, the third and above birth rate, the long-term contraception rate 
and the social compensation fees collecting rate. 
Finally, the supervision system monitoring the town government’s discretion on 
policy selection and the implementation of the family planning regulations is very 
limited. With this limited supervision system, another problem has been caused as a 
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consequence: non-supervised data from the grassroots level.61 ‘As a result of these 
constraints, birth planning has suffered the fate of all centralized planning systems, 
which struggle with the problem of lacking or receiving distorted information from 
below. Among all Chinese statistical data, birth-planning figures are the most 
unreliable. While additional surveys and multiple systems of record-taking have 
introduced some checks, they have been unable to prevent the situation from 
deteriorating’.62 
 
                                                
61  See White, "Implementing the 'One-Child-Per-Couple' Population Program in Rural China: 
National Goals and Local Politics." 
62 Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development. 
p.331. 
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Chapter 6 The Influence Of Political Reforms on the 
Implementation of the Family Planning Regulations 
6.1 Introduction 
Political influences on family planning implementation have been widely studied 
since the 1980s. 1  This research not only pointed out that the successful 
implementation of the family planning regulations has been due to the centralised 
Chinese government structure which ensured execution at the local level, but also 
commented on the conflict between family planning implementation and the 
agricultural responsibility system.2 It is a conflict between liberating the economy in 
the reformed China and maintaining tight control of the political and social sphere.3  
In addition to the agricultural responsibility system, another political reform ⎯ the 
village committee election ⎯ that was introduced at the beginning of the 1980s, also 
intensified this conflict, particularly when the Villagers Committees Organization 
Law was adopted in 1998. On the one hand, the central government tried to improve 
grassroots democracy and manage the rural areas with these self-governed village 
                                                
1 See Merli, Qian, and Smith, "Adaptation of a Political Bureaucracy to Economic and Institutional 
Change under Socialism: The Chinese State Family Planning System."; Croll, Davin, and Kane, 
China's One-Child Family Policy; Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy 
and Demographic Development; White, China's Longest Campaign: Birth Planning in the People's 
Republic, 1949-2005; Greenhalgh, "The Peasantization of Population Policy in Shaanxi: Cadre 
Mediation of the State-Society Conflict." 
2 The Agricultural Responsibility System is also called the Household Responsibility System (jiting 
lianchan chengbao zeren zhi 家庭联产承包责任制). Under this system, after signing a contract with 
each individual family of the village, the farmers could freely produce over the quota. Compared to 
the former Agricultural Cooperative System, in which people were paid equally based on their age and 
ability rather than their actual work, this responsibility system greatly stimulated the farmers 
productivity. 
3 Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development. 
p.4. 
See ibid.; White, "Implementing the 'One-Child-Per-Couple' Population Program in Rural China: 
National Goals and Local Politics." p.307. 
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committees; on the other hand, the central government had to make sure these self-
governed organizations continued to carry out the central government’s (and other 
level governments’) policies and decisions, particularly unpopular policies.  
This chapter aims to explain how the democratic village committee elections have 
influenced family planning implementation at the village level. First of all, the 
setting and role of the village family planning mechanism in relation to policy 
implementation is explained. This is followed by an examination of the political 
influences on the implementation of the family planning regulations. Then, the 
effectiveness of the village officials’ supervision system is discussed. After this, the 
literacy standards of the officials and its influence on their work performance are 
analysed. Then, with an understanding of the village family planning officials and 
their setting, there follows a discussion of how the new political reform ⎯ the village 
committee election ⎯ has influenced family planning implementation. Finally, this 
chapter discusses other factors that might have caused ineffectiveness in the village 
family planning officials. 
6.2 The Context of the Village Family Planning Mechanism 
6.2.1 The Setting of the Village Family Planning Organization 
The early stages of the village level family planning mechanism took their form in 
the mid-1970s. From 19744, a leader at each level was responsible for the family 
planning work in addition to their ordinary duties. This was normally the People’s 
Commune secretary (shuji 书记) at the commune level, and the brigade’s secretary at 
                                                
4 It was requested by the S Provincial Revolution Committee’s Family Planning Leader Group on 
November 1974. See SX History Records Research Institution (Shizhi Yanjiuyuan 史志研究院), Sx 
Local History Record (Sx Tongzhi  Sx通志). p.423. 
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the brigade level. At the production team level, women’s leaders (funv zhuren 妇女
主任), leaders of China’s Communist Youth League, and barefoot doctors took joint 
responsibility to assist the upper level government visits and organized the villagers’ 
meetings or women’s meetings for the advocating of the family planning regulations. 
During this period, the family planning campaign was mainly led by the county level 
health department and many at-the-village (xiaxiang 下乡) activities were organized. 
They focused on advocating the state’s family planning policy and popularizing 
contraception methods. The family planning campaign slogans and posters were 
painted on the external wall of village houses. The mobile cinema team was 
organised at all villages in turn. Some family planning-promoting films were made 
especially, such as Sweet Project (tianmi de shiye 甜蜜的事业). With limited 
entertainment activities before the 1990s, the open-air cinema and the broadcasts, as 
well as the posters, were viewed as entertainment by the villagers. Even those who 
might not originally accept the idea of birth control or contraception might have 
come to watch and listen, having been attracted by the modern media and the crowds 
gathering around. These kinds of publicity methods continued until the mid-1990s. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the PRC’s family planning campaign went into full 
swing with the introduction of the ‘one-child’ policy. The family planning 
organizations needed to be further strengthened at all levels to cope with this 
tightened policy. As a result, one year after the founding of the PRC’s National 
Population and Family Planning Commission in 1981, the professional village level 
family planning officials were requested to set up “both the production brigades and 
the production teams should have one leader member responsible for the family 
planning work in particular. (dadui he shengchandui yao you yiming lingdao ganbu 
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zhua jihuashengyu gongzuo 大队和生产队要有一名领导干部抓计划生育).”5 
Instructed by this document, most villages6 appointed a professional family planning 
official to carry out the family planning work under the dual management of both the 
village committee and the town level family planning office. At this time, the village 
level family planning mechanism was formulated. China’s five level family planning 
system had extended to villages and developed into a six level hierarchy system: 
state, province, prefecture/city, county, town, and village. 
The village level family planning organisation was normally composed of a leader 
and one or two officials. The leader is often the director of the village committee 
(often referred to as the “village head”(cunzhang 村长)), or secretary of the village 
party branch (cun zhibu shuji 村支部书记). The leader normally did not get directly 
involved in the detailed family planning work. It was mainly the family planning 
officials who dealt with the tasks directly. The family planning officials in most 
villages were part time officials who were often the women’s leader (funv zhuren 妇
女主任), the village doctor (weishengyuan 卫生员), or the village accountant. Only 
in some big villages was a full time family planning official appointed. 
The title of these village family planning officials changed from ‘the Captain of 
Family Planning’ (jihuashengyu duizhang 计划生育队长) in the 1970s to ‘Specialist 
                                                
5 See "The Central Committee and the State Council's Instructions for Further Implementing Family 
Planning Work (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Jihuashengyu Gongzuo 
De Zhishi 中共中央国务院关于进一步做好计划生育工作的指示)."  
6 The production brigades and production teams were the sublevel organizations of the People’s 
Commune between 1958 and 1984.  
Under the household responsibility system (jiating lianchan chengbao zhi 家庭联产承包制 ) 
introduced in the late 1970s, the political structure of communes and production brigades were 
replaced by the villager’s committee, which is a self-governed administrative organization and a 
policy implementation tool for the Chinese government. Furthermore, the commune was replaced by 
the town; the production brigade by the village; the production team by the small villager’s group 
(cunmin xiaozu 村民小组). 
 
 
 
 
 
168 
Family Planning Official’ (jihuashengyu zhuangan 计划生育专干) in the 1980s, 
when the independent family planning organisation was set up at county and town 
levels, then to ‘village information official’ (cun xinxiyuan 村信息员) in the 2000s. 
6.2.2 The Function of the Village Family Planning Mechanism 
Some Western scholars, such as Susan Greenhalgh7 and Tyrene White8, have argued 
that the village level officials (the village level cadres, the village women’s leaders 
and the village committee members) are the actual grassroots level enforcement 
officers in rural China. They believe that, because these officials “firmly rooted in 
local society, … live in the (same) village, (and) … are linked to villagers by kin and 
friendship ties, and their livelihood is drawn from village resources….”9, they “have 
often tried and sometimes succeeded in bending those rules to the advantage of their 
relatives and neighbours when state rules have challenged profoundly held local 
values or threatened farmer economic security.”10  
Actually, the relationship among villagers is more complex than these academics 
observed. Although most villagers in a village have a kind of extended family 
(qinshu 亲属) relationship, this relationship is not as close as they supposed it to be. 
Some modern village studies found that sometimes the relative relationship11 is even 
                                                
7 Greenhalgh, "The Peasantization of Population Policy in Shaanxi: Cadre Mediation of the State-
Society Conflict." 220. 
8 White, "Implementing the 'One-Child-Per-Couple' Population Program in Rural China: National 
Goals and Local Politics."; China's Longest Campaign: Birth Planning in the People's Republic, 
1949-2005.  
9 Greenhalgh, "The Peasantization of Population Policy in Shaanxi: Cadre Mediation of the State-
Society Conflict." p.220. 
10 Ibid. p.220. 
11 This relative relationship here not limited to the patrilineal family, but refers to a much wider 
network which based on the extended family of both paternal and maternal side. 
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closer than the extended family.12 Fei Xiaotong did also note the family relationship 
in his early research — “the relatives are not relatives and it does not matter how 
close you are (danshi qinshu jinguan zenyang qinmi, jiujing shi tiwai zhiji 但是亲属
关系怎样亲热，究竟是体外之己).”13 In the reformed China, the extended family 
relationship gradually became weaker as a result of modernization and migration.14 
With modernization, many farmers migrated to the urban areas and changed their 
jobs from their traditional field work and developed new lifestyles; they no longer 
relied on agricultural production as their main income; their living style and values 
all changed, even those who still stayed in the village. The family planning campaign 
further intensified this change. Because of birth control, the traditional big family 
size sharply reduced in rural areas from the 1980s. This smaller extended family 
caused more complex relationships among local villagers because the villagers 
became less related to each other due to the smaller families, families having varied 
resources and the generally different economic conditions. On the one hand, they still 
relied on the traditional family and neighbourhood relationships and benefited from 
it; on the other hand, they also competed with each other intensively when their 
personal interests were challenged. Therefore, it is an oversimplification to conclude 
                                                
12 “the marriage family relationship is better than the extended family … The marriage family 
relationship is a joint from two families into one family while the extended family is a separation 
between the brothers. (zuqin zhijian de guanxi haiburu yinqin … yinqin shi fuqi de heerweiyi, zuqin 
shi xiongdi de yifenweier. 族亲之间的关系还不如姻亲 … 姻亲是夫妻的合二为一，族亲是兄弟
的一分为二.)” SeeYinhe Li, Reproduction and Village Culture - Grandson of Grandpa (Shengyu Yu 
Cunluo Wenhua--Ye Zhi Sun 生育与村落文化-- 爷之孙) (Beijing: Culture and Art Press (wenhua 
yishu chubanshe 文化艺术出版社), 2003). p.71.  
13 Xiaotong Fei, From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society (Xiangtu Zhongguo 乡土中国) 
(Beijing: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press (waiyu jiaoyan chubanshe 外语教研出版社
), 2012). Section 12, Consanguinity and Regionalism. 
14 Xueyi Lu, ed. The Villages and Farmers in the Reform (Gaige Zhong De Nongcun He Nongmin 改
革中的农村和农民 ) (Beijing: Party School Publishing House of CPC Central Committee 
(Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe 中共中央党校出版社), 1992). p.20. 
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that the family and neighbourhood relationship is the main reason for village cadres 
bending unpopular policies in order to benefit local villagers.  
In order to properly understand the role of the village family planning organization, it 
is necessary to analyse the PRC’s government structure and the local officials’ actual 
work. Without a systematic investigation of China’s hierarchical government system 
and family planning administrative system, it is hard to understand why village level 
cadres are not the grassroots level officials even though they are involved in 
regulation and decision enforcement and also face the villagers directly. 
After the 1980s, the PRC’s government organization system is a 4-tier local 
government system from province to prefecture/city then to county and town. 15 
According to the PRC’s constitution, the township/town government is the most 
basic level of government. The rural villagers’ committee (or the urban residential 
committee) is not part of China’s formal government organization system, but a self-
governed organization.  
It was only in the People’s Commune period that the village (production team) level 
was the basic government level. From 1958 to the end of the 1970s, unlike any 
previous government system in Chinese history, the farmers were controlled as a 
military organization by the central government.16  At the town level, the People’s 
Commune managed both the local administrative and economic work (zhengshe heyi 
政社合一). Below the commune level, it was the ‘production brigade’ (shengchan 
dadui 生产大队) level and under that then the ‘production team’ (sehngchan dui 生
                                                
15 Xie Qinkui, China's Local Government System (Zhongguo Difang Zhengfu Tizhi Gailun 中国地方
政府体制概论) (Beijing: China Broadcast and TV Press (zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe 中国
广播电视出版社), 1997). p.6. 
16 In the history of China, the farmers have always been controlled by informal organizations, in 
which bao-jia system was a popular one. See chapter 5 for more details.  
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产组) level. As an economic and political organization, the ‘production brigade’, 
which transferred into the village, was the basic official government organization at 
that time.  
At the beginning of the 1980s, with the collapse of the commune system, the ‘town 
government’ replaced the ‘People’s Commune’ and took over its political function, 
the ‘village committee’ replaced the ‘production brigades’, and the ‘village team’ 
(cunmin xiaozu 村民小组) replaced the ‘production team’.17 The village committee 
was not a formal component of the government, but a ‘self-governance’ organization, 
or an “informal and quasi-governmental administration”.18 Therefore, regarding the 
family planning administrative system, the town level family planning office is the 
most grassroots level government organisation, rather than the village level.  
The village family planning officials do not perform the same role as the town level 
organizations even though they implement the regulations and face the villagers 
directly just as the town level officials do. Although the village committee has a duty 
to carry out the state and upper level government decisions and regulations, it mainly 
supports the town government work rather than carrying out the task 
                                                
17 In China’s countryside, there is a difference between the administrative village (xingzheng cun 行政
村) and geographical village (ziran cun 自然村). Geographical villages (ziran cun 自然村), refer to 
individual villages that are physically separate from other villages. Two or more small geographical 
villages are often joined together to form an administrative village. See Zhenwei Liu, Peasants and 
the Development of Rural Organisations (Nongmin Yu Nongcun Zuzhi Jianshe 农民与农村组织建设) 
(Guiyang: Guizhou People’s Press (guizhou renmin chubanshe 贵州人民出版社), 1994). p.54. 
A village committee is set up in each administrative village, and each geographical village is a village 
team. The village team is the most basic organization in rural China and the team leader is elected by 
the village team meeting (cunmin xiaozu huiyi 村民小组会议). See "PRC Organic Law of Village 
Committees (Zhonghuarenmingongheguo Cunmin Weiyuanhui Zuzhifa 中华人民共和国村民委员会
组织法),"  (2010). Article 28.   
The village administrative office (cungongsuo 村公所) was set up in a few areas. It was a government 
organization and responsible to the town government directly, and its personnel were appointed by the 
town government. 
18 Zhong, Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below. p.159. 
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independently.19 Tyrene concluded that the main function of village cadres in terms 
of family planning enforcement is providing penetration and surveillance, and 
monitoring village women of reproductive age.20 It is also indicated by their title ⎯ 
the “village information official” (cun xinxiyuan 村信息员) ⎯ that in addition to 
advocating the relevant regulations, their main functions include supervising and 
providing information to the town level. Moreover, the village level officials do not 
have the administrative authority to enforce the implementation of the family 
planning regulations. They are mainly the assistants of the town level which is the 
agency authorized to ensure compliance and enforcement. Therefore, the village 
level family planning organization is not the grassroots level agency but rather the 
assistant of grassroots level agencies. 
However, the village family planning mechanism ⎯ a special informal organization 
⎯ made a vital contribution to the enforcement of the family planning regulations. If 
we take one town as an example, it will be quite clear how important the village level 
family planning official is in practice. At EY town, there have been 24 administrative 
villages (xingzheng cun 行政村)21 since May 1984. Among these 24 villages, there 
are 5 villages on the plain, 6 at the edge of the mountain and 13 on the mountain. At 
the time of the founding of EY Town family planning office in 1979, there was only 
1 person doing the family planning work in the office. 2 people joined the office in 
the 1980s. During that time, even with strong support from both the town level 
government and the village committee, the family planning work was still very tough 
                                                
19 See "The Regulation of S Province Implementating PRC's Organic Law of Village Committees (S 
Sheng Shishi《Zhonghuarenminguoheguo Cunmin Weiyuanhui Zuzhifa》Banfa S省实施《中华人
民共和国村民委员会组织法》办法),"  (1999). Article 7. 
20 White, China's Longest Campaign: Birth Planning in the People's Republic, 1949-2005. p.85. 
21 These administrative villages are made of 33 geographically integral villages (ziran cun 自然村). 
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work for these officials with lots of tasks and much local resistance. Most of them 
worked more than 10 hours per day from early morning to late at night without 
weekends off or holidays. In the 1990s and 2000s, the team was further enlarged 
when 1 official joined in 1994 and 5 officials during 2004-2009. However, even with 
8 officials working in 2009, the workload, which required the consideration of 7776 
households at EY town, was still massive. Without the assistance of the village 
family planning officials, it would be impossible for these limited personnel to carry 
out all the tasks. 
Because of this close relationship between the town and village levels, they always 
have the same tone when they are facing inspections from the upper level 
governments. Sometimes, the town level guides the village level to edit or conceal 
unflattering data in order to satisfy the inspectors. Before the inspection, the town 
office would give notice (dazhaohu 打招呼) to the village and the individual families 
about what to say and what should not be said. The number of people taking long-
term contraception is usually easily concealed as it is hard to check, as is the number 
of excess birth numbers. These are the hard measures of the town’s job performance 
by the inspector. The concealing of this data from the inspector means that the town 
and village are the only levels that have the real data of China’s actual population. In 
order to get more reliable data from the grassroots level, a direct mobile phones 
report system (jiceng shouji zhibao xitong 基层手机直报系统 ) has been 
implemented in S province since November 2009.  With this system, all the village 
family planning officials were equipped with mobile phones with certain free 
minutes and text messages. The village officials were required to report the data to 
the provincial family planning organization directly monthly. The effectiveness of 
this system is not yet known and further studies need to be carried out. 
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In conclusion, the PRC’s 6-tier family planning administrative organisation system 
can be divided into three levels. The top level is the state’s family planning 
commission who provide the family planning strategy and principles, and guides the 
nationwide family planning work. The middle level is the provincial level (including 
autonomous regions and municipalities) family planning commission. Because of the 
PRC’s decentralised family planning regulations, this is the level which drafts the 
practical provincial regulations in terms of the local circumstances but which also 
complies with the central government’s guidelines. This is also the level that 
manages the provincial family planning work.  The prefecture or city level 
commissions are assistants to the provincial level. The grass roots level is the county 
and township/town family planning organization. They are foot soldiers in 
implementing upper level regulations. The county level is the decision making level 
in the local areas22 and the town level is the actual front line team who implement the 
regulations in the real world and face the villagers directly. The village level, in spite 
of lacking a clear definition of its legal and administrative status, has always been 
treated and viewed as an arm of the Chinese county and/or town government.23  
6.3 Effectiveness of Implementation 
During the fieldwork of this author, many complaints were heard from the town 
officials about the effectiveness of the village level’s assistance. It is generally 
commented that there are more demands from the upper level government but less 
support from the village officials from the late 1990s. The town level found that 
                                                
22 The county level family planning organization has the authority to decide the local incentive 
policies for the single child families, sterilized families with a single child or two girls, and the 
families whose single child became disable or died. 
23 In practice, when talking about the family planning agencies in rural areas, the town and the village 
level are often named together as “countryside family planning officials” (xiangcun jihuashengyu 
zhuangan 乡村计划生育专干). 
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much of the workload left to the town levels by the village level was done so because 
the village officials either didn’t have the ability to carry out the task, or were not 
willing to fully engage with the work.  The educational requirements, supervision 
system and the political reform are the three main factors that have influenced the 
effectiveness of the implementation.  
6.3.1 Education Requirements 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the main duty for the village officials was to take the women 
to the town hospital for abortions and IUDs insertion, as well as collecting penalties 
from the above-quota births. During that time, the work was more straight-forward 
and did not require much in terms of education level. The statistical tasks were 
simple and only four types of data were required normally: date of birth, death, IUDs 
insertion and abortion. It was easily manageable even by officials with only a 
primary level education.  
However, from the end of the 1990s, there were more requirements for the statistical 
task and more regulations and policies regarding the family planning. These more 
complex tasks required a higher educational level. It was concluded by the town 
officials that those officials with a senior secondary school education level found the 
work much easier to understand and carry out; but those with lower levels found it 
difficult.  
With the help of QX County Statistical Bureau, an anonymous survey of the village 
family planning officials’ education level of EY town and the whole QX County was 
carried out. It was found out that only 24% of the officials at EY town have the 
senior secondary or above education level and 40% in the whole county. Although 
the educational level of senior secondary school is sufficient for the village officials 
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in most regions, it is hard to attract such people because of the low pay for this job. 
Most farmers with senior secondary school education levels can easily find a good 
job with much better pay. It is only those people with low education levels who are 
willing to take the job. Overall, the low educational standard of the village officials 
further reduced the effectiveness of the implementation and left extra workload to the 
town officials. 
Figure 6. 1 Education Level 
6.3.2 Supervision System of Village Family Planning Officials 
Before 2000, the village family planning officials were directly employed and 
supervised by the town family planning office: xiangpin xiangguan (乡聘乡管). 
After 2002, with a formal payment to these village officials, employment authority 
transferred from the town to the county level: xianpin xiangguan cunyong (县聘乡管
村用) ⎯ employed by the county, and managed by the town, and working for the 
village. However, in practice it is always the village committee who have the 
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decision-making on personnel. In order to smoothly carry out the work and maintain 
a good relationship with the village level, it is very unusual for the town office to 
reject the village’s candidates. In addition, because of the tradition that it is normally 
the women’s leader ⎯a member of the village committee ⎯ who takes the family 
planning official’s role, it is even harder for the town office to get involved in the 
suggestion of the family planning officials. 
Because the town office does not have the actual authority on the engagement of 
these village officials, and the fact that these village officials are not formal 
government officials, the town office has very limited supervision authority over 
them. Although they do have the authority to reduce their pay or even dismiss them 
for unsatisfactory performance, this authority has rarely been used in practice. The 
main methods of influence that the town office relies on are the regular monitoring 
and economic incentives. 
From the beginning of the 1980s to recent years, the compensation paid to the village 
family planning officials has changed from being effective to being less effective, 
possibly due to the increase in local farmers’ average income. A graph was made to 
compare this incentive and local farmers’ average income from 1980 to 2009. From 
this graph, it can be clearly seen that the gap between the village family planning 
official and the local farmer’s average income has become bigger and bigger since 
1994. 
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Figure 6. 2 Compensation for Village Family Planning Officials 
The earliest economic incentives started from the beginning of the 1980s when the 
Central Committee and the State Council instructed that all villages should have a 
specialist official responsible for the family planning task. This document also 
required that these officials should receive compensation for their income having 
been affected by taking this job.24 According to this document, from the end of 1982, 
most village family planning officials in QX County started to be paid a certain 
amount of compensation by the villages. During the Collective Ownership System, 
they got work points (gongfen 工分) for the time they spent on family planning work. 
                                                
24 See [1982] CPC’s Document 11, ‘Family planning management institutions should be established 
and completed at all levels (in China), … One of the leaders from the production brigades or 
production teams should be responsible for family planning work. These family planning officials 
from production brigades or production teams are entitled to some kinds of absence from work 
compensation.’ (yao jiquan chongshi geji jihua shengyu guanli jigou,, … dadui he shengchandui yao 
you yiming lingdao ganbu zhua jihua shengyu gongzuo, bing tuoshan jiejue tamen de wugong butie. 
要健全充实各级计划生育管理机构，… 大队和生产队要有一名领导干部抓计划生育工作，并
妥善解决他们的误工补贴. )  
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After the Production Responsibility System replaced the former collective 
agricultural system, they were paid by the town and village. The work points or 
economic rewards varied from place to place. In the 2000s, the village family 
planning officials were formally named “village information officials” (cun 
xinxiyuan 村信息员) in S province. Supported by the provincial, city and county 
levels government, their salary was formally regulated and they were paid directly by 
the county level government. 
In DY town, the position of the village family planning official has been mostly 
taken by the women’s leader. Like many other areas, the main reason for this 
combination is to reduce the personnel cost. For this reason, 2 villages that 
previously had independent family planning officials also merged this position with 
that of women’s leader. This combination was also a result of local cultural 
influence. At the beginning of the family planning campaign, family planning was 
treated as the woman’s responsibility only, by most villagers and even the grassroots 
level officials. Therefore, it was taken for granted that this was the duty of women’s 
leader. Moreover, the women’s leader, as a member of the villagers’ committee, does 
not have any practical authority except organising the Women’s Day activities on 8th 
March. The merging of the family planning official and women’s leader not only 
gave the women’s leader more practical power but also help to carry out the family 
planning work in the name of the village committee in practice.25 
During the survey, Dongnanfang (DNF) village, a middle-income village, was 
selected as a sample to explore more details about the village family planning 
                                                
25 19/11/2009 Interview with Deputy Header of DY Town government who is in charge of family 
planning. 
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officials’ income. In DNF26, the women’s leader Zhao, a forty-year-old lady, was 
responsible for the family planning work before 1983. At the beginning of China’s 
hard birth control campaign, the family planning work faced huge resistance. Even a 
normal long-term contraception method, such as IUDs insertion, was unacceptable to 
the local villagers. During that time, Zhao’s main duty was assisting the upper level 
health department’s campaign visits and advocating birth control. By the end of the 
year, she was paid dozens of RMB (jishi yuan 几十元) as combined compensation 
for being both the women’s leader and family planning official while the average 
farmer’s annual income was 156RMB. Based on the prices at that time, this sum of 
money could almost pay for her family’s food supplements for the whole year.27  
Following the strengthening of the family planning campaign and organizational 
settings in 1982,28 another village doctor, Chang, was also engaged to join the family 
planning team as Zhao’s assistant in 1983. After Zhao left this position in 1994, 
Chang became the only family planning official in DNF. From 1983, compulsory 
contraception started to be carried out in China. The focus of the village family 
planning officials switched from the general advocating of birth control and 
contraception, to particular IUDs insertion for women who had reached the 
maximum number of births, and abortion for the non-quota pregnancies. Therefore, 
in addition to the original work of advocating the birth control campaign and 
assisting the upper level’s visits, they were also required to supervise the women of 
                                                
26 The following figures about the compensation paid by village and town was obtained by the 
interview with Dongnanfang village family planning official. See interview DNF221209. 
27 During that period, the local farmers’ food sources were mainly supplied by their own land, such as 
flour and vegetables. In addition to this main supply, they needed to buy some vegetables in the winter 
and spring, and salt, sugar, meat, match, etc. The Chinese leaves, one of the most popular winter 
vegetables in north China was 0.02-0.04RMB per kg, and the matches were 0.02RMB per small box, 
doufu was 0.40RMB per kg, and five sweets cost 0.10RMB.  
28 See "The Central Committee and the State Council's Instructions for Further Implementing Family 
Planning Work (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Jihuashengyu Gongzuo 
De Zhishi 中共中央国务院关于进一步做好计划生育工作的指示)." 
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reproductive age and report their updated reproductive information regularly. They 
were required to update and report four basic data of birth, death, IUDs insertion and 
abortion to the town family planning office monthly. In addition, they were also 
required to closely monitor those families who had reached the maximum birth limit 
but refused to take long-term contraception. Once they found any family in the 
village with a non-quota pregnancy or birth, they were responsible for reporting the 
situation to the town family planning office. In the 1980s, the town family planning 
office quite often received the village official’s report at midnight.29 Even then, the 
town officials would visit such non-quota families immediately. 
In 1983, the assistant Chang received 9 work points per day for carrying out the 
family planning work. By the end of the year, she was paid about 100RMB. Zhao 
was paid slightly higher, nearly half of the local farmers’ annual income. From 1984, 
with the introduction of the Responsibility System (zerenzhi 责任制 ), the 
compensation was raised to 300-400RMB per year for Zhao, which is more than 3/4 
of the local farmers’ average income. From the late 1980s, the town family planning 
office also started to contribute to this compensation, which was 120RMB per year. 
In total, in the late 1980s, the compensation for this part time job reached 420-
720RMB, which is almost equal to the local farmers average annual income.30 This 
high monetary incentive was maintained until the middle of the 1990s. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, the local farmers’ income gradually increased by 70RMB per 
year from 766RMB in 1990 to 966RMB in 1993. The compensation to the village 
                                                
29 During that time, communication was still very poor in rural China. Usually, there was only one 
telephone in the village’s office. In order to stop the pregnant women running to the other places, they 
normally either phoned29 the town family planning office or went to the town office personally. At 
each level of government, evening duty officials have always been on hand to deal with emergency 
situations. They would report the emergency situation to the related department immediately. 
30 From the data obtained from the QX County Statistical Department, the QX farmers’ average 
annual income rose as follows from 1984 to 1990: 442RMB, 494RMB, 525RMB, 585RMB, 
648RMB, 715RMB and 766RMB. 
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family planning officials was around 900-1000RMB from which the village paid 
around 600-700RMB and the town paid 360RMB. Because of this well paid 
compensation, it is not difficult to understand why these village family planning 
officials would actively carry on doing the job during the 1980s through to the 
beginning of the 1990s. This incentive made the job attractive despite the fact that 
the family planning work faced lots of resistance at that time, and was called the 
most wicked job by local villagers. Due to the village officials’ contributions, the 
birth control regulations have been executed very successfully at DNF and the whole 
town, even with the great local resistance.  
But from 1994, the local farmers’ average income increased dramatically. It shot up 
by 500RMB per year from 1994 to 1998 and reached 2903RMB in 1998. In 
comparison, the pay for the family planning officials, which was, in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, similar to or even greater than the local farmers’ average income, 
became 23% (271RMB) less in 1994, and the gap further widened and widened in 
the following years. By the end of the 1990s, the average farmers’ annual income 
had risen up to 3202RMB in QX County. In contrast, the pay for the family planning 
officials in DNF remained around 1000RMB. 
After 2000, the S provincial government formally regulated the salary of the village 
family planning officials. A basic annual salary of 1440RMB31 was set, provided by 
the province, prefecture and county government. On top of that the town and the 
village levels could contribute extra funding depending on their local financial 
circumstances. In DNF, above the basic salary, the village topped up from 700RMB 
in the 1990s to 1800RMB in 2007，which is the total pay for the position of the 
                                                
31 This salary is supposed to be increased based on the price inflation. However, it has been remained 
same from the 2000s to 2014.  
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women’s leader and the family planning official.32 In total, DNF family planning 
officials received 3240RMB in 2007 in DNF, which is only half of the local people’s 
average income,33 and furthermore, these family planning officials are not entitled to 
any government paid pension. 
During the survey, many family planning officials expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the low pay and non-entitlement to the state pension. Because they are neither 
formal government officials nor full-time personnel, none of them thought it is 
necessary to fully engage with this job. In addition, because this is a semi-official job 
that lacks the guarantee of a state pension, most of these officials still have to find 
other jobs so they can build a private pension, or else they will take up a greater 
share of the housework to support the family. As a result, the village officials only 
perform the family planning tasks at their convenience. In EY town, all the villages 
set up a village family planning service room (cun jihuashengyu fuwu shi 村计划生
育服务室). However, none of them are used properly as a work place but rather as a 
storage room for the documents and posters. Mostly, the office was only opened 
when the town or upper level government came down to inspect their work. Even the 
routine inspections by the town family planning office are sometimes just carried out 
in the village family planning official’s home.  
In one of the interviews, Chang said that:  
‘compared with [the 1980s and 1990s], the [family planning] work is 
more accepted by local villagers now. But with more and more family 
planning tasks, I have to spend more time and energy on it. Because of 
                                                
32 The salary paid by the village varies depending on the village’s economy level. Villages with better 
economy conditions could pay 2000-3000RMB, while others with worse economic conditions would 
only pay around 1000RMB (qian er ba bai 千儿八百). 21/12/2009, QX: Interview with Director of 
QX Family Planning Commission. 
33 The average annual income for QX County farmers is 6394RMB in 2007. 
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engagement in this work, it is hard for me to take any other job. [Of 
course,] little pay is better than nothing. But compared with the workload 
of other jobs, the pay for the family planning work is very little. I can 
earn better whatever else I do.’ (he yiqian bi, xianzai zhege gongzuo shi 
haozuo le. Keshi xianzai de gongzuo yaoqiu ye duole. Jibenshang ganle 
zhege, jiu meiyou jingli he shijian gan beide le. Xianzai fade zhedian 
qian, bi meiyou qiangdian, keshi yao bushi zhege gongzuo, wo gansha ye 
bi zhege zhengde duo. 和以前比，现在这个工作是好做了. 可是现在
的工作要求也多了. 基本上干了这个，就没有精力和时间干别的了. 
现在发的这点钱，比没有强点. 可是要不是这个工作，我干点啥也比
这个挣的多.)34 
The table attached here is the information the village family planning officials were 
required to collect and keep updated during the 2000s. This information was named 
yikouqing (一口清) data by the local government, which means that the village 
family planning officials should know these data very well and know them by heart. 
They were required to keep updating them and report them to the town office 
monthly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
34 Interview ChangDNF221209. 
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Table 6. 1 Yikouqing Data 
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With lower economic incentives, the village officials were unwilling to carry out the 
family planning tasks as actively as they would have in 1980s and the early 1990s. 
These days, most of the time they choose to do the quantitative work, such as 
collecting the data, distributing the publicity materials, but avoid spending time on 
the soft quota tasks and hard tasks such as persuading families who broke the family 
planning regulations to take long-term contraception or pay the excess-birth fine. The 
decrease in job performance can be summarised by the words of a town level 
officials:  
‘Nowadays, the family planning is more and more difficult to carry on 
with. All of the work has been taken up by town level family planning 
officials. Before, we had lots of help from village family levels. But now, 
nobody would like to take this job as the compensation for the job is so 
little, and there’s no guaranteed state pension. It is not worth it to waste 
one’s time here. This is a job which will not bring any benefit to yourself 
but brings lots of trouble, i.e. bad neighbour relationships, or negative 
influence once you do not have any power. As a result, the town family 
planning officials have to take on the extra jobs of the village family 
planning officials. Even for something necessary, you cannot command 
them to do anything, it’s more like you have to plead with them to do it. 
There are so few officials, so how could we do so many things with such 
limited capability?’ (xianzai, jihuasshengyu gongzuo yuelaiyue nan zuo 
le. Suoyou de gongzuo dou tui dao xiangzhen jihuashengyu zhe/er. 
Yiqian, nongcun jisheng zhuangan hai neng bang ting duo de, ye bu yong 
tai caoxin. Danshixianzai, zhege gongzuo meiren yuanyi gan. name 
yidian qian bu zhide. You meiyou yangbao baoxian he tuixiujin. Zhege 
gongzuo hai jin deizui ren. Xianzai you dian quan hai bu yaojin. Deng ni 
tui xia lai jiu bu hao nong le. Suoyi xianzai, zanmen xiangzhen shang 
jiudei ti cunli gan haoduo shi. Jiushi you shi ye buneng mingling, hai dei 
qiu renjia. Danshi xiangzhen shang jiu zheme jigeren. Naneng mang de 
guolai le. 现在, 计划生育工作越来越难做了. 所有的工作都推到乡镇
计划生育这儿. 以前, 农村计生专干还能帮挺多的, 也不用太操心. 但
是现在, 这个工作没人愿意干. 那么一点钱不值得. 又没有养老保险和
退休金. 这个工作还尽得罪人. 现在有点权还不要紧, 等你退下来就不
好弄了. 所以, 现在, 咱们乡镇上就得替村里干好多事. 就是有事也不
能命令, 还得求人家. 但是乡镇上就这么几个人, 哪能忙的过来呢?)35 
                                                
35 28/10/2009 Interview with Director of DY Town Family Planning Office. 
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In some places, in addition to an economic incentive, the village family planning 
officials are also entitled to the same political influence as the village team leader’s 
(cun xiaozuzhang 村小组长).36 They are entitled to be involved in the decision-
making on the local affairs of economy, society and culture. However, this 
entitlement does not make any difference in practice: for those officials who are 
engaged by the women’s leaders, they are already members of the village committee; 
for the other officials, the local villagers normally do not approve of their political 
entitlement as they would not have been elected by the villagers. 
In summary, under a lack of an effective penalty or other incentive system, the 
economic incentive has become the only system to attempt to stimulate the village 
officials’ work performance. This being the case, the officials’ job fulfilment has 
been mainly dependent on this incentive mechanism. In DNF, the payment to village 
family planning officials has increased sharply under government support in the 
2000s. However, by considering the compensation relative to the local farmers’ 
average income, the compensation became a lower and lower percentage of the 
officials’ total income. Because of the low pay and non-guarantee of a state-paid 
pension or medical insurance, these officials have to take extra jobs to meet their 
normal living costs and save up for their pension. Therefore, without an effective 
penalty system or incentive system, it is difficult to guarantee that the village 
official’s work performance will be sufficient, particularly for implementing 
unpopular policies. 
                                                
36 See ZY Family Planning Bureau, ed. Village Family Planning Official's Work Instruction Book 
(Cun Jisheng Fuwu Yuan Gongzuo Zhidao Shouce 村计生服务员工作指导手册) (2009). p.1. 
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6.3.3 New Political Reform 
Because the town family planning office lacks an efficient supervision system for 
evaluating the village family planning officials’ job performance, the town office has 
to heavily rely on the town government’s support. If the town government paid 
greater attention on the issue, they would put more pressure on the village 
committees and keep monitoring and inspecting the performance of their tasks. A 
saying can describe the attitude of the village leader to the execution of their tasks, 
‘the village looks to the local villages, the household looks to the other households 
and the villagers look to the village officials.’ (cun kan cun, hu kan hu, laobaixing 
kan de shi cun ganbu 村看村，户看户，老百姓看的是村干部) 
In the past, the town government could easily influence the village’s implementation 
with direct leadership or by getting involved in the appointment of the village leading 
group members. However, after the election of the village committee, the 
relationship between the town government and the village committee has changed 
from the direct leadership of the People’s Commune to the directing, supporting and 
guiding relationship of the town government.37 The town government do not directly 
get involved with the village committee’s election. As many other scholars have also 
found, the local government still has some sort of influence on the village committee 
election, particular those wealthy non-agriculture villagers;38 and the key influences 
on the actual election are concentrated in a few big families or groups in the villages. 
Although the current elections are still not completely democratic as they are in 
                                                
37 See "PRC Organic Law of Village Committees (Zhonghuarenmingongheguo Cunmin Weiyuanhui 
Zuzhifa 中华人民共和国村民委员会组织法)." Article 5. 
38 See Ting Luo, "Village Economic Autonomy and Authoritarian Control over Village Elections in 
China" (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014). pp33-46. Yansheng Shen, "The 
Rise and Fall of Village Governance in History and Rebuilding Village Governance in Contemporary 
China (Cunzhuang De Xingshuai Yu Chongjian 村庄的兴衰与重建)," Strategy and Management 
(zhanlve yu guanli 战略与管理) 6 (1998). 
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Western societies, this political reform has been a big step towards a democratic 
China. As local economies and cultures are developing, however, this political 
reform also brings some conflict when it comes to carrying out public policies, 
particularly unpopular policies. 
At EY town, most villages set up the village committees to replace the former 
production brigades at the beginning of the 1980s. The villager committees in EY 
town usually comprised about 5 members, including a committee chairman (zhuren 
主任), a deputy chairman, an accountant, and a women’s leader (often acting as the 
family planning official) as well as a member in charge of village public security.39 
However, at the beginning when introducing these elections, these committee leaders 
were mainly decided or influenced by the county or town government. With this 
control over the personnel, the town government could directly supervise and 
manage the village work performance. The villager’s committee and other village 
organizations40 generally provided full support concerning implementation. With the 
gradual improvement of China’s democracy and the 1998 restriction of local 
government involvement in the election, the village committee at EY town gradually 
started the more independent ‘election’ after 1998. All committee members were 
directly elected by the villagers every three years.  
Although the village committee was required to assist the town government’s work, 
they preferred to promote the popular regulations, particular the regulations 
                                                
39 The village committee members are varied from village to village. It is normally 3-7 members in 
China. In addition to the necessary members of the chairman and deputy chairman, as well as the 
account, the others are optional members decided by the villagers. In some areas, the women’s leader 
has been completely replaced as the family planning officials, and they may or may not be the 
member of the village committee. 
40 In generally, there are four official organizations in the village: Village Party Branch (cun 
dangzhibu 村党支部), Villager’s Committee (cunmin weiyuanhui 村民委员会), Village Assemblies 
(cunmin huiyi or cunmin dahui 村民会议或村民大会), Village Representative Assemblies (cunmin 
daibiao huiyi or cunmin daibiao dahui 村民代表会议或村民代表大会) 
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benefiting local villagers, which would improve their reputation and ‘score points’ 
during the next election. The birth-control regulations are not liked by the village 
committees as they would neither satisfy the villagers nor bring any benefits in the 
near future. Therefore, the implementation of these unpopular regulations has been 
very limited unless there is great pressure exerted by the town government leader. In 
that case, the village committees would better carry out these unpopular regulations 
in order to get support for other issues from the town government. 
In addition to the village committee election being influenced by political reform, it 
was also influenced by a change of setting. Due to the early understanding of the 
family planning work that as work related to women only, and also the limited 
budget, the role of village family planning officials was often taken up by the 
women’s leader, village doctors and accountants. Therefore, the elections and term 
shifting of the village committee also directly influenced the taking up of positions as 
family planning officials. This frequent personnel turnover of village officials not 
only caused inconsistency in the work but also extra training work for the town 
family planning official.  
During the visits to all these villages, it was clear that the town family planning 
officials always have to spend more time on training the village officials who joined 
in 2008. The town official Chang complained:  
‘the senior village family planning officials know the work much better 
than these new officials. So we can spend less time on and pay less 
concern to them. We always have to spend lots of time on training these 
new staff. Because most of these officials are not full time personnel, you 
can’t expect them to be trained intensively. We (the town officials) have 
to come down to the village to provide the training to them. It normally 
takes about one year for them to become familiar with the job. But just as 
the communication becomes smooth and we can deliver the work easily, 
the personnel change again at the next term shift. What a waste of time 
and budget!’ (naxie lao jishengyun shengshi. Zhexie xinlaide sha ye 
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buzhidao, shenme doudei congtoujiang. Renjia youbushi na quanzhi 
gongzi de, ye buneng yaoqiu renjia sha ye buganle qu peixun, suoyi 
zhineng shi meici xialai shihou jiangyijiang. Yiban dei guole diyinian 
caineng mingbai de chabuduo le. Ranhou, ganggang yongde shunle, 
yihuajie jiu you huanren le. Jin zheteng! 那些老计生员省事。这些新来
的啥也不知道，什么都得从头讲。人家又不是拿全职工资的，也不
能要求人家啥也不干了去培训，所以只能是每次下来时候讲一讲。
一般得过了第一年时间才能明白的差不多了。然后，刚刚用的顺了，
一换届就又换人了。尽折腾！) 41 
Even those villages with specialised officials for the family planning work were also 
influenced by the village committee election. The town family planning office head 
Chang commented: 
‘In order to smoothly carry out the work, the new village committee 
normally appoints their own staff to particular positions. Otherwise, it is 
difficult to carry out the work [if the previously appointed personnel do 
not cooperate with them]. Some of the village family planning officials 
are elected by the villagers [if they are engaged by the women’s leader or 
accountant], and some of them are appointed by the new village 
committee members.’ (youxie jisheng renyuan shi xuanchualai de, youxie 
shi cunlingdao tiba de qinjn renyuan. Zhexie renyuan bixu he cunganbu 
neng xietiao, fouze wufa kaizhan gongzuo. 有些计生人员是选出来的，
有些是村干部提拔的亲近人员。这些人员必须和村干部能协调，否
则无法开展工作。)  
It is clear that the town government has nothing to do with the appointment of the 
DNF village family planning official in practice.  
Data for the job-starting year of all village family planning officials at EY town was 
collected in 2009.  It was found that 75% of officials have been replaced during the 
village committee term changing in 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008. Only 20% of them 
are senior officials who have continued the work since before 1998. This means that 
the town officials need to provide training to nearly 5 officials every 3 years, which 
                                                
41 Interview ChangXMEY200809. 
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is a heavy workload for the town officials considering their limited staff and 
resources. 
 
 Figure 6. 3 Starting-Years for Current Family Planning Officials 
This new political reform ⎯ village committee election ⎯ has improved China’s 
democracy at the grassroots level on the one hand, but has caused resistance to 
implementing unpopular public policies on the other. Under this new political 
reform, the village committee is a self-governed organization and its members are 
elected by the village members. Without the hierarchical administrative relationship 
and the personnel control, the town government cannot directly influence village 
governance. This political reform has increased the burdens on the town government. 
The town government officials described themselves as being pressed on both sides 
like a sandwich filling (jiabanqi 夹板气): on the one side, they have to carry out the 
upper level government decisions and policies; on the other side, they have no 
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particular policies in order to get the attention of the village committees. Rather than 
using traditional leadership, the town government and officials need to maintain 
good relationships with the village committees in order to get their support for 
implementing some of the unpopular policies. In addition, because EY town holds 
the tradition that women’s leaders are usually also the family planning officials, and 
there are budget restrictions on paying for specialised family planning officials, the 
family planning personnel have been affected greatly by the term changing of the 
village committee every 3 years. This team inconsistency has resulted in further 
devastating consequences for the execution of family planning regulations and 
resulted in more difficulties and greater workloads for the town officials. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analyses how China’s economic and political system has influenced the 
family planning regulations’ implementation at the village level. The village family 
planning mechanism, though not an official government organization, has been 
crucial in assisting the grassroots level government work since the 1980s. During the 
1980s and early 1990s, the village officials worked very effectively on advocating 
the family planning regulations, publicizing the contraceptive methods, and 
collecting the basic data of the population. In addition to the direct management of 
the town government who wielded financial and personnel controls to guarantee the 
smooth implementation of the governments’ regulations, an effective incentive 
system also greatly improved the village officials’ motivation to do their job well.  
However, since the mid-1990s, with the rapid economic development in China, 
Chinese farmers’ incomes shot up rapidly and their living standards greatly 
improved. Even though the government has tried to improve the pay for these village 
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officials, this improvement has been very limited compared with the local farmers’ 
increase in income. In addition, without any other effective supervising method, this 
incentive system has been the only method left available to try to improve job 
performance at the village level. Meanwhile, under the improvement of Chinese 
democracy at the grassroots level, new political reforms of the village committee 
elections have been executed in most rural areas since the end of 1990s. During the 
long process of improving China’s democracy and rule of law, Chinese villagers 
have begun to be aware of their legal rights. Legal and civilized implementation 
methods replaced the former brutal and inhumane methods. Moreover, these new 
political reforms also caused an end to the direct administrative control of the village 
mechanisms by the town government. Without the direct personnel control of the 
village family planning officials and the village committee, the town government 
now had less influence on the implementation at the village level. At this time, the 
amount of attention the town head paid to the family planning work now had more 
influence on the implementation outcomes. Furthermore, with the local tradition of 
the women’s leader being also a family planning official, the village family planning 
mechanism’s consistency has been seriously affected by the regular election term 
shifts. Since the 1990s, the task of family planning expanded from just birth-control 
to also include immigration control, concern for the gender balance and care for girls 
(guanai nvhai 关爱女孩), reproductive health, and care for single child families and 
two-girls families (shuangnv hu 双女户 ). These wide-reaching tasks for the 
grassroots officials not only required better literacy, but also more complicated 
statistical work. However, because of the low pay of the village officials and the 
tendency for new village leaders to prefer to appoint new members to assist in their 
work, the educational level of the village officials has been insufficient for the job. 
 
 
 
 
 
195 
Regarding the above economic and political factors that have influenced the 
implementation at the village level, some suggestions can be made to improve the 
situation. First, in order to better supervise the village officials, a more effective 
supervision system should be established, such as a better paid position and a more 
practical penalty system. Secondly, a highly educated and independent family 
planning official, who is not a member of the village committee, should be employed 
at the village level to keep consistency and better fulfil the job requirements. Finally, 
since the current family planning organizations have been merged with the health 
departments and China’s one-child policy is being gradually relaxed, it is expected 
that China’s family planning regulations will become more advocacy-based and 
return to being a normal health issue. 
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Chapter 7 Family Planning Funding 
7.1 Introduction 
In addition to the factors discussed in the previous chapters, i.e. the contents of the 
family planning regulations, the local government leaders’ concerns, and the 
effectiveness of the supervision systems and village support, the family planning 
funding available for the grassroots level organizations is also an important factor 
influencing local officials discretion. The grassroots level governments, allocated at 
the bottom of China’s hierarchical administrative structure, are always facing 
insufficient resources and funding. However, they are also the levels that take the 
most liability for raising the family planning funds necessary to implement the 
family planning regulations. Therefore, because of the insufficient government 
allocation, it is the non-government family planning funds that have been the main 
source of family planning funding. The local economic levels and the upper level 
government support heavily influenced the financial environment at the grassroots 
level. The financial situation in turn directly influences the town family planning 
officials’ implementation behaviours. 
By analyzing the sources and expenditure of the family planning funding at each 
level, this chapter explains each level of government’s liability for providing family 
planning funding, with particular focus on the county and town level. A case study is 
then presented which examines EY town’s family planning funds, and discusses how 
financial circumstances have influenced the family planning officials’ behaviour and 
implementation of the family planning regulations. 
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7.2 Sources of Family Planning Funding 
According to various sources, the family planning funding is divided into three big 
groups: government funding, non-government funding and international support. 
Government funding refers to the central and local government’s allocation of funds 
for family planning. Non-government funding refers to funding outside the 
government budget, such as fines for the unpermitted births, and fees collected from 
farmers and local enterprises. International support refers to financial, technical, 
personnel training and equipment support supplied by international organizations.1  
During the 1960s and 1970s, this funding was made up completely of government 
allocations, for which the local government was mostly responsible. However, with 
the start of the one-child family planning campaign in 1979/1980, and the maturing 
of the PRC’s family planning administrative system into a system comprising fully-
functional, autonomous organizations, 2 the government allocation of family planning 
funding was found to be insufficient to support the increasing demands. As a result, 
the farmers and rural enterprises in rural and work units (gongzuo danwei 工作单位) 
in urban areas were required to supplement the family planning funding directly or 
indirectly. These parts of non-government resources are usually used to supplement 
the lower level family planning, particular the county and town levels. International 
support for family planning funding also started soon after the formal establishment 
of the independent family planning administrative system at the beginning of the 
1980s. 
                                                
1 Kuifu Yang, Shengli Chen, and Jinsheng Wei, eds., The Outcomes and Investments of China's 
Family Planning (Zhonogguo Jihuashengyu Xiaoyi Yu Touru 中国计划生育效益与投入) (Beijing: 
People's Press (renmin chubanshe 人民出版社), 2000). P.161. 
2 See chapter 3 for the historical development of the PRC’s family planning campaign, and chapter 4 
for the PRC’s family planning organizational structure and development from central to town levels. 
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7.2.1 Government Allocations 
In 1964, soon after the establishment of the State Council’s Family Planning 
Commission (guowuyuan jihuashengyu weiyuanhui 国务院计划生育委员会 ), 
family planning became an independently budgeted item. Before 1978, it is the 
Family Planning Commission and the Health Ministry jointly managing this 
specialist funding.3 During this period, it was mainly the regional governments which 
contributed to this funding. The central government did not contribute its share until 
1973, when the State Council’s Leading Group for Family Planning (guowuyuan 
jihuashengyu lingdao xiaozu 国务院计划生育领导小组) was set up, and its 
contribution was very limited. From table 7.1, it can be seen that the central 
government contributions made up only about 10-16% of total government 
allocations from 1973 to 1998. Although there is a lack of accurate data after 1998, it 
has been confirmed by scholars and local family planning officials that central 
government funding has remained a small portion of contributions (in percentage 
terms).  
 
                                                
3  Chonghuan Chang, ed. Contemporary China's Family Planning Project (Dangdai Zhongguo 
Jihuashengyu Shiye 当代中国计划生育事业 ) (Beijing: Contemporary China Press (dangdai 
zhongguo chubanshe 当代中国出版社), 1992). P.274. 
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Table 7. 1 Government Budget Allocations for Family Planning 1965-98 (million 
RMB)4  
Year Total Public Funding Other Funding 
Central 
Government 
 
Local 
Government  
1965 
27.63  27.63  
1971 59.52  59.52  
1972 75.47  75.47  
1973 123.48 15.00 108.48  
1974 140.31 20.00 120.31  
1975 169.20 26.00 143.20  
1976 167.81 29.00 138.81  
1977 175.27 25.00 150.27  
1978 197.64 25.12 172.52  
1979 251.33 22.46 228.84 0.03 
1980 332.11 33.79 297.73 0.59 
1981 345.96 50.08 293.99 1.89 
1982 453.31 74.49 372.27 6.55 
1983 786.02 95.96 668.62 21.44 
1984 796.81 110.03 654.77 32.01 
1985 787.01 145.12 599.82 42.07 
1986 845.58 139.57 652.29 53.72 
1987 903.19 137.10 715.37 50.72 
1988 1056.28 152.29 851.98 52.01 
1989 1218.92 144.67 1026.94 47.31 
1990 1406.18 155.51 1189.76 60.91 
1991 1691.44 239.61 1371.47 80.00 
                                                
4  Sources: 1965-1980: see Muhan Sun, The History of China's Family Planning (Zhongguo 
Jihuashengyu Huodong Shi 中国计划生育活动史) (Changchun: Northern Women and Children Press 
(beifang funv ertong chubanshe 北方妇女儿童出版社), 1987). P.164. 1981-1998: See Yang, Chen, 
and Wei, The Outcomes and Investments of China's Family Planning (Zhonogguo Jihuashengyu 
Xiaoyi Yu Touru 中国计划生育效益与投入). pp181-182. Original sources: Chian Fiannce Bureau: 
Culture and Education Administration Statistic Data (caizhengbu wenjiao xingzheng shiye tongji 
ziliao财政部《文教行政事业统计资料》)，Infrastructure Investment Statistic Data （jiben jianshe 
touzi tongji ziliao《基本建设投资统计资料》)；State’s Population and Family Planning Bureau’s 
Finance Department (guojia jishengwei jicaisi 国家计生委计财司)，National Family Planning 
Public Funding Financial Report (quanguo jihua shengyu shiyefei caiwu juesuan biao全国计划生育
事业费财务决算表). 
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1992 2036.18 260.80 1676.16 99.22 
1993 2408.72 277.46 2011.98 119.28 
1994 2819.01 322.70 2385.26 111.05 
1995 3380.70 361.28 2888.21 131.21 
1996 4059.62 394.50 3527.40 137.72 
1997 4561.17 443.69 3979.35 138.13 
1998 5234.63 469.65 4568.18 196.80 
 
The central government’s limited allocation was used to pay the national level family 
planning administrative officials’ wages, subsidize the provincial projects, in which 
70 per cent was for the minority regions and poor areas of Central and West China,5 
and also provide oral contraception and contraceptive tools which were supplied free 
of charge nationwide.6 However, it was still the regional governments who were 
responsible for local family planning costs.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, the major task in family planning work was setting up 
formal and independent family planning organizations from central to local levels, 
organizing family planning working teams, and advocating family planning. The 
total of government budget allocations for family planning increased gradually when 
the central government joined in the budget allocations in 1973, and funding jumped 
sharply in 1979 when the family planning campaign became the one-child campaign. 
Funding increased further still in 1983 when the one-child campaign intensified. In 
                                                
5 Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development. 
P.191. 
6 The oral contraception and tools were provided free of charge nationwide from January 20th, 1974. 
See State Council’s Family Planning Leadership Group et al., "A Joint Emergency Notice of Free 
Providing of Oral Contraceptions and Contraceptive Tools Nationwide (Guanyu Quanguo Shixing 
Mianfei Gongying Biyun Yao He Biyun Gongju De Jinji Lianhe Tongzhi 关于全国实行免费供应避
孕药和避孕工具的紧急联合通知)," ([74]GuoJiYuZi (No.1), January 9th 1974). 
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1992, the allocation rose dramatically again under the large scale expansion of rural 
birth-control work.7  
Table 7.1 shows the central and local government contributions to family planning 
from 1965 to 1998. The total government allocation for family planning is divided 
into family planning public funding (jihuashengyu shiye fei 计划生育事业费) and 
others. From this table, it can be seen that the family planning public funding is the 
main part of the government allocation, comprising over 90%. Therefore, the family 
planning public funding could be used alone to represent the overall trend of the total 
government allocations. In the 1960s, the family planning public funding covered the 
family planning campaign’s propaganda expenses, contraceptive surgery equipment 
costs, cadres training, subsidies for persons practising birth-control and other running 
costs, and contraceptive surgery and abortion costs for rural residents and urban 
residents not on the state payroll.89 The contraceptive surgery costs of urban residents 
on the state payroll and their immediate family members were to be borne by their 
organizations’ budgets or by the public health budget. From 1970, contraceptive 
medicine and tools were provided to all citizens throughout the country.10 This cost 
was also accounted for in the budget allocation. Since the beginning of the 1980s, 
following the establishment of the family planning administrative system from state 
                                                
7 Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development. 
P.191. 
8 The family planning public funding covers the cost of contraceptive surgery for all rural residents 
and those urban residents who are unemployed or do not have a permanent job. See "State Council 
Approved the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Finance's Regulation About Family Planning 
Funding Expenditure Issues (Guowuyuan Pizhuan Weishengbu Caizhengbu Guanyu Jihuashengyu 
Gongzuo Jingfei Kaizhi Wenti De Guiding 国务院批转卫生部、财政部关于计划生育工作经费开
支问题的规定),"  ([64]GuoWeiZi (No.140), April 4th 1964). 
9 SX History Records Research Institution (Shizhi Yanjiuyuan 史志研究院), Sx Local History Record 
(Sx Tongzhi  Sx通志). P.453. 
10 Free provision of oral contraception and tools nationwide started in 1970. See, Ministry of Finance 
and Ministry of Health, "The Notice About the Free Provision of Oral Contraception (Guanyu 
Biyunyao Shixing Mianfei Gongying De Tongzhi 关于避孕药实行免费供应的通知)," (1970). 
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to grassroots level, the wages of the town, township and street level family planning 
cadres were also accounted for in the budget. In the late 1980s, the expenditures for 
family planning stations at the county level were further included in the budget.  In 
addition, the single child award (dusheng zinv baojian fei 独生子女保健费) for rural 
residents and unemployed urban residents was also included in the budget, while the 
single child award for other employed urban residents was required to be paid by 
their employers.11  
The family planning public funding does not include the family planning 
administrative funding (xingzheng fei 行政费), foreign affairs funding (waishi fei 外
事费), research funding (keyan fei 科研费), and infrastructure funding (jichujianshe 
fei 基础建设费). In the table above, this funding is classified together under ‘others’, 
and accounts for less than 10% of the total government funding. Infrastructure 
funding is the biggest component in this category.12  
7.2.2 Non-government Funding 
Non-government family planning funding started in 1982. Alongside the maturing of 
the local family planning administrative organizations from the beginning of the 
1980s, the provincial family planning regulations were widely issued and enacted at 
                                                
11 Mingguo Cao and Muhan Sun, eds., The Study of China's Reproduction Management (Renkou 
Shengyu Guanli Xue 人口生育管理学 ) (Changchun: Jilin University Press, 1987). P.273. Yang, 
Chen, and Wei, The Outcomes and Investments of China's Family Planning (Zhonogguo 
Jihuashengyu Xiaoyi Yu Touru 中国计划生育效益与投入). P.183. 
12 Related researches: Zhongguan Wu and Lijian Xiao, "Researches About the Efficiency Assessment 
on China's Family Planning Investment and Ourcome from 1971 to 1990 (Zhongguo 1971-1990 Nian 
Jihua Shengyu Touru Chanchu Xiaoyi Pinggu Yanjiu 中国 1971-1990年计划生育投入产出效益评
估研究)," Populatino and Family Planning (renkou yu jihuashengyu 人口与计划生育) 3 (1994); 
Yang, Chen, and Wei, The Outcomes and Investments of China's Family Planning (Zhonogguo 
Jihuashengyu Xiaoyi Yu Touru 中国计划生育效益与投入); Lang Sheng and Xinjie Qi, "The 
Magnitude and Constitution of China's Family Planning Investment (Zhongguo Jihua Shengyu Touru 
De Guimo Yu Goucheng 中国计划生育投入的规模与构成)," Population and Family Planning 
(renkou he jihua shengyu 人口和计划生育) 3 (2000). 
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that time. The ‘excess-birth fine’ (chaosheng fei 超生费) was regulated and collected 
by the grassroots level family planning officials soon after. This fine became and 
remains an important source of funding for grassroots level family planning.  
When the family planning work expanded to the large rural areas in the 1990s,13 the 
funding from government and the excess birth fines was found to be insufficient to 
cover the family planning expenditure. The farmers and the rural enterprises were 
requested to shoulder part of the family planning costs. In rural areas, their formal 
monetary resources comprised ‘the expenses retained for the village's collective 
undertakings’ (cun tiliu fei 村提留费) and ‘fees for unified management of township 
public undertakings’ (xiang tongchou 乡统筹费). The village collective undertakings 
refers to village public accumulation funds (gongjijin 公积金),14 public welfare 
funds (gongyijin 公益金) and management costs. The fees collected by the town 
were used for schools and education (banxue 办学), family planning, special care 
(youfu 优抚), militia training, and road construction and repair. The local farmers 
had to pay both of these two fees, and the local enterprises needed to pay the town’s 
fee. In practice, the ratio of the above funds used for family planning varied from 
town to town. However, in order to reduce the burden on farmers, these fees have 
been cancelled after the farmer’s tax and fees reform in 2004.15 In addition to these 
                                                
13 Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development. 
P.191. 
14 It is used for maintaining or expanding the village’s production.  
15 From 1998, central government started a series of tax and fees reduction reforms in order to reduce 
the farmer’s heavy burden. See Ministry of Finance and State's Tax Bureau, "A Notice of Comments 
About Some Agricultural Tax Issues in the Pilot Scheme of Rural Area's Tax and Fee's Reform 
(Guanyu Nongcun Suifei Gaige Shidian Gongzuo Zhong Nongye Shui Ruogan Wenti De Yijian De 
Tongzhi 关于农村税费改革试点工作中农业税若干问题的意见的通知)," (CaiShui (No.43), 2000); 
State Council, "The State Council's Comments About Further Extend the Pilot Scheme of Farmer's 
Tax and Fee's Reform in Nationwide (Guowuyuan Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin Nongcun Shuifei Gaige 
Shidian Gongzuo De Yijian 国务院关于全面推进农村税费改革试点工作的意见 )," (GuoFa 
(No.12), 2003). 
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formal funds, some other funds were also used for family planning indirectly. One 
example is XB town in XY county, where due to the advantageous coal resources, 
many small coal industries were founded in the 1990s. By collecting fines for 
environmental pollution, deposits for safe production and ‘voluntary’ subsidies, etc. 
the town government was able to supplement its main finances. Part of this fund was 
used for family planning after the town government reallocation.16 However, when 
the financial regulations became more restrictive in 2000, this funding source 
reduced sharply. Since then, the excess-birth fine became the main source of non-
government family planning funding.17 
In addition to the excess-birth fine, contributions from rural enterprises and 
individual farmers, and the “work units” (gongzuo danwei工作单位) — state and 
collective owned enterprises, public institutions such as schools and universities, 
government organizations, and NGOs (tuanti 团体) — bore a significant portion of 
the burden for family planning funding. During the 1960s, they were requested to 
cover the contraceptive surgery and abortion costs for their formal employees and 
their direct family members. In addition, these working units also needed to cover the 
subsidies for staffs practising birth control and other running costs, and the medical 
expenses for those suffering the side effects from contraceptive surgery or abortion. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, with the intensification of one child policy campaign, 
the ‘single-child award’ (duseng zinv baojian fei 独生子女保健费) was also 
regulated.18 The cost of these rewards was requested to be shouldered by the work 
units in urban areas, and by county and town government in rural areas. In addition 
                                                
16 Interview YangXY270814. 
17 Interview Tan10092014. 
18 "The Central Committee and the State Council's Instructions for Further Implementing Family 
Planning Work (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Jihuashengyu Gongzuo 
De Zhishi 中共中央国务院关于进一步做好计划生育工作的指示)." 
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to the single-child reward, the work units were also responsible for other fees related 
to employees with a single child, such as childcare, health care and insurance, and 
late marriage and late child-birth rewards.19 Although there is a lack of accurate data 
for this part of the funding, some estimates have been calculated by researchers, 
although, the use of different databases and statistical methods leads to different 
estimates. In an earlier research project, Zhongguan Wu and Lijian Xiao provided the 
estimated data for a wider range of non-government funding from 1971-1990, which 
included: the contributions by the state-owned enterprises, public institutions, 
government organizations; the contributions by other institutions and enterprises in 
urban areas; the costs covered by the street (jiedao 街道) family planning funding;20 
and the costs in the rural areas.21 In 2000, based on the number of reproductively 
active women in enterprises (including the state owned and other types of enterprises) 
and some sampling surveys, Yang, Cheng and Wei provided another estimate of the 
enterprises’ family planning contributions and found that the enterprises contributed 
19.45% of non-government family planning funding.22 
                                                
19 Yang, Chen, and Wei, The Outcomes and Investments of China's Family Planning (Zhonogguo 
Jihuashengyu Xiaoyi Yu Touru 中国计划生育效益与投入). P.167. 
20 The single child reward of the unemployed urban citizens is paid by the street family planning 
funding. See, "The Central Committee and the State Council's Instructions for Further Implementing 
Family Planning Work (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Jihuashengyu 
Gongzuo De Zhishi 中共中央国务院关于进一步做好计划生育工作的指示)." 
21  Wu and Xiao, "Researches About the Efficiency Assessment on China's Family Planning 
Investment and Ourcome from 1971 to 1990 (Zhongguo 1971-1990 Nian Jihua Shengyu Touru 
Chanchu Xiaoyi Pinggu Yanjiu 中国 1971-1990年计划生育投入产出效益评估研究)." pp11-12.  
Similar data was also provided by Scharping. See, Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: 
Population Policy and Demographic Development. P.190.  
22 See, Yang, Chen, and Wei, The Outcomes and Investments of China's Family Planning (Zhonogguo 
Jihuashengyu Xiaoyi Yu Touru 中国计划生育效益与投入 ). pp167-170. Sheng and Qi, "The 
Magnitude and Constitution of China's Family Planning Investment (Zhongguo Jihua Shengyu Touru 
De Guimo Yu Goucheng 中国计划生育投入的规模与构成)." P.33. 
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7.2.3 International Support 
International support for the PRC’s family planning also started in 1980. However, it 
only made up a very small portion of total family planning funding, and became less 
and less in the later years and finally stopped in 1998.23 
7.2.4 Summary 
Table 7. 2 Family Planning Funding Expenditure 1971-98 (million RMB)24 
Year Government Budget 
Allocations 
Non-government 
Funding 
International Support 
Amount Percentag
e 
 
 
Amount Percentag
e 
Amoun
t 
Percentage 
  %  %  % 
1971 59.52 100.00  0.00  0.00 
1972 75.47 100.00  0.00  0.00 
1973 123.48 100.00  0.00  0.00 
1974 140.31 100.00  0.00  0.00 
1975 169.20 100.00  0.00  0.00 
1976 167.81 100.00  0.00  0.00 
1977 175.27 100.00  0.00  0.00 
1978 197.64 100.00  0.00  0.00 
1979 251.33 100.00  0.00  0.00 
1980 332.11  97.60  0.00 8.18 2.40 
1981 345.96  97.69  0.00 8.18 2.31 
1982 453.31  60.32 289.10 38.47 9.08 1.21 
1983 786.02 57.22 578.20 42.09 9.48 0.69 
1984 796.81 47.56 867.55 51.78 11.17 0.67 
1985 787.01 40.20 1156.40 59.08 14.10 0.72 
1986 845.58 36.64 1445.50 62.64 16.57 0.72 
1987 903.19 34.01 1734.60 65.32 17.87 0.67 
1988 1056.28 34.10 2023.76 65.33 17.87 0.58 
1989 1218.92 34.34 2312.80 65.15 18.07 0.51 
                                                
23 "The Magnitude and Constitution of China's Family Planning Investment (Zhongguo Jihua Shengyu 
Touru De Guimo Yu Goucheng 中国计划生育投入的规模与构成)." P.35. 
24 Sources: ibid. P.36. Original sources: same as table 7.1. 
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1990 1406.18 34.95 2601.90 64.66 15.59 0.39 
1991 1691.44 30.43 3831.21 68.93 35.60 0.64 
1992 2036.18 38.31 3247.70 61.11 30.96 0.58 
1993 2408.72 34.06 4630.37 65.48 31.97 0.45 
1994 2819.01 35.50 5091.79 64.12 29.95 0.38 
1995 3380.70 35.85 6018.00 63.81 32.23 0.34 
1996 4059.62 38.62 6419.93 61.08 30.94 0.29 
1997 4561.17 40.25 6769.95 59.75 0.23 0.00 
1998 5234.63 42.38 7117.26 57.62 0.20 0.00 
 
Table 7.2 shows PRC’s total family planning funding coming from each of the three 
main sources. Both central and local government budget allocations increased 
significantly from 1964. Even taking inflation into consideration, government 
funding increased 12.27% from 1971 to 1998. 25  Although government budget 
allocations increased rapidly, family planning still faced insufficient funding due to 
the increasing demands of the intensifying family planning campaign. In 1971, the 
budget allocations for family planning amounted to just 0.082% of all state 
expenditure. By 1998, this figure had risen to a still modest 0.485%.26 Hence, with an 
insufficient government allocation, it was non-government funding-raising27 that 
made the major contribution to China’s family planning. It can be seen from table 7.2 
that non-government funding took up a very significant proportion, 38.47%, of 
family planning funding in the first year it was introduced, 1982. This proportion 
quickly increased to over 50% two years after and remained at around 60% during 
                                                
25 Yang, Chen, and Wei, The Outcomes and Investments of China's Family Planning (Zhonogguo 
Jihuashengyu Xiaoyi Yu Touru 中国计划生育效益与投入). P.176. 
26 See National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC, China Statistical Yearbook (China Statistics Press, 
1999); Finance Yearbook of China,  (China's Finance Magazine (Zhongguo Caizheng Zazhi She 中国
财政杂志社), 1993&1998); Sheng and Qi, "The Magnitude and Constitution of China's Family 
Planning Investment (Zhongguo Jihua Shengyu Touru De Guimo Yu Goucheng 中国计划生育投入的
规模与构成)." P.38. 
27 The non-government funding in this thesis was quoted from Yang, Chen and Wei’s paper.  
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the following years. International support, particularly the United Nations Population 
Fund, did make a certain contribution to China’s family planning in the 1980s and 
1990s,28 but it only made up a very small proportion of overall funding. 
7.3 Regional Level Family Planning Funding 
With the exception of contraceptive medicines and tools, the regional governments 
share the cost of almost every aspect of family planning. The central government is, 
in general, responsible for a lighter part of these costs. The notices jointly issued by 
the State’s Planning Commission and other departments have clearly listed the items 
which are subsidized by the central government: contraceptive medicines and tools, 
contraceptive surgery and abortion, single child rewards, equipment for the 
grassroots level family planning stations, grassroots level family planning publicity 
and education, personnel training, and certain award projects for rural birth planning 
families.29 Central government support varies from region to region according to 
regional economic levels. The general principle is more support to the poor Western 
areas, less to the Middle, and even less to the wealthy Eastern areas.  
At the regional levels, the family planning funding liability is delivered by the 
provincial, prefecture and county levels unequally. The county level, being closest to 
                                                
28 Sheng and Qi, "The Magnitude and Constitution of China's Family Planning Investment (Zhongguo 
Jihua Shengyu Touru De Guimo Yu Goucheng 中国计划生育投入的规模与构成)." P.34. 
29 See Office of State Planning Commission and Office of State Family Planning Commission, "The 
Notice of Managing the Special Supplemental Investment to Local Family Planning (Jihuashengyu 
Buzhu Difang Zhuanxiang Touzi Guanli Banfa De Tongzhi 计划生育补助地方专项投资管理办法的
通知)," (1992). The National Planning Commission was renamed as National Development and 
Reform Commission (fagaiwei 发改委) in 2003.  
See Ministry of Finance and State Family Planning Commission, "The Notice of Managing the 
Special Family Planning Funding Subsidized by the Central Government to the Local Government 
(Zhongyang Buzhu Difang Jihuashengyu Shiye Zhuanxiang Jingfei Shiyong Guanli Banfa De Tongzhi 
《中央补助地方计划生育事业专项经费使用管理办法》的通知)," (CaiJiao (No.25), 2002). 
Article 6. See Ministry of Finance and State Population and Family Planning Commission, "The 
Comments About Improving the Population and Family Planning Investment System (Guanyu 
Wanshan Renkou He Jihuashengyu Touru Baozhang Jizhi De Yijian 关于完善人口和计划生育投入
保障机制的意见)," (Caijiao (No.588), 2011). 
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the grassroots level, encounters most of the direct expenses, and so bears the heaviest 
duties. However, excluding the contraceptive medicine and tools, and contraceptive 
surgery and abortion,30 the county level government shares all of the other costs 
incurred with the other regional levels. The town level government does not 
contribute to the family planning funding directly.  
7.3.1 County Level Liability for Family Planning Funding 
At the county level, because most of the costs incurred are directly costs, the demand 
for family planning funding has become intensive. In order to satisfy this high 
demand, the county government has to seek assistance from the local society, such as 
farmers and local enterprises, to supplement the insufficient budget allocation. 
Therefore, unlike the provincial and prefecture levels, which mainly rely on their 
budget allocations, county level family planning funding is supported by both the 
budget allocation and non-government fund-raising. 
7.3.1.1 Family Planning Infrastructure Funding 
For the county level, the infrastructure cost was mainly born by the county 
government.31 In the 1980s, following the setting up of the formal family planning 
administrative system, the buildings, offices and technical appliances for family 
planning organizations were also included.  At county level, the main infrastructure 
was normally sorted out by placing the family planning administrative organizations 
(as well as the family planning association) inside the ‘government yard (zhengfu 
                                                
30 The oral contraception and tools were fully funded by the central government, and the contraceptive 
surgery and abortion were mainly funded by provincial family planning funding and supplemented by 
the state and prefectures. 
31 The infrastructure cost at the province and prefecture levels are also born their level’s government. 
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dayuan 政府大院)’,32 or in any vacant building.  The office equipment and technical 
appliances were mostly paid for by county level funds with a small supplement 
coming from the central and provincial governments, and an even smaller amount 
coming from prefectural funds. At QX County, the county population and family 
planning bureau and the family planning association were located in one building in 
the county people’s government yard. Six offices were occupied by five officials of 
the bureau and nine staff members of the association: one large office was occupied 
by the bureau head, two smaller independent offices were occupied by one deputy 
head and another deputy head in charge of the files and records (dangan 档案), one 
office was for the accountant, and two offices were for the other general staff 
members. They didn't have an independent meeting room but shared one with other 
departments. The county government supplied all of the offices with office desks, 
chairs, and cabinets. However, only one laptop was supplied for each office. 
Among the infrastructure works, only the key projects, such as the establishment of 
county level family planning stations, received significant central government 
support. In the 1980s, there was only a 20% contribution from the central 
government for buildings and technical appliances for the local family planning 
organizations.33 However, with the start of the eighth five-year plan (1991-1995), the 
central government’s support for county level family planning stations suddenly 
increased. This special fund supported the rebuilding of one third of the entire 
county’s family planning stations. Again, this central government fund also required 
                                                
32 Similar as the town government yard mentioned in Chapter 5, in many places in China, the county 
and town levels’ People’s Government are located in a group of gathered building. This group of 
gathered building was normally secured by the wall and with one main entrance. This place is 
normally called ‘government yard’ by the Chinese. Some major kuaikuai departments were also 
allocated in this yard, such as family planning.  
33 Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development. 
P.193. Yang, Chen, and Wei, The Outcomes and Investments of China's Family Planning (Zhonogguo 
Jihuashengyu Xiaoyi Yu Touru 中国计划生育效益与投入). pp181-182. 
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the help of local government funding. For each family planning station that was to be 
rebuilt, the central government contributed a maximum of 0.1 million RMB, while 
the provincial and prefectural levels each made a larger contribution than the central 
government. The central government’s funding was only used for the building and 
office infrastructure, while the regional governments’ funding was used for the 
medical and technical appliances. The county government bore the rest of the costs.34 
However, QX County Family Planning Station was not able to get any financial 
support from the central government. It was situated with the family planning bureau 
when it was established in 1985. Without proper space and medical equipment, the 
staff have to travel to individual town hospitals to carry out the insertion and removal 
of IUDs, abortions and sterilization. In 1988, supported by the county government, it 
got a new independent office equipped with medical facilities. Since then, it became 
possible to carry out some basic birth-planning operations there, although the 
majority of operations were still done in the town hospitals. In 2007, it moved into a 
new 3- level modern building. Using local government bonds, the county 
government invested 0.5 million RMB into this new building and its facilities, with 
some subsidies also coming from the province and prefecture. This new building 
provides the family planning station with enough space for general offices, an 
operation room, a gynecology check room, a test room, an ultrasound room, an 
electrocardiogram check room, a family planning advice room, and a population 
                                                
34 See the Office of State Planning Commission and Commission, "The Notice of Managing the 
Special Supplemental Investment to Local Family Planning (Jihuashengyu Buzhu Difang Zhuanxiang 
Touzi Guanli Banfa De Tongzhi 计划生育补助地方专项投资管理办法的通知)." Section 2.5, ‘The 
central government funding is to act only as a guide. It is mainly the responsibility of the regional 
governments to arrange the investment.  The provinces’ and prefectures’ investment should not be less 
than the central government’s investment. The rest are to be supplemented by the county governments. 
(zhongyang zijin qi zhengce yindao zuoyong, touzi zhuyao kao defang anpai. Sheng qu anpai de touzi 
he zhuangbei fei buying shaoyu zhongyang buzhu shuer, buzu bufen you suozai xian buqi. 中央资金
起政策引导作用，投资主要靠地方安排。省、区安排的投资和装备费不应少于中央补助数额，
不足部分由所在县补齐.’ 
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school. This new building is also properly equipped with office furniture, as well as 
technical and medical facilities and tools. A travelling van was also equipped for 
village visits. Some of the facilities were sponsored by the prefecture and province 
family planning organizations. 
In conclusion, with the exception of some family planning stations’ building costs, 
the county level family planning infrastructure costs are mainly covered by the 
county government, while the provincial level can use part of the central 
government’s medical funding for its infrastructure work. According to regulations 
about S province family planning public funding, 15% of central government’s 
medical funding can be used for the running costs of the family planning medical 
organization, of which the province receives 60% and the prefecture and county the 
remaining 40% between them for their publicity costs, conference costs, and storage 
and maintenance costs. However, in practice, because the provincial family planning 
medical station was set up together with the family planning commission, the part of 
the funding meant for running costs was used to support the provincial family 
planning infrastructure work. 
7.3.1.2 Family Planning Public Funding 
Family Planning Running Costs 
In addition to their infrastructure responsibility, the county level also has to shoulder 
a major part of the general publicity costs, office expenses and training costs, while 
the provincial and prefectural levels only partly supplement these costs. At QX 
County, it is usually the provincial levels which provide some support for publicity 
costs, while the prefecture offers more support for the office and training costs. 
These supports take the form of either direct funds or subsidies. For example, 
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concerning the training costs of the grassroots level officials, the province or the 
prefecture usually covers the training and materials costs, while the county level is 
responsible for covering only accommodation and travel expenses. For some 
particular projects, the province or prefecture would normally provide the majority or 
even totality of the funds. For example, S province provided all the publicity funds 
for Encouraging the Balanced Sex-Ratio Activity in 2014.  
Among all the expenses shouldered by the county level, the greatest is the family 
planning officials’ wages. At county level, this expense includes the salaries of all 
the staff members of the county level family planning bureau, family planning 
association, family planning station, and family planning medical station (yaoju zhan 
药具站).35 These wages take up more than half of the county family planning 
funding. At QX County, the total wage cost is 2.8 million RMB, which is about 65 
per cent of the total county family planning funding, which is 4.28 million RMB.36  
Family Planning Awards 
In addition to the above running costs, the county level government also has to 
shoulder a big share of the family planning awards. Although the share of county 
liability varies from place to place depending on the local economic levels, the 
county level has always taken up quite a heavy proportion of these costs. For 
                                                
35 Theoretically, the salary of civil servants (gongwuyuan 公务员) is included in the administrative 
funding, rather than the family planning public funding. In QX County, most staff members of the 
most of them are from the family planning bureau while some of them are family planning association 
officials. However, in order to reach the required investment on the family planning public funding, in 
practice, this part of wages is also calculated in the county level’s allocation for family planning 
public funding. 
36 See interview FZY10092014. 
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example, at Yi County in Hebei Province, the single child award was funded by a 
ratio of 8:2 between the county and town.37  
In S province, this burden has been shared amongst the central, province, prefecture 
and county governments since 2003.38 Prior to the 2000s, there was only one type of 
family planning award — the single child award. However, because of insufficient 
family planning public funding, the single child award for rural residents could not 
be guaranteed in QX County.39 From 2003, following the central government’s new 
campaign, the ‘family planning incentive mechanism’ (jihuashengyu liyi daoxiang 
jizhi  计划生育利益导向机制), regional governments started to invest more funds 
for family planning awards. 
The central government normally supports two projects: the monthly ‘retirement 
reward for rural birth-planning families’ (nongcun bufen jihuashengyu jiating jiangli 
                                                
37 See Yi County People's Government Office, "The Notice of Implement Rural Part Family Planning 
Award's Special Support Policies (Guanyu Luoshi Nongcun Bufen Jihuashengyu Jiating Jiangli Fuzhu 
Tebie Fuzhu He Duixian Jiangli Youhui Zhengce De Tongzhi 关于落实农村部分计划生育家庭奖励
扶 助 特 别 扶 助 和 兑 现 奖 励 优 惠 政 策 的 通 知 )," 
http://www.yizhou.gov.cn/zfwj/2014/10/24/883926ce-cf26-4849-998f-c8b654cb8aea.htm (28th Oct 
2014). 
38 Xinhua Net, "S Province: Award and Subsidy Ets Six Policies Helped Birth Planning Families 
Achieve Well-Off (S Sheng: Jiang Mian Bu Deng Liuxiang Zhengce Zhu Jisheng Jiating Ben 
Xiaokang S省: 奖 免 补等六项政策助计生家庭奔小康)," http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-
12/11/content_3907336.htm (28th Oct 2014). 
39 Before 2005, the single child award was not guaranteed in rural China. Although the central 
government provided some support, it was mainly focused on the poorer areas. In some areas, because 
the local peasants were not aware of their entitled benefits, the local government could easily cut this 
part of the funds if there was a funding shortage. Many urban residents on the state payroll also have 
no guaranteed award from their employer. Furthermore, in most areas, the increase in the value of the 
single child award has been much slower than the ratio of inflation. For example, in S province, the 
single child award was 2.5 RMB per month in the 1980s, five RMB per month in the 1990s, then 
increased to ten RMB, then finally 50 RMB since 2008. See "S Province People’s Government Family 
Planning Regulations (S Sheng Renminzhengfu Guanyu Jihuashengyu De Ruogan Guiding S省人民
政府关于计划生育的若干规定) (Invalid)." S Province Family Planning Regulation, 1989, S 
Province Family Planning Regulation 1999, edited in 2002, 2008, and 2014.  
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fuzhu 农村部分计划生育家庭奖励扶助)40 and the monthly subsidy for ‘the birth-
planning families with special needs’ (jihuashengyu jiating tebie fuzhu 计划生育家
庭特别扶助).41 The level of support from the central government varies depending 
on the local economic level. According to the 2004 document jointly issued by the 
Ministry of Finance and the Family Planning Commission, regional support for the 
rural birth-control families’ awards is 80% in the poor Western areas, 50% in the 
Middle areas, and very little in the wealthy Eastern areas.42 In S province, the central 
government provides 50% of the total funds for these two awards, while the province 
and prefecture are responsible for 40% and 10% of the funds respectively. 
The county level does not share the above monthly liability, but it does cover 40% of 
a one-off subsidy for birth-planning families with special needs, while the province 
and prefecture each cover 30%43 – this is normally called 3:3:4 by local officials. In 
addition, the county government is also responsible for 40% of the monthly single 
child award for rural residents and urban residents not on the state payroll, and for 
the one-off and monthly awards given to families who have given up their second 
child quota and rural families with two daughters who have had sterilization. In 
                                                
40 "Ministry of Finance and National Population and Family Planning Commission's Joint Notice 
About the Pilot Scheme of Developing the Rural Birth-Planning Families' Retirement Award, 
Forwarded by the State Council (Guowuyuan Bangongting Zhuanfa Renkou Jishengwei Caizhengbu 
Guanyu Kaizhan Dui Nongcun Bufen Jihuashengyu Jiating Shixing Jiangli Fuzhu Zhidu Shidian 
Gongzuo Yijian De Tongzhi 国务院办公厅转发人口计生委财政部关于开展对农村部分计划生育
家庭实行奖励扶助制度试点工作意见的通知),"  (GuoBanFa (No.21), 2004). 
41 It refers to those certificated single child families whose single child was disabled or dead. It applies 
to both rural and urban families. 
42 See, "The Notice of the Pilot Scheme on Proposed Rewards and Support Systems for the Rural 
Birth-Control Families (Nongcun Bufen Jihuashengyu Jiating Jiangli Fuzhu Zhidu Shidian Fangan 
Shixing De Tongzhi 农村部分计划生育家庭奖励扶助制度试点方案 (试行 )的通知 ),"  
(GuoRenKouFa (No.36), 2004).  
43 See S Province Finance Bureau, S Province Population and Family Planning Commission, and 
Bank of China's TY Branch, "The Notice of Print and Distribut the Temporary Regulation of 
Managing S Province Rural Birth-Planning Families' Retirement Award (Guanyu Yinfa S Sheng 
Nongcun Jihuashnegyu Jiating Jiangli Zhuanxiang Zijin Guanli Zanxing Banfa De Tongzhi 关于印发
《S 省农村计划生育家庭奖励专项资金管理暂行办法》的通知)," (JinCaiJiao (No.127), 2005). 
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2014, the total funds for the family planning award is 0.8 million RMB for QX 
County, which is the second largest share in county level family planning public 
fund. 
Not only does the level of central government support vary from province to 
province, but the type of award also differs depending on the local conditions. In S 
province, in order to give more support to birth-planning families, since 2009 there 
has been a rural birth-planning families’ pension award – specifically, single-child 
parents pay half and the county government pays the other half of their pension 
insurance for 15 years. At the moment, the insurance is 100 RMB per person every 
year. Those who have paid for 15 years or more, and parents over 60, are entitled to 
this pension award. In some pilot schemes of S province, such as XB County, the 
pension benefit is 900 RMB per year (75 RMB per month).  
Furthermore, in recent years, with more and more of these family planning awards 
schemes appearing, the provincial level is gradually shifting more of its burdens to 
the county. For example, as explained above, the financial responsibility for most 
rural birth-planning family awards used to be shared according to a ratio of 3:3:4 
among the province, prefecture and county. However, this 3:3:4 ratio was changed to 
2:3:5 at ZY county in S Province from 2012. For some regions with better economic 
circumstances, the province’s burden has completely moved to the county and so the 
burden ratio has become 3:7 between prefecture and county.44 
                                                
44 LL City Finance Bureau and LL Population and Family Planning Commission, "A Notice About 
Adjusting Finance Ratios of the Rural Birth-Planning Families' Rewards (Guanyu Tiaozheng Nongcun 
Jihuashengyu Jiating Jiangli Caizheng Fudan Bili De Tongzhi 关于调整农村计划生育家庭奖励财
政负担比例的通知)," (LvCaiJiao (No.1246), 2011). 
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Other Funds 
In addition to the above financial responsibilities, the county level, being the lowest 
level of local government to have financial autonomy, also shares some of the 
burdens of the village level. The county level has provided one-third of the village 
family planning officials’ wages since 2000, which is equal to the province’s and 
prefecture’s contributions. In S province, the rules are that the province, prefecture 
and county levels each have to contribute 40 RMB to the monthly wages of the 
village family planning officials. The town can pay an amount based on its financial 
ability to pay. 
Overall, the county level, as the most basic level of government that has financial 
autonomy, shoulders the heaviest burden of family planning funding, more than any 
of the other regional levels. The government budget allocation was often found to be 
insufficient to fully afford this considerable liability. Non-government funding, such 
as the fees collected from local enterprises, has made a great contribution to family 
planning funding. In addition, the county level also received a significant proportion 
of its family planning funding from collecting excess-birth fines. The county and 
town share these excess-birth fines in order to support each level’s family planning 
costs, but the ratio is different from place to place. For example, in ZY County, the 
ratio for sharing this fine is 7:3 between county and town, while the ratio is 2:8 in 
QX County. However, even with these multiple funding sources, the family planning 
funding often faces shortfalls caused by funding shortages in either the upper levels 
or county level governments. In these situations, the county family planning 
organizations, as well as the town level family planning office, always face pressure 
from the people directly. 
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7.3.2 Town Level Liability for Family Planning Funding 
Compared to the county level, the town level generally carries a lighter financial 
burden. But the town level still quite often faces funding shortages. This is caused 
not only by insufficient budget allocations but also large running costs. The major 
expenses at this level are the large publicity costs, materials costs and the staff 
wages. 
As explained in chapter 5, family planning has always been given a hard target by 
local officials. Under these intensive qualitative and quantitative quotas, rather strict 
evaluation systems, and with family planning being a key political issue for the town 
government leader, the implementation of family planning regulations was often 
given priority even amongst all the other hard targets. Therefore, in order to better 
carry out this tough work, the town government normally pays more attention to it.  
However, the implementation of family planning regulations faces many difficulties. 
The major difficulty is the local people’s resistance, as the one-child policy naturally 
conflicts with China’s son-preference. Although each level’s family planning 
organization does organize lots of publicity for birth control, the town family 
planning office is a key actor that supports all publicity. In addition, the town 
officials also have to arrange in their own time individual home-visits to those 
families who put up big resistance. This work is not only time-consuming but also a 
real safety risk. Stories of family planning officials being injured were not 
uncommon in the 1980s and 1990s. A family planning official, Gu, was once hurt by 
a lady, who had a non-permitted pregnancy, during a home visit to persuade the 
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family to have an abortion. Another time, after finishing work in a village, she was 
hit by someone and lost consciousness for a couple of hours.45  
Another difficulty of implementing the family planning regulations is the massive 
workloads. As the family planning campaign developed, their job has also 
developed, from simply collecting the excess-birth fine in the 1980s, to also 
recording and managing migrations, educating the locals about the sex-balance, 
publicizing pregnancy and reproduction health, providing extra care for girls, issuing 
related documents, and training the village officials. In addition, they are also 
responsible for coordination with the other departments. In order to fully track the 
population change, in particular unpermitted births and the migrant population, the 
town officials also need to check their information with the police station, hospital46, 
and local enterprises.47 Furthermore, following the trend of the ‘profit guide to 
family planning’ (jihuashengyu liyi daoxiang 计划生育利益导向), in addition to the 
financial awards, more and more incentives were created to benefit birth-planning 
families, such as serious illness support (dabing qiuzhu 大病求助 ), medical 
insurance, low income support, free textbook & other fees for the children of birth-
planning families children at the primary and junior secondary education stage, as 
well as extra points given to these children on the secondary school entrance exam.  
Most of these jobs carried out by the town level family planning officials are very 
detailed. With the requirement of a minimum 90% awareness rate, they need to 
                                                
45 Interviwee, Gu, a specialist family planning deputy town head, who was a family planning assistant 
since 1984. GuEY19112009. 
46 Since 2009 at EY town, communicating with the local police station and hospital has been called 
‘information corresponding’ ( xinxi hutong 信息互通). But the information is never given voluntarily, 
it was always the town family planning officials who goes there personally, requests the relevant 
information, and then copies it down by hand. 
47 This is called family planning ‘localized management’ (shudihua guanli  属地化管理). It means 
that the local enterprises and all organizations are also responsible for managing their employees’ 
reproductive behaviour. They need to record their marriage status, childbirth numbers and pregnancy 
status. However most private enterprises don't practice this at all.  
 
 
 
 
 
220 
publicize the main regulations not only in the villagers’ meetings or through public 
media, but also by distributing the publicity materials in person and explaining it to 
every individual household. This inevitably results in large publicity and material 
costs. 
In facing so many difficulties and such huge workloads, the town government 
normally achieves their goal by recruiting more staff. However, with limited 
establishments (bianzhi编制), the extra staff they recruit are only temporary and 
their wages are not guaranteed by the government allocation. At EY town, there are 
only two formal family planning officials, while the remaining five staff members 
are temporary. Therefore, it becomes the town government’s responsibility to pay for 
these temporary staff members.  
Being at the bottom end of the resource allocations, the town level always receives 
very limited funding from the government. Therefore, in order to fulfil the family 
planning task, the town government has to manage by getting support either from the 
local villagers or local enterprises. 
7.3.3 Town Level Family Planning Funding Sources 
Before the 2000s, EY town’s family planning funding was mainly funded by 
government allocation, san-ti-wu-tong [the three and five deductions] (三提五统),48 
social contributions and excess-birth fines. However, following economic reforms, 
tax and fee reforms, and family planning reforms, the main sources of the town level 
                                                
48 San-ti-wu-tong refers to ‘the expenses retained for the village's collective undertakings’ (cun tiliu fei 
村提留费) and ‘fees for unified management of township public undertakings’ (xiang tongchou 乡统
筹费). 
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family planning funding have become the government allocation and excess-birth 
fines only. 
7.3.3.1 Government Allocation 
This part of the funding covers both the permanent official’s wages and the family 
planning office’s running costs. At the end of every calendar year, the town 
government reports next year’s planned budget to the county government, which will 
determine the funding that will be allocated, after approval. However, as discussed 
above, this allocated fund is very limited and does not cover all the running costs or 
any temporary officials hired by the town. 
7.3.3.2 San-Ti-Wu-Tong 
From 2003, following the central government’s implementation of tax and fee 
reforms nationwide, san-ti-wu-tong was gradually cancelled in China. As a result, the 
share of the family planning funding which was borne by the local villagers was 
shifted to the regional governments. The town government, as the major beneficiary 
of san-ti-wu-tong, in turn has shouldered the brunt of this shifted burden. 
7.3.3.3 Other Social Contributions 
At town level, social contributions are another source of the government funding. 
This contribution to the town government’s total funding varies according to local 
economic levels. In some rich towns, social contributions make up the majority of 
the town government’s funding. In general, the town government has complete 
control of this part of the fund. It is used for local government running costs, 
including the family planning running costs and temporary officials’ wages, road 
repair, school buildings, or even local officials’ bonuses, or other hidden expenses.  
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With the exception of a small amount of fees collected legally, such as the 
environment management fees, most of these fees collected from the local 
enterprises are illegal. As one local official described the situation:  
‘You don't need to think what the fees for. Once the government officials 
tell you that your (company) needs to pay some fees, then you just pay it. 
It can be of couple hundred thousand RMB or a couple of million RMB. 
Regarding the receipt, it could be anything. Or, sometimes, the local 
government tells you than you need to share the costs for repairing the 
road or building the school. Then you also need to pay the figure 
allocated to you. Sometimes, some enterprises need to pay fees when 
they set up their company. Once they pay they will soon get the 
certificate. For the deposit, such as the safe production deposit, it 
becomes the government’s funds once you have paid it. You should just 
forget about it.’  (Ni jiu buyong guan shi weisha, fanzheng shi zhengfu lai 
ren le, gao ni, ni dei jiaoqian le: shaode jishi wan, duode nibai wan. 
zhiyu shouju kai cheng sha ni jiu buyong guan le. Huozhe shi, xiulu le, 
jian xuexiao le, qiye dei jiao dian qian le. Nimen jiao jiu xing le. Haiyou 
yixie shihou, kaigong shihou jiudei jiaoqian. Jiao le qian, gezhong zheng 
jiu ban xialai le, ni jiu neng kaigong le. Zhiyv anquanshengchan de yajin 
sha de, yiban jiu dou zidong kou le, jiu buyong xiangde jianglai huan le. 
你就不用管是为啥，反正是政府来人了，告你，你得交钱了: 少的
几十万，多的几百万. 至于收据开成啥你就不用管了. 或者是，修路
了，建学校了，企业得交点钱了。你们交就行了。还有一些时候，
开工时候就得交钱，交了钱，各种证就办下来了，你就能开工了。
至于安全生产的押金啥的，一般就都自动扣了，就不用想的将来还
了.)49 
However, this part of the funding has become more and more limited in recent years 
as a result of more regulation of local government fee collections. 
As for EY town, it has two military controlled enterprises and two private enterprises. 
As these enterprises do not make huge profits, the town government hardly collects 
any extra fees.  
                                                
49 Interview YXB11112014. 
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7.3.3.4 Excess-Birth Fines 
At the beginning of the family planning campaign, the fine for a non-quota birth was 
called an ‘excess-birth fine’. It was renamed ‘out of quota birth fee’ (jihuawai 
shengyu fei 计划外生育费) in 1992, and then a ‘social maintenance fee’ (shehui 
fuyang fei 社会抚养费) in 2000. For urban residents on the state pay roll, the fine 
was directly deducted from the couple’s wages by their work unit. For unemployed 
urban residents, it was the street family planning office which collected the fine. For 
rural residents, it was the village committee or town government who collected the 
fine. The fine was managed by the village, town, or county government and shared 
between them according to a particular ratio. 
1979-1982 Collected and Managed by the Village 
The earliest fine-collecting in S province started on Oct 1st, 1979. However, at this 
early stage, it was only for the third child where a family had to pay the fine.50 In 
rural areas, the fine was replaced by work points51 (gongfen 工分) which were 
normally directly reduced accordingly by the production brigade. At this time, wages 
or work points deducted from families were completely used up into the unit’s bonus 
(fulijin 福利金) or community welfare (gongyijin 公益金). 52  
                                                
50 "S Province Proposed Regulations on Family Planning Work (S Sheng Jihuashengyu Gongzuo De 
Ruogan Guiding (Shixing) S省计划生育工作的若干规定(试行)),"  (GeFa (No. 154), 1979). Section 
4:  
51 During the Agricultural Production Cooperative and People’s Commune period, the farmers’ work 
was calculated by the work point. The full point is 10 in a work day. All the people, depending on the 
strength of their labour rather than their actual contributions, were set up their work point in a single 
working day. In general, a strength men labour could earn 7-9 work points and women could early 5-7 
work point, and children and elders only get 2-3 work points. By the end of the year, the farmers get 
their income based on their annual work points. These work points system was canceled in the 
responsibility system.  
52 "S Province Proposed Regulations on Family Planning Work (S Sheng Jihuashengyu Gongzuo De 
Ruogan Guiding (Shixing) S省计划生育工作的若干规定(试行))." 
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1982-1989 Collected and Managed by the Town 
Following the intensification of the family planning campaign, an economic penalty 
for non-quota second-birth was established on 1st Dec, 1982.53 For rural residents, it 
was first the village which was responsible for collecting the fine, but that changed to 
the town family planning office in 1987.  
Meanwhile, because of the insufficiency of the government allocation for the family 
planning funding, the fines collected were not allowed to be expended freely by the 
work units or villages as was the case before, but had to be used to subsidise the 
family planning funding. 54 According to the regulations, the fine could be used to 
pay the single-child bonus, or subsidise those couples who had a birth-control 
operation. In 1984, in response to the central government’s decision to ‘unify control 
over income and expenditure’ (tong shou tong zhi 统收统支) on the family planning 
fine,55 S province published detailed regulations about it,56 providing that the village 
committee was responsible for collecting the family planning fine in the villages, the 
street office was responsible for collecting the fines from urban residents who are 
unemployed or working in private enterprises, and work units were responsible for 
collecting fines from their employees. In addition, in rural areas the management of 
the fine shifted from the village to the town government. The collected fines were 
shared between the village, town and county in a ratio of 60%, 30% and 10% 
respectively. 
                                                
53 "S Province People’s Government Family Planning Regulations (S Sheng Renminzhengfu Guanyu 
Jihuashengyu De Ruogan Guiding S省人民政府关于计划生育的若干规定) (Invalid)." Section 10. 
54 Ibid. 
55 "The Proposed Regulation on Strengthening the Excess-Birth Fine Management (Guanyu Jiaqiang 
Chaosheng Zinvfei Guanli De Zanxing Guiding 关于加强超生子女费管理的暂行规定) ",  (State 
Family Planning Commission and Ministry of Finance, 1982). 
56 "The Proposed Regulation on Strengthening the Excess-Birth Fine Management in S Province (S 
Sheng Guanyu Jiaqiang Chaoshengzinvfei Guanli Shixing Banfa S省关于加强超生子女费管理试行
办法)." 
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From 1987, the fine collecting authority completely shifted from the village to the 
town as a result of the misuse of the fine-collecting authority by some village 
committee members.57 The town government was responsible for both collecting and 
controlling this fine (xiang shou xiang guan 乡收乡管). The share of the collected 
fines also changed to 50%, 30% and 20% between the village, town and county 
respectively. In urban areas, the collected fines were shared between work units, 
street offices and county according to the ratio of 90%, 5% and 5% respectively. 
However, as was the case in the past, without effective financial inspection, the fund, 
which was controlled completely by the town government, was spent freely by the 
local government. As one local official described it: ‘This fund was used for any 
purpose by the town, county and village. There was no inspection or approval of the 
expenditure of this fund. (xiang zenme hua jiu zenme hua, meiyou jinadu ye bu xuyao 
shenpi. 想怎么花就怎么花，没有监督也不需要审批.)’58 In some areas, some 
money from the fines collected was used for bonuses for the town and county level 
family planning officials and even other government cadres.59 Some funds were also 
embezzled or borrowed illegally. 
1989 Collected by the Town and Managed by the County 
At the end of the 1980s, in order to better manage the excess birth fines, the 
management method was changed again. Between 1984 and 1989, the method was 
‘unified control over the income and expenditure’ (tong shou tong zhi 统收统支). It 
meant that the town government was responsible for accounting for both the fine 
                                                
57 S Province Family Planning Commission, S Province Finance Bureau, and Agricultural Bank of 
China S Branch, "S Provincial Regulations on the Management of Excess-Birth Fines (S Sheng 
Chaosheng Zinvfei Guanli Banfa S省超生子女费管理办法)," (1987). 
58 Interview YXB27082014. 
59 Interview DUCC13112009. 
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income and its expenditure. In order to better manage this fund, this ‘unified control’ 
was changed to ‘two accounts for income and expenditure’ (shouzhi liangtiao xian 
收支两条线) in 1989 in QX County when the first S provincial Family Planning 
Regulation was published formally.60 The fine collected was handed to the county 
level financial bureau, then reallocated to the county family planning bureau, town 
family planning office and village individually. This method was also called ‘town 
funding managed by the county’ (xiang cai xian guan 乡财县管). Out of the excess-
birth fines collected, 80 per cent was reallocated to the township government and 20 
per cent was kept by the county family planning bureau. The village was not 
involved in fine management nor took any share. 
This two-accounts-management varied from place to place in S province. In 1992， 
an individual provincial regulation about the excess-birth fine confirmed this 
management change as well as the shared ratio between the town and county.61 This 
8:2 ratio between town and county has been widely retained in most counties in S 
province, but some areas adjusted it according to their local conditions in the later 
2000s. For example, in ZY county, the ratio between the county and town is 7:3.62 
The fine for the excess-birth increased further according to the 1989 formal 
provincial family planning regulation. As for the non-quota second-births, the fine 
                                                
60 "S Province Family Planning Legislation (S Sheng Jihuashengyu Tiaoli S 省计划生育条例) 
(Invalid),"  (1989). 
61 S Province Family Planning Commission, S Province Finance Bureau, and S Province Bureau of 
Commodity Price, "S Province Implementation Suggestion About the Management Method of out of 
Quota Birth Fee from Three Departments from the Central Government (Guanche Guojia Sange 
Buweiju Jihuawai Shengyufei Guanli Banfa 贯彻国家三个部委局‘计划外生育费管理办法’的实施
意见)," (1992). 
62  Telephone interview with ZY county family planning bureau deputy head. Interview 
FZY22102014. 
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was increased from 15% of income to 20%, while the out-of-quota third-births 
increased from 20% of income to 40%.63 
7.3.4 Summary 
In China’s hierarchical administrative structure, the grassroots level organizations, 
located at the bottom end of the allocation chain, have always faced a lack of funding 
and manpower. However, their liability for family planning funding has become 
heavier and heavier due to the top to bottom administrative structure until eventually 
the grassroots level governments have the heaviest burdens placed on them.  
As for the county level, they have to shoulder the majority of their own infrastructure 
costs, running costs, and also a large share of the family planning awards, and are the 
completely liable for the county and town family planning officials’ wages and share 
liability for paying the village officials’ wages. As for the town level, although it 
does not share the huge costs of the family planning awards, it still faces its own 
large running costs.  
The town level’s large family planning costs are caused by both the day-to-day 
running costs and temporary officials’ wages. Due to the massive workloads, 
resistance from the locals, and tough inspections, the town government not only paid 
more political attention to it, but also recruited more staff members as another direct 
method of fulfilling the task. However, with there being limited places for the formal 
                                                
63 "S Province Family Planning Legislation (S Sheng Jihuashengyu Tiaoli S 省计划生育条例) 
(Invalid)." Article 29. 
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establishment (bianzhi 编制)64 at the town level, these officials (chi xiang caizheng 
de吃乡财政的) do not have the same entitlements as officials paid by the county 
(chi xian caizheng de吃县财政的), although they are also called ‘cadres’. Their jobs 
are not permanent or secure although many of them could work until their retirement 
age, or transfer to being a formal cadre at some later stage; while they are temporary 
they are not entitled to a pension, state-paid health insurance, housing subsidy or any 
other subsidy. The temporary staff wages and massive workloads cause large running 
costs and are a big burden on the town government.  
With limited government allocation, non-government funds, particular from excess-
birth fines, have become a major source of revenue for the town level family 
planning. The collected excess-birth fine has been shared between the town and 
county since the end of the 1990s, although the exact share differs from county to 
county depending on local economic levels. At the town level, the excess-birth fines 
are the main source of revenue for paying for the extra family planning staff hired by 
the town as well as subsidizing the day-to-day running costs. 
7.4 Financial Influences on the Town Family Planning Officials 
From the analysis above, it can be seen that the financial environment of town level 
family planning is very complicated and varies from town to town according to local 
economic levels and government support from higher levels. The most direct effects 
of the financial environment at the town level are on the officials’ wages, particularly 
the temporary staff, and on the family planning running costs.  
                                                
64 At the town level, a person in the administrative establishment means that they are formal and 
permanent cadres — civil servants (gongwuyuan 公务员), also called a ‘person paid by the county’ 
(chi xian caizheng de吃县财政的). The people recruited by the town government are temporary staff, 
but are still called ‘cadres’. They are not entitled to a pension, nor the state-paid health insurance. 
Such a person is called a ‘person paid by the town’ (chi xiang caizheng de吃乡财政的). 
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Generally, the town’s formal officials’ wages differ from county to county while the 
town’s temporary officials’ salaries differ from town to town. For counties in a better 
financial environment, the officials get better subsidies from the county to 
supplement their wages. For example, in 2009, the formal town family planning 
official salary in XY county ranged from 2,000 to 3,000RMB per month, while it 
was around 2,000 RMB in ZY county and only 1,200 RMB in QX county. But the 
temporary officials have always had a lower salary than the formal officials in most 
areas in S province even though they are carrying out exactly the same work. For 
example, the formal officials’ monthly salary is between 2,000 to 3,000 RMB in XY, 
while the temporary official’s was just 1,200.  
The next part of this chapter will consider in more detail these two main expenses of 
personal wages and running costs, taking EY town as a case study, and analyse how 
the financial situation reflects on the family planning officials’ implementation. 
Although the following analysis of EY town is not representative of all towns in 
China, it might still reflect some of the general trends. 
7.4.1 Personal Incomes  
In EY town, there were seven staff members in the family planning office, including 
the office head. During my fieldwork from July to December 2009, one lady in 
charge of statistics and IT was on maternity leave, so her work was being covered by 
someone recruited by the town. These general officials were individually responsible 
for: publicity, family planning association & medicines & single child certificate 
approvals, migration & new-born certificates, technical services, excess-birth fines & 
statistics & IT.  
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Among these seven officials, only the office head and a senior family planning 
official, L, were formal officials, whose salaries were paid by the county 
government. The others were temporary staff recruited by the town and paid by the 
town government using the excess-birth fines. In 2009, the monthly salary for a 
temporary family planning official was 900 RMB per month, while the formal 
official’s salary was 1,200 RMB. 
L, a nearly 50 year-old man, was the most senior member of staff in the office. He 
joined the family planning office in the mid-1980s, thanks to a close personal 
relationship with the town leaders. He had two children:  a son, who got married a 
year ago, and a daughter, who had nearly finished the university education. His 
hukou was transferred from rural to urban residence after he got this job, but his wife 
still kept her rural hukou. Therefore, they were still living in the village where they 
lived before which was also the town government location. In their own garden, they 
built another two bedrooms for their son’s family. In addition to his formal income, 
their family also had some income from their land, and a small baking business. As 
for L, he was quite happy with his job and the pay. In his opinion, the family 
planning officials were fairly paid during the 1980s and 1990s compared with the 
local people’s average income. This relatively well-paid job made it much easier for 
him and his wife to bring up his children than for other families. Now, having paid 
for his son’s wedding and paying off the last of his daughter’s education fees, he did 
not have any big financial responsibilities. Therefore, L was happy to stay in this 
position until his retirement age even though the pay had become relatively low in 
recently years because of the rapid increase in local people’s average incomes and 
rapid price inflation. 
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However, L was an exceptional case in the office because of his age. Apart from L 
and the newly recruited staff, all of the other officials were urban residents aged 
between 25 and 40. They all had a young child to bring up and most of them resided 
in the county centre (xiancheng 县城). Therefore, they were faced with much more 
pressure than L. The following list of QX County’s child-rearing costs explains well 
this family burden. 
Table 7. 3 Children-rearing Costs (Including the Education) at EY Town (2009)65 
Age Stage  Annual Cost (RMB) 
0—3 Pre-Nursery 3,500 
3—7/8 Nursery 3,000 
7/8—13/14 Primary Education 1,000 
13/14—16/17 Junior Secondary School 2,000 
16/17—19/20 Senior Secondary School 
or Technical School 
or Other Education 
10,000 
19/20—23/24 Higher Education 15,000 
Total  124,500 
Annual Average  5,200 
 
 
Table 7. 4 Marriage Costs for a Son (2009)66 
Items Cost (RMB) 
Betrothal Gifts 85,000 
House Village 80,000-90,000 (800-900 per m2) 
County Town 300,000-400,000 (3,600-3,700 per m2) 
 
                                                
65 Group Interview at EY town 19112009. 
66 Group Interview at EY town 19112009. 
 
 
 
 
 
232 
From the list above, it can be concluded that a family needs to save at least 5,000 
RMB per year to cover one child’s education costs. If they have a son, then the 
parents need to also save for their son’s wedding costs, which amounts to at least 
5,000 RMB per year. Therefore, the town-paid officials would have to save up all of 
their salary for 20 years in order to cover their child’s education and marriage costs. 
This is a huge burden for these young urban couples.  
With this huge burden, it is not difficult to understand why there is only one young 
male staff member, N, in the family planning office. In this region, people still hold 
to the traditional cultural value that men should take the major financial 
responsibility for the family while women are responsible for most of the housework. 
Therefore, because of the low wages, it is normally women who apply for the family 
planning office rather than men. N, in order to better support the family, also does 
some small business with his friends, talking privately on the phone or checking 
personal things on the office computer during office hours. N’s behaviour, however, 
is quite acceptable for all other staff members including the office head. She 
commented:  
‘N is a man and it is not easy for him to raise the whole family with this 
little money. I will keep one eye open and another blind as long as he 
gets his work done on time and stays in the office most of the time.’ 
(Nyige nande. Zhe dian qian yanghuo yijia ye bu rongyi. Zhiyao ta neng 
anshi wancheng gongzuo baozheng chuqin, wo jiu zheng yizhi yan bi 
yizhi yan. N一个男的. 这点钱养活一家也不容易. 只要他能按时完成
工作保证出勤, 我就睁一只眼闭一只眼.)67 
The table below is a summary of the personal information of the EY town family 
planning officials. From this table, it can be concluded that the females, temporary 
staff and young staff aged 25-40 make up the majority. The demographics of the EY 
                                                
67 Interview with EY town family planning office head. GEY26102009. 
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town staff are actually quite typical for town level family planning offices, perhaps 
unsurprisingly. Because it is a job related to birth control, and involves face-to-face 
family visits where one has to persuade couples to undergo an operation, it is 
generally more suited to females. In addition, after 30 years of the family planning 
campaign, most of the early stage officials are either retired, have been promoted or 
have changed jobs. Most towns recruited young officials during the 1990s and 2000s. 
Furthermore, as there are generally only 2-3 formal positions in each town family 
planning office, and the office head and the most senior staff member normally take 
the most formal positions, the more recently recruited officials are mostly town-paid 
staff.  
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Table 7. 5 Personal Information of EY Town Family Planning Officials 
Name F/M Age Year 
Joined 
Town 
paid / 
county 
paid 
Education68 Family 
Married
/single 
Children 
C  F 35 2007 C U M Nursery 
L M 52 1986 C J M -Married 
-University 
N M 27 2004 T S M Nursery 
Ning F 49 2004 T S M Secondary 
School 
D F 40 1993 T S M University 
M F 20 2009 T S S  
H F 25 2004 T U M Baby 
 
It follows that the financial situation of the majority of the town-paid staff could 
explain the team’s overall motivation and incentive to fulfil their duties. Generally, 
                                                
68 U-university; J-junior secondary school; S-senior secondary school. 
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the better-paid officials would be more motivated to carry on with the work, and to 
take the initiative in their work. At EY’s family planning office, the direct 
consequence of this job, which is neither secure nor well paid, and gets little respect 
because of its conflict with Chinese reproductive culture, is that people doing it have 
no interest in or motivation towards implementation. Most implementation is only 
carried out as a result of enforcement from above i.e. hard quotas and inspections. 
7.4.2 Running Costs 
Theoretically, the town family planning office should not only get its allocated 
family planning funding from the county government, and share part of the collected 
excess-birth fines, as well as some office funding from the town government, but 
should receive even more support on top of that from the town government. 
However, in practice, even the specialist family planning government allocation 
could not be guaranteed to be allocated to the actual family planning work.  
As discussed in chapter 5, the attitude of the town leaders is another important factor 
deciding the implementation result of the family planning. In those towns where the 
town leaders attach more importance to the family planning work, it not only gets 
better support from all of the working units, related departments and village 
committees, but is given priority in the budget allocations for family planning 
funding. For those towns with town leaders who give less attention to family 
planning, they were not given priority for family planning funding. In fact, 
sometimes, if the town government has a very tight budget, the family planning 
funding, being one of the guaranteed funds, is often used to cover other costs. 
At EY town, the total of excess-birth fines collected was 270,000 RMB in 2008, of 
which about 220,000 RMB was reallocated to pay for the town family planning work. 
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However, due to the town government’s tight budget, 90,000 RMB was used by the 
town government for other purposes.69 The rest of the funds were used for the travel 
expenses, office overheads, wages, magazines, technical machines, publicity costs, 
etc.  
Table 7. 6 EY Town’s Family Planning Funding Expenditure (2009) 
Items Cost (RMB) 
Travel (car cost mainly) 10,000 
Office Funding 30,000-40,000 
Wages 50,000 
Magazines and Newspapers 10,000 
Town level’s share for the ultra-sound 
machine and breast scanner (the rest 
was paid for by the provincial level) 
10,000 
Publicity Cost 20,000 
Total 130,000-140,000 
 
                                                
69 Interview with town deputy head, GEY25122009. 
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Among these costs, the wages and the share of the technical machine are fixed costs. 
The magazines and newspapers are compulsory expenses, including the People’s 
Daily, Population and Family Planning Magazine (renkou he jihuashengyu 人口和计
划生育), Population Digest (renkou wenzhai 人口文摘), and the Party’s newspapers 
and magazines (dangbao dangkan 党报党刊), as well as some others required by the 
upper level governments. As for the publicity costs, even with upper level 
government support, the town level still needs to print out leaflets or pay for some 
small gifts with printed information on them. With the requirement of a 100% 
distribution rate of publicity materials to individual households which contain 
women of fertility age for each village, the 20,000 RMB funding is very limited for a 
town with a population of 25,000. The office fund covers the cost of stationery, 
office appliances, phone calls, business trips and entertaining costs (zhaodai fei 招待
费) , as well as repairing costs for office appliances. 
After all these necessary costs, the family planning office is left with very limited 
funds to carry out their actual family planning work. They have a very tight budget 
as it is for spending on office appliances. EY town family planning office takes up 
four bungalow rooms in the town government yard: one room is for pregnancy 
checks and insertion of IUDs etc.; one is for medicine storage; another big one serves 
as the general office; a smaller room inside the general office has one computer and a 
single bed for the evening duty staff. There is no photocopy machine, no scanner, nor 
wireless Internet. In order to reduce printing and photocopying costs, they handwrite 
most paperwork. As with most other grassroots level organizations, they don't have a 
cleaner to clean the office. They are not only responsible for cleaning their office 
every Friday, but also the inside and outside areas in front of their office. During the 
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winter, the temperature outside ranges between 0ºC  and -15ºC, but even inside the 
office, with a thick door curtain hanging up to stop the wind and cold air blowing in, 
the temperature is only 5ºC. Everybody wears very thick winter clothes inside the 
office. They don't have the budget for an electrical heater (or an air conditioner for 
the humid summers). Concerning transport, excluding L, all other officials take the 
free shuttle bus provided by the town government for communication. The office 
only has one very basic mini van which is mainly used when an official attends 
county family planning bureau meetings, attends a short training course, or visits the 
villages. Without good public transport or convenient travel tools, they are often put 
in an awkward situation when the task is urgent. Some of the farthest villages are 
impossible to reach by foot, so sometimes they have to borrow a colleague’s bicycle 
or car during very bad weather in order to finish their work – either information 
distribution or village-visiting -- in time. 
In recent years, more and more new tasks, such as pregnancy care, new-born care, 
forest ownership reform (linquan gaige 林权改革 ), birth defect prevention 
(chusheng quexian ganyu 出生缺陷干预), and family planning awards, are assigned 
to the town officials. With limited funding and overloaded with tasks, they find it 
impossible to finish every task completely. Therefore, they exercise discretion when 
implementation the family planning regulations. 
7.5 Conclusion 
At EY town and many other towns, the excess-birth fines have been a major source 
of family planning funding. It is also the main source of the majority of the town 
family planning officials’ wages. These funding situations not only influenced the 
town family planning officials’ behaviour in the form of being directly funneled into 
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their salary, but also forced officials to act with autonomy in the implementation 
process. 
Without a proper legal procedure, the fine-collecting was the most tough and 
complex family planning task to carry out. On the one hand, the officials needed to 
collect the fine to maintain the office’s running costs and get paid, and fulfill their 
duties. On the other hand, they not only faced lots of local resistance to the fine-
collecting, but were also limited by practical restrictions on the collecting. Since the 
2000s, there has been a gradual change of reproductive culture and increasing cost 
for the raising of children as well as the effective enforcement in general of the 
family planning regulations. As a result, more and more families have been 
complying with the family planning regulations. For the town family planning 
officials, it means that the total capacity for collecting fines has been decreasing year 
by year. In order to pace themselves and keep to each annual quota, the town 
officials have restricted the fine-collecting. For example, during 2005-2009, the 
quota for the fines collected at EY town was 180,000RMB per year. The town 
officials would only collected about 200,000RMB to fulfill this task. They said: ‘[We 
can’t] collect too much; otherwise it will be difficult to fulfill next year’s task. 
([women buneng] duoshou, fouze xiayinian gongzuo nanzuo. [我们]不能多收，否则
下一年工作难做.)’70  
 
 
                                                
70 Interview Kouer27122009. 
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Chapter 8 Grassroots Level Family Planning Officials 
Discretion over Family Planning Implementation 
8.1 Introduction 
In the practical enforcement of the family planning regulations, the local officials 
have been allocated many tasks by upper level governments. When facing the piles 
and piles of tasks with insufficient funds and limited labour force, the local officials 
have felt the need to apply their own discretion over the implementation.  
The local family planning officials’ work normally includes: publicizing the family 
planning regulations; investigating the statistics of local population change, 
particularly the excess quota births and the migration data; cooperating with other 
units, such as the police and hospitals; training the village family planning officials; 
carrying out administrative office work, such as checking the documents related to 
the one-child certificates, birth permissions or extra-birth quotas; providing 
contraceptive technical support, such as distributing oral contraception and 
contraceptive tools, providing ultrasound checks and contraceptive operations 
(usually insertion or removal of IUDs,1 or abortion); controlling the local population 
growth rate according to the upper level government’s quota, with particular focus on 
reducing the number of excess-births by means of violation fines, and persuading 
couples to use long-term contraception. After 2000, the new tasks of ‘forest tenure 
                                                
1 An IUD is a long-acting reversible contraceptive method applied to women. It is one of the most 
common contraceptive methods in China because of its lower technical requirements (compared to 
other surgical methods) and low cost. 
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reform’ (linquan gaige 林权改革),2 birth defect prevention (chusheng quexian fanyu 
出生缺陷干预) and family planning rewards (jihuashengyu jingli fuzhu 计划生育奖
励辅助) were added to the above list. In addition to these, the local officials also 
need to go on training courses organized by upper level family planning 
organizations to learn about the updated government policies, population studies, and 
undergo technical and ICT training. There is naturally a lot of office work officials 
must carry out, but the most important is the paperwork that ‘fulfills’ their tasks and 
which ‘reports’ their achievements to the upper level family planning organizations.  
The local officials usually have to decide on priorities and determine which tasks are 
the ‘hard’ ones. For all the local officials, population growth control is the hardest 
target to meet. As discussed in chapter 5, according to the upper level government’s 
assessment of the population growth rate, the town gets its local quota, and then this 
quota is distributed to the individual villages according to the population size. In 
order to fulfill the hard target of the regulated population growth rate, the local 
officials have to work very hard on excess-birth control and long-term contraception, 
which are the hard objective measures of their job assessment. In practice, 
particularly since the 1990s, the main methods of controlling the number of excess-
births are persuading those families who have reached their maximum birth 
allowance to use long-term contraception, and fining those families who have had an 
excess-birth. In addition to the efforts made to achieve this hard target, the town 
officials also spend a lot of time on the paperwork reporting the statistical data and 
                                                
2 ‘Forest tenure reform’ policy was another provincial policy implemented in 2008. According to this 
policy, families with a one-child certificate, or families with a daughter and had a sterilization 
operation, were entitled to an extra portion of land. See, S Pronvice Family Planning Commission and 
S Pronvice Forestry Bureau, "The Proposed Reward Policy to the Qualified Birth-Planning Families 
for the Forest Tenure Reform (Guanyu Zai Jiti Linquan Zhidu Gaige Zhong Dui Jihuashengyu Jiating 
Geiyu Youhui De Banfa (Shixing) 关于在集体林权改革中对计划生育家庭给予优惠的办法(试行
))," (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
242 
their work achievements. Also important is any work directly connected to the upper 
level organizations, such as those related to training courses or conferences. 
The town officials spend lots of time on these top-priority tasks, and there is very 
limited time left over for all of the other tasks. Therefore, it is quite often the case 
that the town family planning officials only get to carry out work which is unpopular 
with the locals. 
The contraception and fine-collecting targets are the hardest targets for the local 
family planning officials to meet. By taking EY town as a case study, this chapter 
will explain in detail the levels of discretion the local officials exercise when dealing 
with these two tasks.  
8.2 Local Officials’ Discretion on Excess-Birth Fines 
In S province, the economic and political penalties for the families violating the 
family planning regulations were regulated in 1979 in provincial regulations. These 
penalties were confirmed in subsequent central and regional regulations. But the 
practical enforcement of these penalties did not start until the beginning of the 1980s 
in S province, and specifically 1983 in QX County. These penalties included both an 
economic penalty for an out-of-quota pregnancy, an out-of-quota birth, and even an 
eligible birth but without official permission, for example, an unmarried birth, or a 
family qualified for a second birth but who broke the gap year regulation. In addition 
to the economic penalties of reduced salary or work points, and fine charges, the 
families who violated the family planning regulations were also deprived of many 
benefits, such as housing, promotions, job awards, employment, maternity leave and 
related medical benefits, or were even demoted from their position or fired from their 
job completely. Out-of-quota children were deprived of many benefits as well, such 
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as nursery care, land, or even entitlement to hukou registration. Without hukou 
registration, these children became ‘black’ persons3 and could not even get education 
in school. The family planning officials’ responsibilities mainly concerned the 
economic penalties. Out of all these fine charges, the excess-birth fine makes up the 
largest portion and serves to offset family planning policy implementation costs. In S 
province, the excess-birth fine for a third non-quota birth was regulated from 1st 
October 1979,4 and a second non-quota birth from 1st December 1982.5  
For urban residents on the state payroll, the fines have always been collected by the 
work unit by deducting them from their salaries directly. For urban residents not on 
the state payroll, it has normally been the street level family planning office which 
collects the fine. As for the rural residents, it used to be the village, but is now the 
town family planning office which is responsible for collecting the fines.  
                                                
3 The black person was translated directly from hei hu (黑户), which means the person without hukou 
registration. It was also translated as missing person by foreigners. According to the six national 
census in 2010, there are more than 130million missing persons in China and most of which are 
excess-birth person. See, Shihua Cheng et al., "A Survey About the Chinese 'Black' Persons' Living 
Condtions (Zhongguo Heihu Qunti Shengcun Zhuangtai Diaocha 中国“黑户”群体生存状态调查)," 
http://www.banyuetan.org/chcontent/jrt/201465/103136.html (17th Dec 2014). 
Some researches about the missing children have carried out by western scholars. See, Daniel M. 
Goodkind, "China's Missing Children: The 2000 Census Underreporting Surprise," Population 
Studies: A Journal of Demography 58, no. 3 (2006). Yong Cai and Lavely William, "China’s Missing 
Girls: Numerical Estimates and Effects on Population Growth," The China Review 3, no. 2 (2003). 
These ‘black’ person also caused another issue is the statistic accuracy, which is mainly caused by the 
local officials enforcement of the birth quotas. In China, this statistic inaccuracy has become an open 
issue for all the scholars and officials but most of them believe that these inaccurate officials data 
could still represent an overall trend of population development. See, interview with Guangzhou 
Wang, Oct 2009. See also, Kejian Tan, "Inaccurate Population and Family Planning Statistics: An 
Analysis of New Features and Counter Measures (Renkou Yu Jihuashengyu Tongji Shishi: Xin De 
Tezheng Yu Duice Fenxi 人口与计划生育统计失实：新的特征与对策分析)," Population and 
Economy (renkou yu jingji 人口与经济) 4 (1998). 
4 See, "S Province Proposed Regulations on Family Planning Work (S Sheng Jihuashengyu Gongzuo 
De Ruogan Guiding (Shixing) S省计划生育工作的若干规定(试行))." Section 4: The fine was 10% 
of wages for urban residents on the state pay roll or 10% of work points for rural residents, and was 
collected for 14 years after the child’s birth. 
5 "S Province People’s Government Family Planning Regulations (S Sheng Renminzhengfu Guanyu 
Jihuashengyu De Ruogan Guiding S省人民政府关于计划生育的若干规定) (Invalid)." Section 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
244 
In QX County, fine-collecting did not start in practice until 1983. At the beginning of 
the 1980s, due to the huge resistance to birth control by the local villagers, the family 
planning work was carried out with extreme difficulty in the rural areas. The village 
leaders, although expected to work with the town and village level government 
officials, did not actually support the family planning work, such that when the 
family planning working team went into the villages, they didn't get any support or 
even a road guide from the village leaders. The village leaders usually made excuses 
to avoid getting involved in the direct implementation of the family planning 
regulations and facing the villagers directly. Dogs were in fact released by the local 
villagers to frighten and drive away the family planning team members. This 
situation was not improved until 1983 when more political pressures were delivered 
from the upper level governments to the village leaders. From then on, the village 
leaders started to better support family planning work and fine-collecting could be 
carried out in practice in rural areas in QX County.  
8.2.1 Implementation of Excess-Birth Fine Under Different 
Authorities  
At the beginning stage of the fine collecting, the local family planning officials had a 
high level of discretion. It was first the village committee and town officials jointly, 
then the town officials alone, who were the main authorities on implementing the 
family planning regulations and collecting the excess-birth fines. 
8.2.1.1 1980: Implementation under the Village and Town as the Joint Authority 
At the beginning of the 1980s, most villages were still managed by the People’s 
Commune. During this time, the production brigades were entitled to decide all 
villagers’ work and their income, so each family’s income was clearly recorded. 
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Therefore, in a similar way as to how fines were collected from urban residents on 
the state payroll, the economic penalties for the excess-birth families were deducted 
by the production brigade directly.  
Later on, this direct deduction ceased due to the economic system changing in the 
rural areas. With political and economic reform and the change from People’s 
Communes to the Household Responsibility System, the village committee had less 
direct control over the villagers’ income. Under the new Responsibility system, the 
villagers were entitled to more autonomy over production and could decide how they 
exploited their land. In addition, the farmers were also allowed to undertake some 
others jobs, such as handicrafts service, or transport. As a result, the individual 
family started to have several different incomes and the villages could not keep track 
of all of the family’s income from all the sources. This non-recorded income caused 
difficulty for the collecting of fines as the amount of fines collected was based on the 
family’s annual income in the previous year. Therefore, the village committee and 
the town family planning officials jointly decided that the fines were to be based on 
the village’s average economic levels,6 and this approach was applied until the later 
1980s. For those villages with higher economic levels and where the village leaders 
paid more attention to the family planning work, the fine-collecting was 
comparatively easy.   
In QX County, fines collected from 1983 to 1986 were generally about one hundred 
to two hundred RMB per family.7 With an average local farmer’s annual income 
being 274RMB to 525RMB from 1983 to 1986, this fine was much less than the 
                                                
6 The standard of the village’s average income was mainly decided based on the village leader’s 
observation and self-estimation. For the villages with poor economic environment, the fine standard 
was only about 100RMB, and for those with better conditions, the fine was around 700-800RMB. 
7 Interview ChDNFVillage22122009. 
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provincial regulation dictated. Based on the 1982 provincial regulations for out-of-
quota second-births, the fine was set at 25% of a family’s total income (based on the 
previous year) for the first two years, then 15% of income for the following five 
years; for out-of-quota third-births, the fine was 30% of family’s total income for the 
first three years, then 10% of income for the remaining eleven years.8 Future 
regulations have gradually increased this amount.  
During 1986 and 1987, in response to large resistance from the villagers to the fine-
collecting and birth-control operations, some village committees reduced the fines 
privately in order to encourage the villagers to pay the fine on time. At this time, the 
collected fines were reallocated to the village, town and county. In some villages, 
they would cancel the village part of the fine. With a ratio of 6:3:1 between the 
village, town and county, this would lead to excess-birth families paying only 40% of 
the required fines in practice.9  In some villages, this fine reduction was continued 
even after 1987.  This was the time when the town alone became the fine-collecting 
authority, so the village could no longer directly reduce the fines, but would instead 
refund part of or the whole of the village’s share of the (reallocated) fine, which 
would be 50% of the total fines. This type of fine reimbursement continued until the 
end of the 1980s.  
8.2.1.2 From the 1990s: Implementation with the Town as the More 
Independent Authority  
From 1989, following the publication and implementation of the first S Province 
Family Planning Regulations, the excess-birth fines began to be shared between the 
                                                
8 "S Province People’s Government Family Planning Regulations (S Sheng Renminzhengfu Guanyu 
Jihuashengyu De Ruogan Guiding S省人民政府关于计划生育的若干规定) (Invalid)." Article 10. 
9 Group Interview DY20082009, DY27122009. 
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county and town only, with the village no longer involved with the reallocation of 
collected fines.10  Following this change, the discretion applied to the amount of the 
fine was in practice transferred from the village to the town level. Hence, the town 
became the main authority over the collecting and managing of fines.  
8.2.2 Use of Discretion by Local Officials Over the Collection of 
Excess-Birth Fines 
8.2.2.1 1980s – 1990s Local Officials’ High Use of Discretion  
Before 2000, the town family planning officials used high levels of discretion when 
applying the standards of the excess-birth fines, which included their fine-collecting 
methods. 
During the initial stages of fine-collecting, the local officials used to collect the fines 
not only in cash, but also in household belongings if the villagers didn’t pay the fine 
on time, such as bicycles, TVs, furniture, watches, radios, cookware, and even cows 
and sheep.11 In some town and county family planning offices, these collected items 
occupied a separate room in the office, with one of the officials having to look after 
the animals. If the villagers paid the fines in full, they could take back their 
belongings. Otherwise, after a certain deadline, their items would be sold and the 
money raised would be paid towards their fines.  
                                                
10 This change in the share of the reallocated fines designated to the county, town and village was later 
confirmed by central government regulations on excess-birth fines and the subsequent provincial 
regulations: the fine was to be mainly used to support the town level family planning work while the 
county would take 20%. See, State Family Planning Commission, "The Management Method of the 
out of Quota Birth (Jihuawai Shengyu Fei Guanli Banfa 计划外生育费管理办法)," (1992). Article 
14 &15. S Province Family Planning Commission, S Province Finance Bureau, and S Province 
Bureau of Commodity Price, "S Province Implementation Suggestion About the Management Method 
of out of Quota Birth Fee from Three Departments from the Central Government (Guanche Guojia 
Sange Buweiju Jihuawai Shengyufei Guanli Banfa 贯彻国家三个部委局‘计划外生育费管理办法’
的实施意见)." 
11 See interview DuCC12112009. 
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During this period, assisted by local police officers and village committees, the local 
family planning officials often behaved quite fiercely when implementing the family 
planning regulations: they often entered the villagers’ houses by force or by 
knocking on the door at midnight; they would take the villagers’ belongings like a 
robber; they would force above-quota pregnant women to have an abortion or 
undergo sterilization in a violent manner, threatening the other family members if the 
couple refused to do so; they would even carry out some extremely inhumane actions, 
such as performing an abortion on a fetus more than 28 weeks old, or jailing the 
family members illegally. At that time, the relationship between the family planning 
officials and the local villagers was like how the police treat criminals.  
Before the 2000s, the town family planning officials’ behaviour was less regulated 
than it has been since the 2000s. In addition to the excess-birth fines, the town family 
planning officials set up some new small fees services to get some extra funding 
although most of these services were supposed to be free of charge. For example, 
fees were charged for couples applying for the one-child certificate, or the in-quota 
birth permission, etc. 
In order to address aggressive implementation, especially the forced collection of 
villagers’ personal belongings and the arbitrary charges made by officials, the central 
government issued the ‘Seven Forbidden Actions Policy in the Family Planning 
Implementation’ in 199512. This policy forbade the following unlawful behaviour: 
jailing, assaulting, and insulting those who violate the family planning regulations 
and their family members; damaging or destroying these people’s properties, 
                                                
12 State Family Planning Commission, "The Notice of Insisting Seven Forbidden Actions in the 
Family Planning Implementation（Zai Jihuashengyu Xingzheng Zhifa Zhong Jianchi 'Qi Ge Buzhun' 
De Tongzhi 在计划生育行政执法中坚持‘七个不准’的通知）," (GuoJiShengZhengZi (No.138), 
1995).  
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belongings or agricultural products; illegally collecting these people’s properties in 
lieu of excess-birth fines; arbitrary fines or charges; penalties to these people’s 
family members, neighbours or others, or taking revenge against those who reported 
or exposed officials’ unlawful behaviours; restricting legal reproduction in order to 
fulfill family planning targets; pregnancy checks on unmarried women.  After these 
policies were issued, these illegal practices gradually diminished in most areas in 
China and completely disappeared in QX County by the end of the 1990s.13  
The town family planning officials also used more discretion at this time over 
applying the fine standards compared with later stages. First of all, although the 
authority over the excess-birth fines transferred from the town to the county in 1992 
in order to avoid abuse in the collecting and management of fines,14 the actual 
practice of this new management system differed from region to region depending on 
the local government leaders’ attitudes towards the family planning work. 
Furthermore, at the initial stages, this ‘collected by town and managed by county’ 
system was immature and still had many loopholes. Compared to the strictness of the 
system in the 2000s, the town officials in the 1990s had more freedom to decide the 
fine amount. Secondly, the provincial regulations at this time conferred relatively 
more authority on the town officials over the fine-collecting. Before 1999, the fine 
amount decided by the province was mainly based on the couple’s previous annual 
                                                
13 Although this policy has listed the most common and fierce behaviours in the implementation, this 
policy also clearly noted to be circulated only inside the family planning department. Therefore, for a 
long time, this policy has only been known by the family planning officials rather the general 
villagers. The purpose of this is to prevent large scale resistance from the villagers once they knew 
that the local officials’ behaviour was illegal, and obstruct the family planning campaign. Therefore, 
in practice, the process of stopping these fierce behaviours took quite a long time. Even now, it still 
often heard that local officials are taking the villager’s belongings to replace the excess-birth fines.  
14 S Province Family Planning Commission, S Province Finance Bureau, and S Province Bureau of 
Commodity Price, "S Province Implementation Suggestion About the Management Method of out of 
Quota Birth Fee from Three Departments from the Central Government (Guanche Guojia Sange 
Buweiju Jihuawai Shengyufei Guanli Banfa 贯彻国家三个部委局‘计划外生育费管理办法’的实施
意见)." 
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incomes. As discussed earlier, as rural areas changed from the commune system to 
the household-responsibility system at that time, individual families’ incomes 
became more varied, and it was difficult for the town family planning officials to 
obtain accurate data for an individual family’s total income. Therefore, the town 
officials had to rely on both the local average income and their observation of a 
family’s particular conditions. In addition, the regional gaps in the levels of fines 
between towns also increased during this time due to the implementation of the 
household-responsibility system. Therefore, even in the same county, the fine 
amount between towns varied from a couple of hundred RMB15 to three thousand 
RMB.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, in addition to the excess-birth fines, there were also fines for 
out-of-quota pregnancies. This pregnancy fine was regulated in the 1982 provincial 
regulation16 but cancelled in 1999.17 This fine was a one-off fine: 20% of family 
income for an out-of-quota second pregnancy and 30% for a third. However, in 
practice, the local officials at EY town never collected this pregnancy fine in order 
not to add to the resistance from the local villagers due to the excess-birth fines. 
8.2.2.2 2000s: Town Officials’ Relatively Restricted Use of Discretion 
From the end of the 1990s, the town official’s discretion over fines became restricted 
due to the increased regulations on fine-collecting and better management of the 
fines. From the end of the 1990s, the separation of the collecting and management of 
                                                
15 A county level family planning official provided this data based on that county. See, interview 
FengZY05122014.  
16 "S Province People’s Government Family Planning Regulations (S Sheng Renminzhengfu Guanyu 
Jihuashengyu De Ruogan Guiding S省人民政府关于计划生育的若干规定) (Invalid)." Article 10 
(1). 
17 The 1999 provincial family planning legislation did not regulate for the collection of pregnancy 
fines anymore. 
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excess-birth fines was widely applied. The system gradually became mature in most 
areas in S province, with the fine being better and more seriously managed. In 
addition, the 1999 provincial legislation also set up a minimum amount for the 
excess-birth fines, which further restricted the town officials’ discretion. Therefore, 
the gap in the fine amount between towns became smaller. Further, regulations 
issued from the central and provincial governments further restricted the town 
officials’ discretion over fine-collecting. For example, before the 2000s, the town 
officials could remove a villager’s household belongings if they refused to pay the 
fines on time. However, after the central government regulations outlining the ‘Seven 
Forbidden Action Policy’ in 1995, the removal of villagers’ personal belongings was 
gradually restricted. In QX County, local officials were prohibited from this 
particular use of discretion completely from the end of the 1990s. 
8.2.3 Town Family Planning Officials’ Discretion on Deciding the 
Excess-Birth Fine’s Amount 
In practice, the town family planning officials have been setting the fine amounts 
differently from how it is stated in the provincial regulations. The main reason for it 
is that the provincial standards, which set a fine amount of about 20% for seven years 
for an extra second-births and 40% for 14 years for a third, have been too high for 
the villagers in many areas. These unrealistic standards have caused great resistance 
from the local villagers and left the town level officials in a dilemma. The result is 
that in practice, these grassroots level officials set up different standards, which are 
more reasonable to the local situation. These grassroots level standards have never 
been written in any formal document or approved formally by any upper level 
government or even the town government who know all about this. When the town 
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family planning officials decide on the fine amount, they do not only rely on the 
official data of the local farmer’s average income,18 but use their own experience and 
observation of the local villagers’ general living standards and affordability. 
8.2.3.1 Reproductive Behaviour 
Since the 1990s, China’s fertility culture has changed slowly and been steadily 
influenced by the high economic pressure of the costs of raising children and the 
changing of the social environment, as well as the restrictive government policies on 
family size. The traditional multi-offspring reproductive culture of ‘more sons, more 
blessings’ has gradually been abandoned in China.19 The number of third above 
births has been gradually decreasing in most areas of China. Even in rural areas, 
people are generally not expecting a high number of children. In QX County, 
families with three or more children have become fewer and fewer since the 1990s: 
three above births were 3% of all new births in the 2000s and 1.5% in the 2010s.20 
This actual reproductive behaviour has been roughly consistent with people’s 
changing reproductive intentions, although it has been found that actual reproductive 
behaviour is slightly lower than reproductive intentions as a result of the current 
family planning policy.21 
                                                
18 Interview FZY28112014. Because the local peasant’s average income was determined by the 
county statistical department’s report, the town officials believed that this data was not wholly reliable 
as those figures themselves are also the result of some kind of adherence to upper level government 
targets. So, in addition to the official data stating the average income, they still heavily rely on 
personal observation of the local villagers’ economic conditions.  
19 Zhenzhen Zheng, "Reproductive Desire of Fertility Women in China (Zhongguo Yulin Funv De 
Shengyu Yiyuan Yanjiu 中国育龄妇女的生育意愿研究)," Population Science of China (zhongguo 
renkou kexue 中国人口科学) 5 (2004).  
20 Data obtained from the county level family planning bureau. This is the official data. The actual 
data might be slightly higher than this, but there still has been a sharp decrease from the 1990s in the 
number of families with more than three children as a consequence of the family planning campaign 
and high pressure of children’s bringing-up costs. 
21 Hao Luo and Zhuoyan Mao, "From Fertility Intention to Fertility Behaviour," Asian Population 
Studies 10:2 (2014). 
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As concluded from research from the 1980s until the present, reproductive intentions 
have changed in China in both rural and urban areas. In the 1980s, the general desire 
in most rural areas was to have two to three children although the exceptional case of 
a high desired number of more than three persisted in some particular regions, such 
as rural areas in Guangdong and Gansu provinces, where people had a very strong 
son preference and multi-offspring culture. In urban areas, the general desire was for 
one to two children. In the 1990s, the rural family’s reproductive desire reduced to 
two children, and even in rural Guangdong and Gansu it gradually became close to 2. 
The reproductive desire for about 50% of urban residents was one child, and for 
about 40% families it was two children.22 Recent research indicates that one child for 
urban families and two for rural families is still the main trend in the 2010s.23  
8.2.3.2 Town Family Planning Officials’ Discretion on Setting the Fine Amount 
In the 1990s, direct resistance from local villagers to the implementation of the 
family planning regulations was less strong than in previous years. The family 
planning officials experienced fewer physical and verbal attacks from the villagers 
                                                
22 Zheng, "Reproductive Desire of Fertility Women in China (Zhongguo Yulin Funv De Shengyu 
Yiyuan Yanjiu 中国育龄妇女的生育意愿研究)." pp73-76. Xiaotian Feng and Qingsong Zheng, 
"Study on the Transitioin of Reproductive Desire among Rural and Urban Residents in the Past 
Twenty Years (Ershi Nian Chengxiang Jumin Shengyu Yiyuan Bianqian Yanjiu 二十年城乡居民生育
意愿变迁研究)," Market and Demographic Analysis (shichang yu renkou fenxi 市场与人口分析) 8, 
no. 5 (2002). P.25. See also, Xiaochun Qiao, "Consideration on China's Reproductive Policy in the 
21st Century (Guanyu 21 Shiji Zhongguo Shengyu Zhengce Yanjiu De Sikao 关于 21世纪中国生育
政策研究的思考)," Population Research (renkou yanjiu 人口研究) 23, no. 2 (1999); Kejian Tan, 
"An Analysis of Chinese Rural Resident's Reproductive Desire Transition (Woguo Nongcun Jumin 
Shengyu Yiyuan Zhuanbian Fenxi 我国农村居民生育意愿转变分析)," Journal of Nanjing College 
for Population Programme Management (nanjing renkou guanli ganbu xueyuan xuebao 南京人口管
理干部学院学报 ) 20, no. 4 (2004). 
23 Yaer Zhuang et al., "Fertility Intention of Rural and Urban Residents in China: Results from the 
2013 National Reproductive Intention Survey (Dangqian Woguo Chengxiang Jumin De Shengyu 
Yiyuan: Jiyu 2013 Nian Quanguo Shengyu Yiyuan Diaocha 当前我国城乡居民的生育意愿：基于
2013年全国生育意愿调查)," Population Research （renkou yanjiu 人口研究） 38, no. 3 (2014). 
See also, Jiawei Hou, Silin Huang, and Ziqiang Xin, "A Change of Chinese Reproductive Desire 
(Zhongguo Renkou Shengyu Yiyuan Bianqian 中国人口生育意愿变迁 ): 1980-2011," Social Science 
in China (zhongguo shehui kexue 中国社会科学) 4 (2014). 
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and got more support from the village leaders. However, although the one-child 
family planning regulations had been implemented for nearly ten years, the son-
preference and multi-offspring culture was still very strong in most rural families. 
Out-of-quota second and third-births in rural areas were still common. Most families 
still wanted to have at least two children even if their first child was a boy, and the 
families who had two daughters were still hoping for a son. The families with more 
children were normally in a poorer financial situation. Therefore, the fine-collecting 
for the excess-births was still a very tough and challenging task.  
In practice, the town family planning officials normally set two different standards 
for the excess-birth fines. One was for couples who agreed to undergo a sterilization 
operation, which was normally ligation for women; the other was for couples who 
refused sterilization. As a result of reproductive intentions changing, third or more 
births became fewer in the 1990s. Therefore, most families agreed to have the 
sterilization operation after their second births. So, in practice, most excess-birth 
fines became of the reduced type given to couples who undergo sterilization after the 
second births. 
Sterilization-Replaced-Fine ( yi jie dai fa 以结代罚) 
Sterilization and the excess-birth fines have both been hard targets of the family 
planning evaluation24. For the town family planning officials, sterilization has been 
the best solution to stop any excess-birth in the future. Therefore, sterilization has 
been widely applied since it was implemented in the middle of the 1980s. According 
to provincial regulations, it was only couples who had more than two children who 
                                                
24 See Chapter 5, population and family planning responsibility commission. 
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needed to have sterilization,25 while families who had only one child just needed to 
have an IUD insertion. 
According to S provincial regulations, there was a general rule to allow rural families 
to have a second child if the first child was a girl.26 Thus, the potential excess-birth 
families were those whose first child was a boy but who wanted a second child, or 
those who had two girls but were still hoping for a boy. Normally, it was relatively 
easy for families who already had a boy to agree to stop further reproduction and 
submit to the sterilization operation, and also pay the reduced fines. The tough ones 
were the families who had two daughters but still wanted a son, and would normally 
refuse to undergo a sterilization operation until they had a boy.  
As a compromise, the local officials rarely enforced sterilization on couples who did 
not already have a son even if they had exceeded the birth quota.27 This was 
especially the case after the central government issued the ‘Seven Forbidden (qi 
buzhun 七不准) [Action] Policy’ in which coercion, which included detaining of 
family members and forced sterilization, were forbidden. In practice, the criterion for 
whether the town family planning officials would enforce sterilization was whether 
or not the family had a boy. 
Therefore, in order to encourage couples to undertake sterilization voluntarily, many 
informal local policies were set up. At EY town, when sterilization was applied in 
1983, the local government introduced a local policy that promised ‘the fines for any 
excess-birth would be discharged completely if the couple undertake sterilization’ in 
                                                
25 See "S Province Family Planning Legislation (S Sheng Jihuashengyu Tiaoli S省计划生育条例) 
(Invalid)." Article 14. 
26 See Chapter 3 for details of the regulations about the allowance for second or third children. 
27 Interview YangXY05122014. 
 
 
 
 
 
256 
order to encourage couples to submit to the long-term contraception operation.28 This 
‘sterilization-in-lieu-of-fine’ ( yi jie dai fa 以结代罚) policy was very popular in S 
province in 1985 and 1986 particularly after it was confirmed by a provincial 
regulation in 1985.29 But because of a shortage of family planning funding, the 
‘sterilization-in-lieu-of-fine’ policy was cancelled in 1987 and replaced with a ‘no 
reduction or annulment of the excess-birth fines for any reason’.30 
Although the sterilization-in-lieu-of-fine policy was cancelled, a reduced fine for 
those families taking sterilization was soon invented by the local officials and 
applied widely in S province. In 1987, the provincial regulations which cancelled the 
‘sterilization-in-lieu-of-fine’ policy restored the previous choice of payment method: 
full payment or payment by instalments. 31  Therefore, the instalments payment 
method became a loophole through which the town officials could implement 
reduced fines. For example, in EY town in 2000, a family who should have paid a 
minimum of 5,000RMB for an extra second-births would only pay around 2,000-
2,500RMB. On the official work fulfilment report, this payment would be noted 
down as an instalment payment, which indicated that there should be further 
payments in the following years. But actually, this would often be the only payment 
they would ask for from the family. 
                                                
28 See Interview LEY20082009. 
29 See S Pronvice Family Planning Commission, "A Supplementary Notice About the Clean-up and 
Rectification of the Excess-Birth Fines Work (Guanyu Dui Qingli Zhengdun Chaosheng Zinvfei 
Gongzuo De Buchong Tongzhi 关于对清理整顿超生子女费工作的补充通知)," (1985). 
30 S Province Family Planning Commission, "An Notice for Implementing the Economic Penalties 
Regulations on Excess-Births Rigorously (Guanyu Yange Zhixing Chao Jihua Shengyu Jingji Xianzhi 
Zhengce De Tongzhi 关于严格执行超计划生育经济限制政策的通知)," (1987). 
31 The excess-birth fines were taken by both full payments and instalment payments in S province 
since it was implemented in 1979. However, the instalment payment method was cancelled from 1985 
to 1987. According to the 1985 provincial regulations, the fines must be calculated in full and paid in 
full, and only the families with exceptional circumstances can apply for the delayed or instalment 
payments. See, S Pronvice Family Planning Commission, "A Supplementary Notice About the Clean-
up and Rectification of the Excess-Birth Fines Work (Guanyu Dui Qingli Zhengdun Chaosheng 
Zinvfei Gongzuo De Buchong Tongzhi 关于对清理整顿超生子女费工作的补充通知)." 
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Neither the government nor the regulations had approved these reduced fines 
formally although they were well known to all local officials and villagers. During 
the fieldwork period, I attended many fine-collections with the local town officials. 
The collection process has never been easy or straightforward, except for those with 
very good financial circumstances. As the officials described it:  
‘We don't have any authority to collect the fines if they refuse to pay for 
it. Before, we could take their household belongings to force them to pay 
the fines. But now, after the Seven Forbidden Actions policy, we can’t do 
anything if they say they don't have any money to pay it. We can only 
visit and persuade them again and again.’ (Xianzai yaoshi renjia bujiao 
fakuan, women meiyou renhe quanli. Yiqian, women hai neng tongguo 
ban dongxi shenme de qiangpo tamen jiao qian. Xianzai youle zhege 
qibuzhun zhengce, renjia yaoshi shuo meiqian, women yidian banfa ye 
meiyou, zhineng yibianbian zuogongzuo. 现在要是人家不交罚款，我
们没有任何权力。以前，我们还能通过搬东西什么的强迫他们交钱. 
现在有了七不准政策后，人家要是说没钱，我们一点办法也没有，
只能一遍遍做工作. )32  
The town officials concluded that even these reduced fines were difficult to collect, 
so it was deemed impossible to collect the full amount. As a result, fine reductions 
were inevitable in practice.33 
Practical Fine Standards: A Case Study of EY Town 
Here, EY town was taken as a sample to examine the local official’s use of discretion 
to set the fine amount in detail. According to 1989 provincial legislation for the 
excess-birth fines, the fine amounts were set at 20% of the couple’s total income for 
seven years for an extra second-births and 40% for 14 years for a third.34 The new 
                                                
32 Group Interview EY10112009.  
33 Shusen Liu and Shukui Zhang, The Study of Population Management in Town and Townships 
(Xiangzhen Renkou Guanli Yanjiu 乡镇人口管理研究) (Jilin: Yanbian University Press (YanBian 
Daxue chubanshe 延边大学出版社), 1991). P.317. 
34 "S Province Family Planning Legislation (S Sheng Jihuashengyu Tiaoli S 省计划生育条例) 
(Invalid)."  (1989). Article 28, Article 29.  
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provincial legislation in 1999 confirmed these standards and strengthened them with 
minimum charges: 5,000RMB for an extra second-births and 20,000RMB for a 
third.35 These standards remained until 2008, when 1999 provincial family planning 
legislation were revised for a second time. In 2008’s revised legislation, the 
minimum standards for the second and third excess-births were increased to 
7,000RMB and 30,000RMB respectively.36 
In 1992, based on the local average family income37 of 1,636RMB,38 the provincial-
prescribed fines were around 2,270RMB for an extra -birth and 9,083RMB for a 
third. Unsurprisingly, the fines set by EY town family planning officials in practice 
were not the same. The fines set by them were 1,500-2,000RMB for an extra second-
births and 3,000RMB for a third.39 As shown in the flow chart below, these practical 
standards have remained lower than the provincial standards even after the province 
introduced minimum levels. After the 1999 regulations the provincial regulated fines 
were 5,000RMB for an extra second-births and 20,000RMB for a third.40 But in 
practice, fines in EY town were set at 2000-2500RMB for an extra second-births and 
3000-3500RMB for a third. Even for those who did not have sterilization, the fines in 
practice were also lower than those set by the provincial standards, which were 3000-
3500RMB41 and 7000-8000RMB for an extra second and third-births. In 2008, under 
the newly revised provincial family planning legislation, the minimum fines rose to 
                                                
35 S Province People's Congress, "S Province Family Planning Regulation," (1999). Article 49. 
36 Ibid. Revised in 2008. Article 53. 
37 It is based on the couple’s income, so it is two times of the local villager’s average income. 
38 The data of the local farmer’s average income was obtained from the QX County Statistic Bureau.  
39 See interview DingEY24122009 on fine-setting in practice. As explained earlier, because most 
couples who had two births did take the sterilization and portion of families who were still expecting a 
boy but refused to have sterilization was small, when the local officials talk generally about fine-
setting, they are usually referring to couples who have had the sterilization. 
40 S Province People's Congress, "S Province Family Planning Regulation." Article 49. 
41 Few families with very good economic conditions paid 4,000RMB.  
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7,000RMB for an extra second-births and 30,000RMB for a third.42 However, this 
revised provincial regulation did not have much influence on the fines set in practice, 
which remained at a similar level to fines set in the 1990s’. 
 
 
Figure 8. 1 Fine-Setting Standards for an Extra Second-Births 
                                                
42 S Province People's Congress, "S Province Family Planning Regulation." Revised in 2008. Article 
53. 
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Figure 8. 2 Fine-Setting Standards for an Extra Third-Births 
The line charts above compared the excess-birth fines of those set by the provincial 
standards and its minimum requirements, and the practical standards applied by the 
town officials in reality. The comparison is drawn from the 1990s to the present, for 
both out-the-quota second and third-births. From these two charts, some conclusions 
can be drawn. Firstly, the fine set by the local officials in practice has remained 
lower than that set by the provincial level in EY towns at most times and the gap 
between the provincial requirements and practical reality has become bigger and 
bigger. These low practical standards have happened not only in EY town but also in 
many other regions in China.43 The story that famous Chinese filmmaker, Zhang 
Yimou, was charged 7.5mRMB (£700,000) for excess-birth fines is no more than 
                                                
43 In some regions, although the fines set in practice are higher than the provincial minimum levels, 
they are still much lower than the general standards would expect based on the people’s family 
income. For example, in some towns of JZ city, a region with better economic levels, the fine levels in 
reality are 10,000RMB for an excess second-birth for non-sterilized couples. But this level is still 
much lower than the provincial standard of 20% of family’s income for seven years. See, interview 
YXB04122014. 
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eyeball attracting news.44 It is not representative of excess-birth fine standards in 
practice in China. From the end of the 1980s, the fine amount set out in the 
provincial legislation has risen and people’s average income has also increased 
rapidly, but the fine amount set by the local officials has remained at a similar level, 
particularly for sterilized couples. Secondly, comparing the out-of-quota second and 
third-births fines, the latter has a bigger gap between the fines set by the provincial 
standards and fines set in practice. This has been mainly caused by the unrealistic 
fine standards set by the provincial government. With the expensive child-raising 
costs in China, families with more children normally have a worse financial situation 
compared with families with fewer children. As the provincial general standards for 
the third excess-birth is 40% of the couple’s income for 14 years, which is four times 
that of the out-of-quota second sbirth charge of 20% for seven years, it is especially 
impracticable to set the out-of-quota third-births fine at this high level, which is far 
beyond the villager’s ability to pay. In facing these unrealistic general standards, the 
town officials view the minimum fine levels as a more realistic goal.  
Causes of the Low Fine-Setting in Practice 
Overall, the setting of lower fines is caused by: the provincial standards being 
unrealistic, calling for fines which are unaffordable; the local villagers’ resistance; 
and the inefficient implementation methods available to the town family planning 
officials. In the 1980s, some regions did implement fine collections based on the 
individual villager’s family income by way of observation and investigation through 
neighbours. However, this individually-based fine standard was soon stopped 
because of villagers disputing the fairness of this standard. So, later on, an average-
                                                
44 BBC, "Filmmaker Zhang Yimou Pays One-Child Policy Fine," http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-china-26081229 (10th December 2014). 
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based standard replaced the individual-based standard. In addition, a lack of valid 
implementation methods for the town officials to collect the fines from villagers is 
also an important factor contributing to the low levels of fine-setting. Unlike the 
urban residents on the state payroll, most villagers are either self-employed or 
employed by private enterprises, in addition to their normal land work. The town 
officials have no authority to get access to their income data or request those private 
enterprises to deduct the fines from their pay directly. Although the provincial 
legislation gave the local family planning officials the authority to apply for ‘legal 
enforcement’ for those who refused to pay the fines in full or on time,45 in reality, 
without a mature bank system and cooperation between bank and revenue offices, 
there have always been many challenges to effective legal enforcement. In addition, 
for most Chinese people, being ‘sued in court’ is a serious issue, and they would feel 
ashamed of being a defendant. Therefore, the town officials believed that this legal 
process would destroy the relationship between the officials and the people and that 
legal enforcement would be counterproductive and in the long run would be unlikely 
to bring in more fines or even make easier the work of family planning 
implementation. 
8.2.3.3 Work Satisfaction of Fine-Collecting 
In facing these high-level fine standards set by the province, the town level is placed 
in an awkward situation. From the point of view of the town family planning officials, 
the many standards or tasks set by the upper levels are too theoretical or ideal, just 
thought up in an ‘office’, and not based on practice. During my fieldwork, the local 
officials would always emphasize that ‘the upper level officials should spend more 
                                                
45 This ‘legal enforcement’ procedure was first regulated in the 1989 provincial family planning 
legislation (article 36), and it has remained in successful legislation.  
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time at the grassroots level’ (naxie shangji lingdao yinggai duo xialai kankan 那些上
级领导应该多下来看看). The fine amounts set by the upper levels are far beyond 
what local villagers can afford and so are impossible to fulfill under any method. But 
they still have to ‘fulfill’ them under pressure from the town leaders and the tough 
evaluation system. 
Regarding the fulfillment of the fine-collecting tasks required by the county or upper 
level governments, one of the town family planning officials expressed her helpless 
feeling:  
‘the standards set by the upper level governments are not practical at all. 
Most local villagers can’t afford such a high amount. What can we do 
when they just can’t afford it?’ (naxie shangmian ding de biaozhun 
genben jiu bu shiji. Dabufen ren dou jiaobuqi. Renjia jiushi jiabuqi 
women neng zenme ban? 那些上面定的标准根本就不实际.大部分人
都交不起.人家就交不起我们能怎么办?)46  
As a result, the only solution found by the local officials is to provide a false work 
report. ‘Regarding those upper level government fine-collecting tasks, it is just a 
numbers game.’47 (zhiyu naxie shangmian yaoqiu de shoufei renwu, na jiushi wan 
shuzi youxi le. 至于那些上面要求的收费任务，那就是玩数字游戏了.) After a 
couple of month’s office work, this numbers game became better understood by the 
author. Actually, it is similar to what the villages had done in the 1980s. The town 
family planning office has two sets of accounts for all the fines collected: one records 
the actual fines collected, while the other one is the formal record used to report their 
work to the upper level government. The actual account was only known by the 
                                                
46 Group Interview EY10112009. 
47 Interview LEY04112009. 
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family planning officials and sometimes the professional family planning deputy 
town head. The other town leaders might not be aware of the exact situation 
regarding the fines collected but, based on their experience and understanding of the 
local environment, it was likely that they knew there was some false data in the 
formal reports. The specific bits of data that were falsified always varied: sometimes, 
the total fine collecting amount was correct (it met the target) but the town officials 
still had to figure out the individual family fines; sometimes, the actual fines 
collected were insufficient (to meet the target), in which case the town officials 
would have to make up the total amount and borrow the money from other sources to 
make up the difference. Because 80% of the fines would be reallocated to the town in 
the following year, it meant that the town office would get less net funding in 
practice in the following year if they did this.  
In addition, the town officials also abused the provincial regulations’ instalment 
payment method to fulfill their tasks. According to the provincial regulations, excess-
birth fines can be paid in instalment in two years for the out-of-quota second-births 
and in three years for the third birth.48 Therefore, the town officials took advantage 
of this loophole and reported insufficient fines as merely part of an instalment 
payment.  
                                                
48 See, S Province Finance Bureau and S Province Population and Family Planning Commission, "The 
Notice of Printing and Distribution of the Regulation of Using and Managing S Province Family 
Planning Public Funding（Guanyu Yinfa S Sheng Shengji Jihuashengyu Shiye Zhuanxiang Jingfei 
Shiyong Guanli Banfa De Tongzhi 关于印发《S 省省级计划生育事业专项经费使用管理办法》的
通知 )," (JinCaiJiao (No.28), 2003). Article 8.  
This instalment payment method was allowed in the earliest regulations of the excess-birth fines in 
1979: the excess-birth fine was calculated as a one-off fine but payable in seven years or fourteen 
years. However, this method was cancelled in 1985 and 1986, and then restored in 1987. The 1987 
regulations sharply reduced the period of the instalment payment: three years for an excess second-
birth fines and five years for a third. See, S Province Family Planning Commission, S Province 
Finance Bureau, and Agricultural Bank of China S Branch, "S Provincial Regulations on the 
Management of Excess-Birth Fines (S Sheng Chaosheng Zinvfei Guanli Banfa S省超生子女费管理
办法)." Section 2. 
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To summarize the conflict the town family planning officials face, on the one hand 
they face insufficient funding, limited manpower, and restricted time to do the actual 
implementation of the family planning regulations; on the other hand, they have to 
spend lots of time doing the paper work, especially the reporting of ‘official’ data to 
the highly-demanding upper level governments. As some town officials complained:  
‘we spend too much time completing our tasks on paper and providing 
this false data. It would be easier for us if we could just concentrate on 
work rather than worrying about these useless ‘tasks’.’ (Women huale 
taiduo shijian wancheng zhexie ‘zhishang’ de renwu he xiang banfa zuo 
jiazhang le. Yaoshi women buyong danxin zhexie meiyou de renwu zhishi 
zhuanxin gongzuo de hua bi zhe yao rongyi de duo. 我们花了太多时间
完成这些纸上的任务和想办法做假账了.要是我们不用担心这些没用
的任务只是专心工作的话比这要容易的多.)49 
8.2.4 The Future of Fine Standards 
The local family planning official’s wide use of discretion over setting the excess-
birth fine is well known at all levels of government. After the release of China’s 
family planning policy in late 2013, the central government also planned to revise 
how the fines are set (the fine standards). The National Health and Family Planning 
Commission had revised the regulation on these fines (social maintenance fees), and 
the draft was sent to the State Council for final approval and promulgation in late 
November 2014. According to China Daily’s report, ‘the draft sets a ceiling on fines 
and social maintenance for couples violating the rules, suggesting penalties should be 
less than three times the local average annual disposable personal income, to unify 
standards in different provinces.’ The new draft is aimed at setting up more 
                                                
49 Interview CEY03112009. 
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reasonable standards, balancing the regional gaps and restricting local officials’ 
discretion to set their own local fine standards.50  
8.3 Local Officials’ Discretion over Birth-Control Operations 
In addition to excess-birth fining, increasing long-term contraception is also an 
important and practical method for the town family planning officials to stop any 
future excess-births. However, the contraceptive method is even harder to implement 
than fine-collecting. During the 1980s and early 1990s, some exceptional cases 
happened in some places, where pregnant women were taken by force by the 
officials and forcibly given an abortion or sterilization operation. However, since the 
issue of the Seven Forbidden Actions policy, this kind of enforcement has gradually 
been abandoned in most areas. In addition, villagers have become more legally aware, 
and would thus feel more emboldened to resist this kind of fierce enforcement. All of 
these changes left the town officials with very limited choices on implement the birth 
control. Therefore, as discussed in the previous part, the annulment or sharp 
reduction of the excess-birth fine was used as a reward for undergoing a 
contraception operation. In EY town, and many other regions, the general principle is 
that fines should be reduced for couples who take up contraception, which is 
normally an IUD insertion for families with one child, and sterilization for families 
with two children, particularly if one of those children is a boy. However, if the 
couple pays the full amount of the fine, they would usually be exempt from the 
sterilization request. 
As with the fine collections, the contraception standards were also largely abused. 
For the town officials, the most reliable method for checking a person’s sterilization 
                                                
50  Juan Shan, "Family Size Violation Fees to Stay," http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-
12/03/content_19014470.htm (11th Dec 2014). 
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status is proof by means of a hospital letter. However, in some areas with strong 
resistance to family planning, the local people could always find a back door to 
getting such a hospital proof letter. Sometimes, the sterilization operation would just 
be a superficial scar on the tummy, but none done underneath. Therefore, it is often 
impossible for the officials to know the truth unless the couple then has an excess-
birth. But even in this case the couple can always claim that their operation must 
have failed. 
Regarding these fake sterilizations, there is not much the town officials can do. 
However, in order to meet their quota targets and avoid penalties, the town officials 
would usually conceal these sorts of facts by choosing not to report the extra births 
above their targets. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the provincial regulations on contraception suggested a more 
compulsory approach: one of the couple should take long-term contraception if they 
have one child, while one of the couple should undergo sterilization if they have two 
children. But this compulsory approach was amended to that of an ‘informed choice’ 
(zhiqing xuanze  知情选择) in the 2002 revised provincial legislation.51 However, in 
practice, compulsory contraception is still widely applied in most areas in order to 
meet the quota targets. 
8.4 Conclusion 
As a result of being overloaded with tasks, the town family planning officials had 
used their autonomy to prioritise these tasks. The highest priority tasks are those with 
hard quota targets as listed by the Population and Family Planning Responsibility 
                                                
51 S Province People's Congress, "S Province Family Planning Regulation." 2nd revised in 2008. 
Article 37. 
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Commission (renkou he jihuashengyu mubiao zeren shu 人口和计划生育目标责任
书), i.e. the ratio of births, permitted second births, the third and above births; the 
long term contraception rate; the amount and percentage of the social compensation 
fees collected. Successful implementation of these tasks would not only guarantee 
their job security but also would closely relate to with their direct income. 
However, during the actual implementation, the town family planning officials have 
faced various forms of resistance from the villagers and other difficulties. Hence, 
rather than enforcing the uniform regulations set by the upper level governments, 
they usually set up more practical rules, which are more suited to the local economic 
conditions and culture. Undoubtedly, their discretion is also influenced by other 
factors, such as the local government and village support. The town officials’ use of 
discretion could be viewed as a desirable adjustment of the upper level government 
population policy to bring it in line with reality. 
In the 2010s, following the relaxing of China’s one-child policy, the family planning 
assessments have also been relaxed. The hard quota of the long-term contraception 
rate has been removed from the Population and Family Planning Responsibility 
Commission, although the actual enforcement of contraception has not stopped in all 
regions. With the promise of change from rule by law to rule of law in the Xi era,52 it 
is expected that the family planning regulations will soon be executed in a legal 
framework. 
                                                
52  Laifang Li, "China Voice: CPC "Rule of Law" Meeting Key to Reform, Fairness," 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-10/19/c_133727639.htm (20th December 2014). 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
9.1 Research Findings 
Through a micro level case study, this thesis investigated the factors that have 
influenced the grassroots level officials’ discretion in the implementation of the 
family planning regulations in a socio-legal environment. Combining empirical and 
theoretical viewpoints, this research contributed to the understanding of not only the 
family planning regulations’ implementation in rural China but also general factors 
which have influenced the local officials’ autonomy on decision-making. 
9.1.1 China’s Family Planning Organizational Structure 
Using documentation, archival records (secondary and official data), questionnaires, 
in-depth interviews and direct observations, this research provided a detailed analysis 
of China’s family planning organizational structure, and pointed out that it is the 
town level family planning office that is the grassroots level family planning agency 
(chapter 4). On the one hand, they are required to fulfil birth control targets loaded 
onto them even though these tasks conflict with the local villagers’ reproductive 
culture. On the other hand, as the agency has to face the local resistance directly, the 
local officials often felt the need to apply their own discretion in the 
implementation.1  
                                                
1 On May 2007, riots happened in a rural area of Guangxi. It was caused by the town family planning 
officials enforcing the strict official standards of the social maintenance fines and executing the fine-
collecting by inhumane methods such as removing household items, etc. "Guangxi Villagers Clash 
with Authorities over Family Planning Measures," http://www.rfa.org/english/china/china_guangxi-
20070526.html?searchterm:utf8:ustring=bobai (28th June 2008). 
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9.1.2 The Institutional Environment Factors Influenced the Family 
Planning Implementation 
After identifying what is the grassroots level agency in the family planning 
implementation, this thesis further discussed the factors that have influenced the 
family planning implementation and how these factors interact and interplay with 
each other. Using the political science institutionalism approach, this thesis examined 
these factors in a broad socio-legal environment. It argues that the family planning 
implementation at the grassroots rural China has been influenced by the following 
factors: the formal and informal organisational structures (chapter 4 & 5), political 
influences (chapter 6), the economic development level (chapter 7), employment 
conditions (chapters 4 and 7), culture (chapter 8), and the relationships among 
various interest groups, i.e. local villagers, village leaders, hospitals, police stations, 
work units, and family planning officials’ understand of their work, as well as the 
imperfect  legal environment (chapter 8). 
9.1.2.1 Organizational Settings 
Chapters 4 & 5 explained that the family planning agency, particularly at the town 
level, is under a dual system of control from both the upper level family planning 
agency and the local town government. In this system, the town government plays its 
role as a vital actor in the implementation of the family planning regulations by 
controlling personnel and funding of the town family planning agency (chapter 
5.2.2). Although the upper level family planning agencies have less influence on the 
direct enforcement (chapter 5.2.2), they set up the targets for sublevel agencies and 
also supervise the sublevel’s work by routine or non-routine inspection and formal 
evaluation at the end of the year (chapter 5.4.1). This evaluation system is called the 
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Population and Family Planning Responsibility System (renkou he jihuashengyu 
mubiao zeren shu 人口和计划生育目标责任管理制).  
At the town level, it is normally the town party secretary who is the actual top leader 
of both the party and the government. He has decisive influence on the local issues, 
including the family planning implementation. Therefore, in order to strengthen the 
local government support for family planning implementation, other supervision 
systems were also set up: the Leadership Responsibility System (yibashou fuze zhi 一
把手负责制) (chapter 5.4.2.1) and the Single Veto System (yipiao foujue zhi一票否
决制) (chapter 5.4.2.2). These two systems have increased the town government’s 
and Party head’s liability for the fulfilment of the family planning tasks. The town 
leaders not only need to supervise their sublevel departments’ ‘single veto’ on any 
individual violating the family planning regulations (chapter 5.2.2), but they are also 
responsible for the whole town’s family planning work (5.4.2.2). Regarding the 
individuals on the state pay roll, they would be denied promotion or even fired if 
they broke the family planning regulations, and their work units or department 
leaders would be disqualified from awards and commendations. As for the town 
leaders, they would be disqualified from promotion if they had performed poorly in 
family planning or the town did not pass the assessment set by the population and 
family planning responsibility commission (renkou he jihua shengyu mubiao zeren 
shu 人口和计划生育目标责任书). 
China’s town government officials, unlike the grassroots level bureaucrats in many 
other countries who are often assigned a limited number of specific tasks, are 
responsible for the majority of governance issues related to almost all aspects of local 
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people’s lives.2 In facing these various tasks, the town government often uses their 
autonomy to decide the priority of the tasks (chapter 5.3.2). The criteria for priority is 
not whether these polices are ‘popular’ or ‘unpopular’ policies for the local villagers, 
but whether the policies’ targets are ‘hard’ targets that matter most to the town 
government. Therefore, compared to the many other ‘popular’ policies with ‘soft’ 
targets, the family planning policies were paid the most attention in most areas 
because of their tough targets.  
Similarly, regarding the family planning tasks, the town government and town family 
planning officials again use their discretion to decide the priority of the tasks. The 
criteria for deciding the priority is mainly made based on the quota and evaluation 
standards of the Population and Family Planning Responsibility System (chapter 
5.4.1). Depending on the Population and Family Planning Responsibility 
Commission (renkou he jihua shengyu mubiao zeren shu 人口和计划生育目标责任
书), the tasks with the hard targets and quantitative quotas became their top task: rate 
of planned births, non-permitted third and above births, long term contraceptive rate, 
social compensation fees collection rate (chapter 5.4.1.2). 
Regarding the town government’s autonomy, some supervision systems were set up: 
democratic evaluation (minzhu pingyi 民主 评议) and the town people’s congress. 
However, because of political traditions and the practical settings, these two systems 
had a limited function to constrain the town government discretion (chapter 5.5).  
This limited constraint on the town government also applies to the town family 
planning officials. When facing intense pressures and impractical deadlines and 
targets from the upper level government that they could not realistically fulfil, they 
                                                
2 O'Brien and Li, "Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China." 168. 
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would sometimes produce fake figures to satisfy the upper level’s inspections 
(Chapter 5.6).3 Unreliable Chinese statistical data, particularly the birth-planning 
figures, have become a new problem facing by the Chinese government. 
9.1.2.2 Political Influences 
From the end of the 1990s, a new democratic system started in China’s villages: the 
village committee election (chapter 6.3.3). However, this new political system 
caused new obstacles for the family planning implementation. Before the village 
committee election, it was mainly the town government who nominated the villager 
leaders. In the new system, the town government has less influence on the village 
leaders’ candidates. Meanwhile, the new elected village leaders often provided less 
cooperation on the ‘unpopular’ policies implementation, since they worried about 
losing the villagers’ support. In addition, the village family planning officials 
positions are often occupied by the women’s leader (funv zhuren 妇女主任). As a 
female member in the village committee, the women’s leader faces the risk of regular 
replacement every three years. This frequent changing of women’s leader, who is 
also the family planning official, resulted in extra training work for the town officials 
and inconsistent work at the village level. Overall, the new democratic system in the 
villages has resulted in less support from the village leaders for the family planning 
work. Furthermore, the low pay for the village family planning officials caused less 
competition for this job - the general low education level has been another obstacle 
for the implementation. Overall, all these factors have caused more difficulty for 
implementation and extra tasks for the town officials. 
                                                
3 Scharping, Birth Control in China, 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development. 
p.331. 
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9.1.2.3 Employment Conditions 
Most town family planning officials work in poor conditions: insufficient equipment, 
job insecurity, and low pay. These issues are caused by both the family planning 
organizational settings (chapter 4.3.2.2) and insufficient family planning funding 
(chapter 7).  
At the town level, in response to being over-loaded with family planning tasks that 
have demanding targets, the town government would often recruit more temporary 
staff to strengthen the labour force and in turn strive for a better outcome. These 
extra recruited staff make up more than 60% of total family planning officials 
numbers at EY town. But with limited positions in the formal establishment (bianzhi 
编制), these temporary staff have neither guaranteed jobs nor wages, or any other 
kind of welfare received by state paid officials (7.3.4). The problem of the temporary 
staff’s wages is normally resolved by using social maintenance fees. 
9.1.2.4 Economic Development Level and Reproductive Culture/Religious 
Culture 
The social maintenance fees, in addition to being used to pay the temporary town 
family planning officials’ wages, also cover the running costs caused by the over-
loaded family planning tasks. Sometimes, they are even shared by other departments 
of the town government. Therefore, the collection of the excess-birth fines became 
not only important for fulfilling the family planning tasks, but also became closely 
related to the town family planning office’s running costs and staff wages. The 
standard set for the excess-birth fines is mainly decided according to the local 
economic levels (chapter 8.2.3) and the resistance from the local villagers. This 
resistance is still mainly caused by the local reproductive culture and religious 
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culture. The local culture usually refers to the reproductive culture of pronatalism 
and son-preference. This culture influences not only the policy formulation at the 
macro level4 but also the practical implementation. LH village, a village in the 
neighbourhood town, is a good example of the religious culture. At LH village, a 
Christian village in the neighbourhood of EY town, the enforced family planning had 
almost caused a riot because of the villagers’ religious beliefs. 5 Since then, the 
family planning regulations have never been actually implemented there. 
9.1.2.5 Interest Groups  
From the above analysis, another factor, which also contributed to the local officials’ 
discretion in implementation, was found to be the relationships between various 
interest groups. In the implementation of the family planning regulations, in addition 
to the main executive’s authority over the town family planning officials and the 
town government, and the objectives of the villagers, there are some other important 
interest group that play a role, such as the local work units6 (they supervise their 
employees’ reproductive behaviour), the local hospital and police station, and the 
village leaders. These actors used to provide important cooperation with the family 
planning agencies, but now they offer much less support as a result of the market 
economy and the new democratic system. This less cooperative relationship has 
caused the town family planning office to become more isolated when carrying out 
the implementation. 
                                                
4 In order to soften the conflict with the Chinese reproductive culture, especially in rural China, the 
PRC’s family planning regulations have a relatively relaxed policy for rural residents: if the first born 
child is a girl, the couples can be allowed to have a second child. 
5 See interview GuEY12102009. 
6 Most of these local work units where the villagers were hired are private enterprises.  
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9.1.2.6 Family Planning Officials’ Understanding of Their Own Work 
Furthermore, the family planning officials’ understanding of their own work has also 
influenced their work performance. In the 1980s, even with the great resistance from 
the local villagers due to the conflict with China’s traditional son-preference and 
pronatalist culture, most of the town family planning officials were proud of their 
work: not only because they got the chance to join the cadre team who had superior 
lives in many ways, but also because they were fully supported by the village, town, 
and upper level governments, which made them see this job as a revolutionary task 
against the ‘old traditional culture’. However, since the end of the 1990s, with the 
economic development in China, and more and more democracy ideas from the 
Western taking root, the family planning officials have gradually changed their views 
on the family planning tasks. With the comparatively low pay, and the position of 
family planning cadre being considered a dead-end department, these officials have 
lost their perceived superiority over the locals. Meanwhile, they have started to be 
more sympathetic to the villagers’ situations: who might need a son to either 
continue the family line or supply labour, and consider the enforced birth control 
methods to not be a humane method (although they wouldn’t know much about 
human rights). This new self-understanding has influenced their performance: they 
have become less willing to enforce birth control unless it is for the purpose of 
fulfilling the tasks.  
9.1.2.7 A Society With Imperfect Rule of Law 
Although China’s family planning policy has been regulated in a legal regime 
following the launch of the State’s Population and Family Planning Law in 2002, and 
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implementing the family planning regulations, i.e. when collecting overdue social 
maintenance fees, the family planning regulations have still been treated mainly as 
administrative issues in practice. This is rooted in the culture in which administrative 
regulations often take priority over the law,7 and of using informal dispute resolution 
methods. Even modern China is a relationship-based society, which always prevails 
over a rule-based or market-based society. These relationships exist everywhere in 
Chinese life, in getting employment, work promotions, housing, information, 
education, and can almost used to solve all the formal and informal, legal or non-
legal affairs in China. Therefore, the law, as a formal resolution method, is only used 
as a last resort. 
9.1.3 The Grassroots Officials’ Discretion over the Family Planning 
Implementation 
Based on the analyses of chapters 4-7, Chapter 8 explored the town family planning 
officials’ discretion level in the implementation. As decided by the family planning 
assessment system – Family Planning Responsibility System (chapter 5) – and actual 
financial need, the town family planning officials’ work is mainly focused on birth-
control operations and fee-collections. In the actual implementation, as a result of 
considering the local economic levels, resistance from the local villagers, and local 
government support, the town officials often set up their own standards for the fines 
and birth-control operations rather than adhering to the formal standards set by the 
upper level governments. 
                                                
7  Similar as Russian, China’s legal system is composed not only by the laws but also the 
administrative regulations, and the latter are often have priority over the law. See Jane Henderson, 
"Law as Regulation," in The Russian Socio-Legal Tradition: Report and Analysis of a Workshop Held 
at Wolfson College, Oxofrd 19th Arpil 2012, ed. Marina Kurkchiyan (2012). 
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In conclusion, the factors influenced the family planning regulations’ implementation 
in rural China can be concluded as: formal and informal organizations, sets of norms 
(culture, convention), cognitive (understanding of the world), relationships, and 
resources (funding, employment conditions, resources).8  
9.2 Consequences of the One-Child Policy 
The social consequences of the one-child policy have been studied since the middle 
1980s. These consequences include: gender inequality and disparity, an unbalanced 
sex ratio and female discrimination, labour shortages, a change in the population’s 
age distribution, a widening of the rural-urban divide, unplanned births, and changes 
to the personality of the single-child, the family structure and traditional Chinese 
culture.9 Most of these were predictions that have been confirmed by now. Amongst 
these consequences, the most serious ones are China’s ageing population and 
unbalanced sex ratio, as well as the labour shortage. Based on the 2010 national 
census, the gender ratio of newborn babies born between 2000 and 2010 was 118 
males to 110 females. It is estimated that there will be 15 percent more young 
Chinese men than women in 20 years. 10 In addition, labour shortages have also been 
reported since the beginning of the 2010: ‘Climbing wages and a diminished 
demographic dividend point to big changes for the manufacturing sector in China’.11 
The most serious consequence is the aged population. With 13.26% of the population 
                                                
8  See Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Analysis. Powell and Dimaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis; 
Dimaggio and Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality 
in Organizational Fields."; Meyer and Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as 
Myth and Ceremony." Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests. 
9 Supra note 12-19, chapter1. 
10 Wang Feng, "You've Come a Long Way, One-Child Policy," http://english.caixin.com/2011-04-
29/100254386.html (20/12/2014). 
11 Huo Kan, "Labour Dents Appear in China's Factory Armor," http://english.caixin.com/2011-06-
02/100265552.html (10 March 2011). 
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now above the age of 60, which is 2.93% higher than 10 years ago,12 China is 
starting to face the ‘timebomb’ of ageing population. This ageing population is 
causing many other social problems, such as the increasing expenditure on pensions, 
greater pressure on social security and public services, the relationship between 
generations, and on the elder people left in the rural areas when the younger 
generations have migrated to the urban areas.13 In contrast to the aging population of 
other countries, the problem is more serious in China: ‘She is getting older before she 
has got rich.’14 Therefore, much research has called for the Chinese government to 
change its population policy to meet these demographic changes. 
9.3 Recent Changes and Prospective Development of China’s 
Population Policy 
In 2013, the Chinese government finally started to relax its population policy after 30 
years of implementing the strict one-child policy. A selective two-child policy was 
confirmed by the central government, and the family planning organizations were 
reorganized. 
In 2013, the National Population and Family Planning Commission was integrated 
with the National Health Ministry to form a new National Health and Family 
Planning Commission (guojia weisheng he jihua shengyu weiyuanhui国家卫生和计
划生育委员会 ). 15   The functions of studying and drawing up population 
                                                
12 Feng, "You've Come a Long Way, One-Child Policy"  (20/12/2014). 
13  "Challenges to China's Population: The Tendency of Few Children and Aging," 
http://en.people.cn/100668/102793/102811/7560854.html (21st December 2013). 
14  "China Faces 'Timebomb' of Aging Population," 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/20/china-next-generation-ageing-population (2nd June 
2012). 
15 On March 2013, the 1st Conference of the 12th National People’s Congress approved the State 
Council’s Organizational Reform and the Functional Transfer Proposal (guowuyuan jigou gaige he 
zhineng zhuanbian fangan 国务院机构改革和职能转变方案). 
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development strategies and population regulations of the former Family Planning 
Commission were transferred to the National Development and Reform Commission 
(guojia fazhan he gaige weiyuanhui 国家发展和改革委员会). The integration of 
these two ministerial-level departments is aimed at better upholding the basic 
national family planning policy, improving medical and health care services and 
deepening institutional reform in the medical care and public health sectors.  
The new National Health and Family Planning Commission is responsible for 
planning the resource allocations of medical care, public health and family planning 
services, establishing a basic medicine system to standardize drug prices, formulating 
China's family planning regulations, and supervising and administering public health, 
medical care and family planning services.16 This national level reorganization was 
completed in June 2013. 17  In the new Commission, three family planning 
departments were set up: the grassroots level family planning advice department 
(jihua shengyu jiceng zhidao si 计划生育基层指导司), the family planning families’ 
development department (jihua shengyu jiating fazhan si 计划生育家庭发展司), 
and the migrant population family planning service department (liudong renkou jihua 
shengyu fuwu guanli si 流动人口计划生育服务管理司). The sub-national level 
reform was started soon after the national level reform. At the time of writing, the 
end of 2014, most province level agencies are in the process of reformation and 
                                                
16 Xinhua Net, "The State Council Will Set up National Health and Family Planning Commission 
(Guowuyuan Jiang Zujian Guojia Weisheng He Jihuashengyu Weiyuanhui 国务院将组建国家卫生
和计划生育委员会)," http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013lh/2013-03/10/c_114965277.htm (10th March 
2013). 
17 See "Regarding the Notification Published by the State Council Office About the National Health 
and Family Planning Commission’s Main Tasks, Initial Organization Setting and Staff Arrangement 
(Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Yinfa Guojia Weisheng He Jihuashengyu Weiyuanhui Zhuyao 
Zhize Neishe Jigou He Renyuan Bianzhi Guiding De Tongzhi 国务院办公厅关于印发卫生和计划生
育委员会主要职责内设机构和人员编制规定的通知),"  (GuobanFa (No. 50), 2013). 
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transformation while the sublevel agencies in most regions have not started the 
process yet. 
On 12th November 2013, the relaxation of the one-child policy to a selective two-
child policy was confirmed by the central government: the Third Plenary Session of 
the 18th Central Committee approved the Decision on Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (zhonggongzhongyang guanyu quanmian 
shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding 中共中央关于全面深化改革若干
重大问题的决定). This decision allowed couples to have a second child if one 
parent was an only child. By the end of 2014, except Hongkong, Macao, Xinjiang, 
Tibet, (Taiwan), all other 29 provincial regions had approved the second-child 
policy. 
Despite the relaxation of the birth planning policies, a comprehensive two-child 
policy has not been scheduled. On 6th March 2014, Li Bin, the head of the National 
Health and Family Planning Commission, reported that China would stick with the 
current policy for the foreseeable future at the annual session of the National People's 
Congress.18 In practice, the new two-child policy mainly focuses on urban residents 
of the 1980s and 1990s single-child generation. There is less impact on rural families 
as second children were permitted for rural families in the original policy if their first 
child was a girl.  
However, some recent research on the new population trends based on China’s new 
population policy have indicated that the population growth is slower than expected. 
During the last couple of months, there have been fewer couples applying for the 
                                                
18  Juan Shan and Huanxin Zhao, "No Timetable for Family Planning Policy Changes," 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014npcandcppcc/2014-03/07/content_17329060.htm (7th 
March 2014). 
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second child quota than expected. Based on this trend, some scholars estimate that 
the population growth rate would not make up for the labour shortage and ageing 
society problems even if a comprehensive two-child policy is fully implemented.19 
Based on these findings, the author predicts that the Chinese government will soon 
further relax its population policy to a comprehensive two-child policy. 
 
                                                
19 Xiaohong Ma, "Why the Application of the Selective Second Child Permission Meet Cold -- a 
Research Based on Beijing (Dandu Erhai Shenqing Weishenme Yuleng?--Jiyu Beijing De Yanjiu 单独
二孩申请为什么遇冷？－基于北京的研究)," in Face to the Future's China's Population Study and 
Third Population Policy Conference (mianxiang weilai de zhongguo renkou yanjiu yu disanci shengyu 
zhengce yantaohui 面向未来的中国人口研究与第三次生育政策研讨会 ) (Shanghai2014); 
Wenzheng Huang, "China's Population Trend and Its Influence to the Future (Zhongguo De Renkou 
Qushi He Dui Weilai De Yingxiang 中国的人口趋势和对未来的影响)," (2014). 
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